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The public-private partnership between DeepMind Health and the NHS 
sparked public outcry for violating patient privacy, capturing the attention of right to 
privacy scholars and practitioners. By contrast, critiques pertaining to the broader 
political economy of the collaboration- which invoke debate around public-private 
partnership models and Big Tech’s expansion into healthcare markets- have not 
been sufficiently investigated by human rights scholars, despite implicating socio-
economic rights. 
 
This thesis explores the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS partnership 
and its implications for the right to health, applying an interdisciplinary lens that 
synthesises insights from political economy, critical data studies, and international 
human rights law. Drawing on findings from documentary analysis of grey literature 
and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and opinion-leaders, it argues 
that data-driven health research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS generate resource 
asymmetries by enabling technology companies to extract wealth from publicly-
funded data in exchange for inequitable and uncertain public benefits. These 
partnerships thus fail to leverage public sector data resources to realise the right to 
health, highlighting the need for alternative models. The thesis further reveals 
knowledge asymmetries that prevent effective state and corporate accountability for 
the right to health, exposing the limitations of existing instruments for corporate 
human rights responsibilities and exploring the rationale for additional human rights 





Together, these findings reveal that data-driven health research partnerships 
risk infringing upon the right to health, thus challenging the underlying political 
rationale for public-private partnership and revealing the problematic ethico-legal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The case study: the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership 
 
1.1.1. The DeepMind-Royal Free data transfer 
 
DeepMind is a UK-based artificial intelligence (AI) company that was acquired 
by the Google conglomerate in 2014.1 In July 2015, physicians in the Royal Free 
London NHS Foundation Trust- one of the largest healthcare providers in the United 
Kingdom’s national health service (NHS)- approached DeepMind about the 
possibility of developing new clinical software.2 
In September 2015, the Royal Free signed an Information Sharing Agreement 
(ISA) with the company to transfer approximately 1.6 million identifiable patient 
records into third-party servers to be processed by Google;3 these records included 
                                               
1 The relationship between Alphabet Inc, Google and DeepMind is complex and has evolved over 
time. In 2015- after DeepMind’s acquisition by Google- Google was restructured and all companies 
within the Google conglomerate- including DeepMind- were subsumed under holding company 
Alphabet Inc. In 2018, DeepMind Health- the unit of DeepMind focused specifically on health and 
involved in the company’s collaboration with the NHS- merged with Google Health, one of the 
subsidiary companies of Alphabet Inc. For this reason, I refer to DeepMind Health, DeepMind, Google 
Health, Google and Alphabet Inc at different times throughout this thesis depending on the context of 
the discussion and the company’s organisational structure at the time. However, for clarity and 
consistency, I refer to the collaboration between the company and the NHS as DeepMind-NHS 
throughout the entirety of the thesis; Samuel Gibbs ‘Google buys UK artificial intelligence startup 
Deepmind for £400m’ (The Guardian, 27th January 2014) 
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/27/google-acquires-uk-artificial-intelligence-startup-
deepmind> accessed 4 August 202 
2 Julia Powles & Hal Hodson 'Google Deepmind And Healthcare In An Age Of Algorithms' (2017) 7 
Health Technol <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12553-017-0179-1.pdf> accessed 4 
August 2020. 
3 Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust ‘Information Sharing Agreement’ (29 September 2015) 




information on patients who had undergone pathology tests at the Trust within the 
past five years as well as data from the Trust’s radiology and electronic patient 
record (EPR) systems.4 The data included highly personal information about patients 
including HIV status, details of drug overdoses and abortions, as well as routine 
hospital administration such as the location and status of patients.5 
DeepMind claimed it intended to use the data to develop a new mobile 
application called Streams, which provides patient safety alerts for Acute Kidney 
Injury (AKI); a relatively common condition in UK affecting kidney function.6 The 
project was approved by the NHS Research Ethics Committee in October 2015 and 
the data transfer commenced the following month.7 These developments occurred 
behind closed doors, with no immediate announcement from either party.  
 In January 2016, the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU),8 which indicated their intentions to establish “a broad ranging, mutually 
beneficial partnership, engaging in high levels of collaborative activity and 
maximising the potential to work on genuinely innovative and transformative 
projects”.9 Soon thereafter, the company officially launched DeepMind Health, a new 
unit with a remit “to support clinicians by providing the technical expertise needed to 
build and scale technologies that help them provide the best possible care to their 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 Subhajit Basu 'Should The NHS Share Patient Data With Google's Deepmind?' (Wired, 11 May 
2016) <www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-deepmind-google-data-sharing> accessed 4 August 2020. 
6 ‘DeepMind Health Independent Review Panel Annual Report’ (5 July 2017) 
<https://kstatic.googleusercontent.com/files/7e0b35e4cb6ccb750cba03fb160a69cc4f24456358042b8
313b88943c49dfbce46037e9c89fad32fae986bd08a84e90c792656e0208d1276f1db895dcb42386b> 
accessed 17 August 2020. 
7 For details of the research approval, see NHS Health Research Authority, ‘Freedom of Information 
(FOI) Act request’ (4 July 2017)  
<www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/410881/response/1001252/attach/2/1718%20FOI%20011%20H
RA%20response%20and%20documentation.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1> accessed 7 September 
2020. See also Powles & Hodson (n2). 
8 Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (28 January 2016) 
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwQ4esYYFC04anR4VHM3aXZpMTQ/view> accessed 10 August 
2020. 




patients”.10 Though this announcement publicised the company’s work with the NHS 
for the first time, it made no mention of the preceding data transfer. 
 
1.1.2. The Privacy Controversy 
 
The partnership first drew attention in April 2016, after New Scientist journalist 
Hal Hodson published an article revealing the true extent of the data transfer 
between the two parties.11 The article raised concerns about the privacy implications 
of the data transfer and the lack of transparency surrounding the deal, arguing that 
the ISA “goes far beyond what is publicly announced”.12 Hodson’s findings catalysed 
action from the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)- the UK’s data watchdog- 
who subsequently launched a year-long investigation into the deal in July 2016.13  
Public controversy was further fuelled in March 2017, when Hodson co-
authored with Cambridge academic Julia Powles a widely circulated article criticising 
the partnership.14 Privacy and data protection issues were a primary concern for the 
authors, who highlighted how patients were not notified of the data transfer nor 
asked to give consent for their records to be used in this way; this lack of consent, 
they suggested, violated patient privacy and agency.15 At the heart of the consent 
debate was DeepMind’s justification that it was providing ‘direct care’- “a clinical, 
                                               
10 ‘We are very excited to announce the launch of DeepMind Health’ (DeepMind blog, 24 Feb 2014) 
<https://deepmind.com/blog/announcements/we-are-very-excited-announce-launch-deepmind-
health> accessed 4 August 2020, para 3. 
11 Hal Hodson 'Revealed: Google AI Has Access To Huge Haul Of NHS Patient Data' (New Scientist, 
29 April 2016) <www.newscientist.com/article/2086454-revealed-google-ai-has-access-to-huge-haul-
of-nhs-patient-data/> accessed 4 August 2020. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Caroline Donnelly ‘ICO probes Google DeepMind patient data-sharing deal with NHS Hospital 
Trust’ (Computer Weekly, 12 May 2016) <www.computerweekly.com/news/450296175/ICO-probes-
Google-DeepMind-patient-data-sharing-deal-with-NHS-Hospital-Trust> accessed 4 August 2020. 
14 Powles & Hodson (n2). 




social or public health activity concerned with the prevention, investigation and 
treatment of illness and the alleviation of suffering of individuals”-16 to NHS patients, 
which would absolve the company from the obligation to obtain patient consent.17 
Powles and Hodson refuted DeepMind’s position, arguing that the lack of approval 
from appropriate regulatory authorities or explicit patient consent amounted to a 
violation of the Data Protection Act 1998.18 The authors further suggested that the 
ISA gave too much discretion to DeepMind in determining how the dataset was 
processed, blurring the clear distinction between data processor and data controller 
under data protection law.19  
 In July 2017, the ICO concluded its investigation into the partnership. The 
Commissioner determined that, although the Royal Free had remained data 
controller throughout the trial period, the trust had failed to comply with the First, 
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Data Protection Principles, and had thus violated the Data 
Protection Act 1998.20 In particular, she criticised the lack of informed consent and 
proof of the necessity and proportionality of processing 1.6 million patient records, 
patients’ inability to opt out, and inadequacies in the ISA.21 The Commissioner 
requested that the Royal Free establish a ‘proper legal basis’ for the DeepMind 
collaboration and future trials, set out how it will comply with the duty of confidence 
to patients in future deals, complete a privacy impact assessment, and commission 
                                               
16 National Data Guardian ‘Information: To Share Or Not To Share? The Information Governance 
Review’ (26 April 2013) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1
92572/2900774_InfoGovernance_accv2.pdf> accessed 11 August 2020, 128. 
17 Powles & Hodson (n2) 
18 Basu (n5); Powles & Hodson (n2) 
19 Powles & Hodson (n2) 
20 Elizabeth Denham ‘Letter to Sir David Sloman (RFA0627721 – provision of patient data to 
DeepMind)’ (3 July 2017) <https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-
taken/undertakings/2014353/undertaking-cover-letter-revised-04072017-to-first-person.pdf> accessed 





an independent audit of the trial of the Streams app;22 notably, no cautionary fine 
was issued. In an accompanying blog post, the Commissioner summarised key 
lessons for other NHS trusts to take from the debacle, concluding that “the price of 
innovation didn’t need to be the erosion of legally ensured fundamental privacy 
rights”.23 
 Soon thereafter, the Royal Free signed up to deliver the Commissioner’s 
recommendations. In an effort to boost transparency around data sharing, the trust 
created a new section of their website detailing what happens to patient data and 
providing information about opting out, as well as patient information leaflets and 
posters addressing commonly asked questions around data sharing.24 The trust also 
signed a new and improved contract with DeepMind, which came into effect in 
November 2016.25 Finally, they took up the Commissioner’s suggestion to 
commission an independent, third-party audit into the Streams app, which concluded 
that its use is now lawful and complies with data protection regulation.26 
DeepMind also responded to the ICO’s findings in a blog post, which 
professed that the company had “underestimated the complexity of the NHS and of 
the rules around patient data, as well as the potential fears about a well-known tech 
company working in health”.27 The post outlined the company’s efforts to improve 
                                               
22 Information Commissioner’s Office ‘Royal Free- Google DeepMind trial failed to comply with data 
protection law’ (ICO blog, 3 July 2017) <https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2017/07/royal-free-google-deepmind-trial-failed-to-comply-with-data-protection-law/#> accessed 
17 August 2020. 
23 Elizabeth Denham 'Four Lessons NHS Trusts Can Learn From The Royal Free Case' (Information 
Commissioner’s Office Blog, 3 July 2017) <https://iconewsblog.org.uk/2017/07/03/four-lessons-nhs-
trusts-can-learn-from-the-royal-free-case/> accessed 17 August 2020. 
24 ‘Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) investigation’ <www.royalfree.nhs.uk/patients-
visitors/how-we-use-patient-information/information-commissioners-office-ico-investigation-into-our-
work-with-deepmind/> accessed 17 August 2020. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Linklaters LLP ‘Audit of the acute kidney injury detection system known as Streams’ (17 May 2018) 
<http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/files.royalfree.nhs.uk/Reporting/Streams_Report.pdf> accessed 
17 August 2020. 
27 ‘The Information Commissioner, the Royal Free, and what we’ve learned’ (DeepMind Blog, 3 July 




transparency, oversight and engagement through the replacement of the original 
ISA, public announcement of subsequent NHS partnerships and publications of 
contracts online, the development of a patient and public engagement strategy, and 
the establishment of the Independent Review Panel.28  
Since the DeepMind-Royal Free collaboration, Streams has been rolled out to 
other NHS trusts, including Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust, Taunton and 
Somerset NHS Foundation Trust, and Yeovil District Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust.29 Furthermore, the company has established a number of additional research 
partnerships within the NHS that, unlike the development of the Streams app, seek 
to develop AI technologies. The first of these- established in 2016- brings together 
DeepMind and clinicians at Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust to identify 
early signs of degenerate eye conditions by applying machine learning to 
anonymous eye scans.30 University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
and the company have also partnered in a bid to improve the efficiency and accuracy 
of segmentation processes by developing AI to identify cancerous tissues on 
computerised tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance image (MRI) scans of head 
and neck cancers.31 Finally, DeepMind established a collaboration with Imperial 
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 Laura Stevens, ‘Google Deepmind and Imperial in streams deal’ (Digital Health, 22 December 
2016) <www.digitalhealth.net/2016/12/google-deepmind-and-imperial-in-streams-deal/> accessed 17 
August 2020; ‘Enhancing patient safety at Taunton and Somerset NHS Foundation Trust’ (DeepMind 
Blog, 21 June 2017) <https://deepmind.com/blog/article/taunton-and-somerset-nhs-foundation-trust-
partnership> accessed 17 August 2020; ‘Bringing Streams to Yeovil District Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust’ (DeepMind Blog, 5 November 2017) <https://deepmind.com/blog/announcements/bringing-
streams-yeovil-district-hospital-nhs-foundation-trust> accessed 17 August 2020. 
30 ‘Excited to announce a new medical partnership with DeepMind Health’ (18 September 2019) 
<www.moorfields.nhs.uk/content/excited-announce-new-medical-research-partnership-deepmind-
health> accessed 10  August 2020. 
31 University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust ‘Research begins to develop 
pioneering technology to plan radiotherapy treatment’ (30 August 2016) 
<www.uclh.nhs.uk/News/Pages/Researchbeginstodeveloppioneeringtechnologytoplanradiotherapytre




College London NHS Foundation Trust to explore how AI could improve breast 
cancer screening.32 
Privacy controversies were largely circumvented in these subsequent deals 
through the anonymisation of patient data, the publication of contracts online, and 
the provision of opt-out procedures for patients.33 Despite this, DeepMind’s work with 
the Royal Free had drawn the attention of many to the limitations of and loopholes in 
data protection law as it applies to new forms of research partnerships between 
public health providers and technology companies, as well as the tech giants’ 
burgeoning interest in NHS patient data.  
 
1.1.3. Beyond privacy: the economic and political implications 
of DeepMind-NHS 
 
Despite the predominant focus on questions of privacy and data protection in 
responses to the DeepMind-Royal Free collaboration, Powles and Hodson’s’ original 
article drew attention to a multitude of related yet less clearly identifiable concerns 
relating to the distribution of resources and knowledge in the partnership. The 
authors highlighted that DeepMind is set to retain ownership of all algorithms- and 
thus knowledge- developed through the collaboration,34 raising questions around the 
                                               
32 Ryan O’Hare ‘Research collaboration aims to improve breast cancer diagnosis using AI’ (24 
November 2017) <www.imperial.ac.uk/news/183293/research-collaboration-aims-improve-breast-
cancer/> accessed 17 August 2020. 
33 'Deepmind Health Q&A | Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust' 
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future costs of the company’s technologies, the value flowing to UK taxpayers, and 
the seeming prioritization of private over public interests.35  
They further highlighted the secretive nature of the partnership and the so-
called ‘transparency paradox’ or ‘one-way mirror’ surrounding the operations of the 
technology giants like Google, which is facilitated by commercial confidentiality 
protections and insufficient corporate public law obligations.36 The authors also 
argued that the partnership failed both to engage with NHS patients and consult with 
relevant regulatory organisations, with due diligence amounting to “a post-hoc and 
inadequate privacy impact assessment”.37 They also expressed scepticism about the 
effectiveness of DeepMind’s Independent Review Panel (IRP), stating that holding 
technology companies like Google to account is “one of the most pressing political 
challenges we face today”.38  
Their criticisms invoke topical scholarly debates around the benefits and risks 
of public-private partnership,39 the political economy of health data,40 and the 
broader implications of Big Tech’s expansion into the healthcare domain.41 Despite 
this, when I commenced my research on the DeepMind-NHS partnership in June 
2017, such issues were peripheral in public and scholarly discussion surrounding the 
partnership by comparison to privacy concerns. This privacy centrism was reflected 
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41 Tamar Sharon ‘The Googlization of health research: from disruptive innovation to disruptive ethics’ 
(2016) J Pers Med 13(6) 563-574; Tamar Sharon ‘When digital health meets digital capitalism, how 




in analysis of the human rights implications of DeepMind-NHS collaboration, which 
articulated its impacts almost exclusively in terms of privacy risks.42  
This focus on privacy- at the expense of other relevant human rights issues- 
reflects a broader trend both within and beyond human rights scholarship on 
commercial data-driven health research. In part, this may reflect the fact that privacy 
is often framed in terms of individual harm and human rights violations; the impacts 
of data-driven health research on privacy are therefore more easily identifiable and 
immediately intrusive for patients than the kinds of systemic harms and soft impacts 
associated with socioeconomic rights like the right to health.43 This could also reflect 
the highly sensitive nature of health data, which may elicit a particularly strong and 
emotive desire for privacy by comparison other forms of data.  Further to this, 
conversations around the human rights impacts of data practice and new 
technologies frequently take place in silos, with discussions on privacy often 
remaining separate from discussions on other human rights, exacerbating disparities 
between them.44 
 Despite the prevalence of privacy-centrism in discussions around DeepMind-
NHS and commercial data-driven health research more broadly, Powles and 
Hodson’s concerns about the broader economic and political dimensions of the 
partnership indicate it may have significant ramifications for other human rights, 
notably the human right to health. The problematic aspects of intellectual property 
(IP) regimes and their implications for access to technologies in the pharmaceutical 
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sector, for example, have been criticised by right to health scholars and 
practitioners.45 Furthermore, issues relating to the transparency and accountability of 
the DeepMind-NHS collaboration implicate not only the state’s obligations with 
respect to the right to health but also topical debates in the business and human 
rights (BHR) movement around the right to health obligations of commercial actors.46 
This suggests that the DeepMind-NHS partnership may have significant and as-of-
yet unexplored implications for the right to health that warrant further investigation.  
 
1.2. Research aims and questions 
My overarching research question is: 
 
“What are the right to health implications of data-driven research partnerships which 
enable commercial technology companies to access patient data from the NHS in 
the United Kingdom?” 
 
This research question encompasses three primary research aims: 
 
                                               
45 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover’ (31 March 2009) UN Doc 
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access to medicines’ (2012) J Law Med Ethics 40(2) 220-233. 
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rights’ (2012) Bus Ethics Q 22(4) 739-770; Surya Deva ‘Treating human rights lightly: a critique of the 
consensus rhetoric and the language employed by the Guiding Principles’ in Surya Deva & Dan 
Bilchitz (eds) Human Rights Obligations of Business: beyond the Corporate Responsibility to 
Respect? (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 78-104; Jernej Letnar Černič & Tara Van Ho (eds) 





a. To analyse the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS partnership 
b. To explore the implications of the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership for the right to health 
 
c. To consider how future data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS 
can advance the right to health. 
 
1.3. Academic context 
 
1.3.1. Public-private partnerships 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are “cooperative institutional arrangements 
between public and private sector actors”.47 In the health sector, this term 
encompasses a wide array of different models including PPPs for health 
infrastructure and services- such as the Private Finance Initiatives (PFI)- global 
health partnerships (GHPs), and the so-called ‘implicit’ PPP involved in 
pharmaceutical research and development (R&D). PPPs share a common 
philosophy; that they promote shared risk-taking and innovation and are mutually 
beneficial to both public and private sectors.48 The PPP paradigm is thus rooted in 
neoliberal and managerialist theory, which conceptualises privatisation as the 
solution to public sector lethargy and bureaucracy.49   
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However, PPPs across the health sector have been subject to criticisms that 
challenge their underlying economic rationale. Though PPPs promise to deliver 
value for money (VfM), critics highlight how the problematic aspects of PPP 
appraisal,50 the underappreciated role of the state,51 and the prioritisation of financial 
metrics over broader considerations of social value and the public interest cast doubt 
on this assumption.52  Furthermore, though equity is often an explicit objective in 
PPPs,53 there is evidence to suggest that PPPs may prioritise corporate profit-
making over the public health of the vulnerable and risk undermining broader health 
systems strengthening.54 
PPPs in health have also faced criticism for lacking transparency and 
accountability. Complex organisational structures,55 public and private sector 
opacity,56 and the lack of oversight and accountability mechanisms surrounding 
                                               
50 Jean Shaoul ‘The Private Finance Initiative or the public funding of private profit?’ in Graham D. 
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2459. 
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PPPs all pose substantial barriers to democratic accountability.57 Additionally, many 
critics draw attention to the ways in which PPPs facilitate the covert expansion of 
private power through obfuscation of the public-private sector distinction,58 risking 
corporate bias and regulatory capture and enabling commercial actors to exert 
undue influence over research agendas in global health.59 These criticisms imply 
that the PPP model may necessitate trade-offs between its purported benefits and 
good governance principles like transparency and accountability.  
Scholarly critique of PPPs in health thus calls into question the philosophy 
and rationale underlying PPPs, highlighting the need for close scrutiny of PPPs’ 
purported benefits. Furthermore, it suggests that PPPs are simultaneously redefining 
and obscuring the distinction between public and private sectors in health, resulting 
in “a transfer of rights and control away from the public sphere: vesting greater 
authority, decision-making, and power over important social concerns in the hands of 
private, unaccountable market actors”.60 Finally, the diversity of PPP forms and their 
underlying commonalities point to the ‘politicisation’ of the PPP paradigm,61 which 
has evolved and adapted over time and space to serve the political ends of those 
who wish to employ it.  
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This scholarship also reveals gaps in our understanding of the normative 
dimensions of PPP, of specific case studies of PPP, and of new forms of partnership 
emerging in the health sector. The focus of my study- the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership- is one such novel iteration of the PPP model. Much like public-private 
collaboration in the pharmaceutical and global health sectors, data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS are justified on the basis that they promote 
mutually-beneficial health innovation. However, the DeepMind-NHS partnership is 
also distinct from the forms of partnership discussed here in that it necessitates the 
sharing of health data. The emergence of the so-called ‘data economy’ underlying 
the revolution in data-driven and automated technological innovation is a paradigm 
shift with significant implications for the relationship between the public and private 
sectors and the dynamics of innovation. For this reason, I turn to the emerging 
sociological field of critical data studies (CDS) to contextualise the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership in the political economy of health data.  
 
1.3.2. The Political Economy of Health Data 
 
Among CDS scholars, there is growing recognition of the commercial value of 
data as a financial asset in the knowledge economy.62 This paradigm economic shift 
has been accompanied by the increasing transformation of health data from a source 
of personal information into a commercially-valuable asset. This shift is being driven 
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primarily by the business models of Big Tech- that is, Google, Amazon, Facebook 
and Apple- who rely on access to data to derive predictive insights and build new 
algorithmic technologies.63 Big Tech’s platform monopolies are increasingly 
expanding into new fields like healthcare,64 with the promise of applying their 
innovative capabilities to develop data-driven healthcare tools to meet public health 
needs.  
However, CDS scholars have raised serious concerns around the distributive 
implications of data-driven health research. Some argue that the economic 
properties of digital markets,65 the ‘data extractive’ business models of the platform 
monopolies,66 and the growing phenomenon of ‘data rentiership’67 fuel corporate 
wealth extraction on an unprecedented scale. As a result, commercial access to 
health data risks generating inequities on the basis of capability to afford access to 
data-driven health products.68 Fuelling these distributive injustices is an underlying 
tension between the commercial and public value of health data,69 which means that 
data-driven health research inherently necessitates trade-offs.70  
The power and political influence of Big Tech is a further source of concern in 
the CDS literature. The ‘one-way mirror’ that enables these companies to operate in 
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Guardian, 19th August 2018) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/19/there-is-a-leftwing-
way-to-challenge-big-data-here-it-is> accessed 21st September 2020; Shoshana Zuboff The Age of 
Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books, 
2019).  
64 Tamar Sharon ‘The Googlization of health research...’ (n41); Prainsack (n40). 
65 Mariana Mazzucato The value of everything: Making and taking in the global economy (Hachette 
UK, 2018). 
66 Morozov (n63). 
67 Birch et al (n40). 
68 Bronwyn Parry & Beth Greenhough Bioinformation (Polity, 2017). 
69 Ibid; Mhairi Aitken et al ‘Who benefits and how? Public expectations of public benefits from data-
intensive health research’ (2018) Big Data Soc July-December 2018 1-12; Barbara Prainsack ‘Logged 
out: Ownership, exclusion and public value in the digital data and information commons’ (2019) Big 
Data Soc Jan-June 2019 1-15. 
70 Sharon ‘When digital health meets digital capitalism...’ (n41); Alessandro Blasimme et al ‘Big Data, 
precision medicine and private insurance: A delicate balancing act’ (2019) Big Data Soc Jan-June 




secret,71 their political influence,72 growing engagement with ‘ethical’ capitalism,73 
and lack of accountability together place Big Tech in a position of unprecedented 
power and political influence.74 Furthermore, Google has particularly caught the 
attention of critical scholars due to the company’s benevolent image obscuring its 
underlying commercial interests,75 its growing monopoly powers and lack of 
accountability,76 and expansion into healthcare markets.77 
This body of literature reveals the emergence of “new constellations of actors 
and power” in data-driven health research, 78 through which the public and private, 
ethical and unethical, and profit and not-for-profit have become increasingly 
intertwined.79 Furthermore, it highlights the need to move beyond an individualistic, 
privacy-oriented focus in CDS to consider the collective implications of the data 
economy.80 
These issues raise ethical dilemmas and pose novel regulatory challenges 
with significant ramifications for the normative underpinnings and legal framework of 
human rights. The following section reviews the human rights scholarship on 
commercial data-driven health research, situating the DeepMind-NHS partnership in 
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the context of the human rights scholarship on health data misuse, 
commercialization and profiteering. 
 
1.3.3. The human rights implications of commercial data-
driven health research 
 
There is now widespread acknowledgement among human rights practitioners 
and scholars that the development and implementation of new data-driven 
technologies has significant implications for human rights.81 Though much of the 
recent focus has been on AI,82 some human rights scholars- particularly advocates 
of the rights to privacy and science- have turned their attention to the process of 
developing data-driven technologies; that is, to the process of data-driven research 
itself.  
The right to privacy has received particular attention in the context of health 
data; this is exemplified by the establishment of a new United Nations (UN) special 
procedure- the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age- and his 
work to define the scope of the right to privacy in relation to health data.83 
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Furthermore, civil and political rights scholars have highlighted the close relationship 
between health data misuse and the right to privacy,84 the importance of 
transparency and accountability in facilitating public trust in this context,85 and the 
close links between the right to privacy and other civil and political and economic, 
social and cultural rights with regards to health data misuse.86 
By contrast, scholarship on health data commercialization and profiteering 
has tended to focus on the implications of data-driven health research for the right to 
science. The right to science is a useful framework to conceptualise these issues as 
there is a wealth of UN-level guidance and academic scholarship surrounding issues 
like IP, equity and access to technologies in the context of scientific research.87 The 
relationship between commercial data-driven health research and the right to 
science has primarily been theorized by scholars like Knoppers and Harris and 
Wyndham,88 who emphasise the state’s positive obligations.89 Right to science 
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scholars further highlight the importance of tackling issues surrounding IP,90 equity,91 
transparency,92 and accountability in data-driven health research,93 and the close 
relationship between the right to science and socio-economic rights like the right to 
health.94 
Some of these scholars draw attention to the relevance of the right to health in 
relation to commercial data-driven health research;95 furthermore, many of the 
issues this literature uncovers relate to cross-cutting human rights principles that are 
also fundamental components of the right to health. The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (CESCR) General Comment 25 has 
reaffirmed the importance of this connection between the right to health and data-
driven innovation, implying it may be an important area of critical enquiry for right to 
health scholars.96 
Despite this, the relationship between commercial data-driven health research 
and the right to health has received inadequate attention. The most significant 
scholarly contribution in this area- the Health and Human Rights Journal Special 
Issue on Big Data, Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and the Right to Health-97 
raises many pertinent issues related to commercial data-driven health research, 
including issues of access to technology, the human rights obligations of commercial 
actors, and right to health due diligence for AI projects.98 However, besides my own 
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contribution on the commercialization of health data, none of the papers focus 
specifically on the implications of commercial data-driven health research for the 
right to health.99 Furthermore, there is an absence of in-depth case studies exploring 
the relationship between big data, AI and the right to health, with most relevant 
scholarship focused on broadly summarising key issues or developing due diligence 
mechanisms.  
 
1.4. Theoretical framework- the right to health and 
the business and human rights framework 
 
My thesis explores the DeepMind-NHS case through the legal framework of 
the right to health and business and human rights. I chose to incorporate the 
business and human rights framework into my analysis in addition to the right to 
health because of the critical role of Google- a commercial actor- in the DeepMind-
NHS partnership. The BHR framework provides a legal framework through which 
technology companies’ right to health responsibilities are conceptualised and 
operationalised. Incorporating the BHR framework into my theoretical framework 
thus enables me to determine the right to health responsibilities of Google under 
DeepMind-NHS and assess the company’s adherence to these responsibilities in 
practice, ensuring that my work places equal emphasis on the importance of the 
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responsibilities of commercial actors in realising human rights as the obligations of 
states.  
In applying this theoretical framework to the DeepMind-NHS case, I focus on 
the following elements: AAAQ and the principle of equity, maximum available 
resources (MAR), state accountability for the right to health and corporate 
responsibility for the right to health. These elements are closely related to political 
economic questions of resource and knowledge distribution and are therefore 
particularly relevant to my interdisciplinary analysis of the DeepMind-NHS case 
study. 
This section introduces the right to health and the business and human rights 
movement and briefly summarises the key elements of the framework on which my 
thesis will focus.  
 
1.4.1. The right to health  
 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health (or right to health) was 
first delineated in the 1946 World Health Organisation (WHO) constitution and Article 
25(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),100 a globally 
applicable set of standards underpinning the international human rights movement. 
However, it was the adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 that enshrined the right to health in an 
international, legally binding treaty for the first time.101 The right to health has since 
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been included in a number of international and regional human rights treaties.102 
Furthermore, at the domestic level, the right to health has been incorporated into 
many national constitutions.103 Most states have ratified the ICESCR, and those that 
haven’t have signed at least one of the other treaties containing the right to health; 
thus, all states have- to a greater or lesser degree- accepted the right to health.104 
Implementation of the right to health under the ICESCR is overseen by 
independent monitoring body, the CESCR. In 2000, the CESCR published General 
Comment 14,105 the first ground-breaking and authoritative explication of the right to 
health under the ICESCR. The promotion and protection of the right to health has 
been further strengthened by the establishment of a special procedure on the right to 
health in 2002, which saw the appointment of the first Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Paul Hunt. Hunt and his 
successors have reported annually to the UN Human Rights Council and General 
Assembly, refining the context and scope of the right to health and identifying key 
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right to health issues,106 and made numerous country visits, identifying critical health 
issues around the world and promoting the right to health internationally.107 
 
Article 12(1) of the ICESCR states that, “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health”.108 Critically, the right to health should not be 
confused with the right to be healthy; factors like genetic susceptibility to illness, for 
example, are beyond the government’s control.109 Instead, the right to health should 
be understood as “the right to an effective and integrated health system, 
encompassing health care and the underlying determinants of health, which is 
responsive to national and local priorities, and accessible to all”.110  
The underlying determinants of health refers to other socio-economic factors 
that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life.111 General Comment 
14 draws attention to the importance of these underlying determinants- which include 
food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate 
sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy environment- and 
stresses the interrelatedness of the right to health and other human rights.112 Non-
discrimination and equality are also key underlying principles of the right to health, 
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requiring that states do not discriminate on the grounds of sex, race, age, language, 
disability, health status, sexual orientation, or socio-economic or other status in the 
provision of health care.113 
Like all economic, social and cultural rights, the right to health places a 
tripartite obligation on the state to respect, protect, and fulfil the right to health;114 this 
inhibits the state from denying or limiting equal access for all persons, requires the 
state to prevent third parties from compromising the health of others, and 
necessitates the adoption of measures to guarantee the full realisation of the right to 
health.115 
 
1.4.2. The business and human rights movement  
 
Though the UN’s engagement with business and human rights (BHR) 
stretches back as far as the 1970s,116 the business and human rights movement 
came to prominence in the 1990s as the culmination of a number of related 
events.117 Crucially, a proliferation of cases implicating corporations in gross human 
rights violations by security forces and repressive governments- combined with a 
number of new cases being filed against corporations involved in WWII and growing 
scrutiny of the apparel, footwear and technology sectors- highlighted the need for the 
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UN to pay greater attention to the relationship between commercial actors and 
human rights.118 
The BHR movement “grows out of a quest for corporate accountability to 
mitigate or prevent the adverse impacts of business activity on individuals and 
communities and out of expectations grounded in a specific core set of human rights 
obligations”.119 It emerged predominantly from the field of international law and is 
therefore focused primarily on developing and enforcing legal solutions to corporate 
misconduct, with an emphasis on strengthening governmental oversight and 
facilitating remedy.120 Furthermore, the movement’s focus on fundamental human 
rights places emphasis on the injustice of corporate misconduct, thus framing 
corporate human rights responsibilities as indispensable and imperative 
obligations.121 
These distinct features of BHR set it apart from the closely related field of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). Despite both seeking to ensure that 
commercial actors engage in socially beneficial and responsible behaviour,122 CSR 
focuses primarily on voluntary corporate beneficence and philanthropy and the idea 
that such activities are important to the success of commercial actors.123 This reflects 
the movement’s genesis in the field of business studies and the conceptualisation of 
the modern corporation as having ethical responsibilities beyond its shareholders 
and employees.124 BHR and CSR are thus premised on differing notions of the 
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primary responsible actors (state vs. corporation), sources of authority (law vs. 
ethics), and thus the strength of obligation (fundamental vs. voluntary).  
Despite their differences, some early developments in the field of BHR- 
notably the UN Global Compact- also embodied elements of the CSR movement.125 
The UN Global Compact- introduced in 2000- is a voluntary initiative inviting 
corporations to adhere to ten (originally nine) principles, two of which include 
supporting and respecting human rights and preventing complicity in human rights 
violations126. Signatories report annually on progress towards fulfilling these 
principles, with the aim of rewarding good business practices and fostering mutual 
learning127. However, the Compact has faced criticism from human rights 
practitioners for lacking ‘teeth’, as companies found to be complicit in human rights 
violations are not excluded.128 The initiative therefore demonstrated the limitations of 
CSR’s corporate voluntarism and signalled the need for stronger human rights 
protections against commercial actors.  
Partially in response to these shortcomings, in 2003, the United Nations Sub- 
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights approved the draft 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights.129 The Draft Norms went further than the 
Global Compact in recognising that businesses have obligations to “promote, secure 
the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights”;130 they thus 
“represented a restatement of existing human rights obligations, found in diverse 
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treaties, and an application of those principles to corporations”.131 The Draft Norms 
were deeply controversial; critics suggested they were too ambitious,132 that the 
obligations delineated in the Norms could not apply to commercial actors,133 and that 
the predominance of the views of experts- rather than states or corporations- meant 
they lacked widespread legitimacy among stakeholders.134 The Norms were not 
approved by the UN Commission on Human Rights and were subsequently 
abandoned.  
The shortcomings of the Norms highlighted the need for a human rights 
instrument that would receive more widespread endorsement from stakeholders in 
the BHR movement. In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed Professor John 
Ruggie- the Global Compact’s visionary- as Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises,135 with a mandate to explore standards of corporate 
responsibility and accountability for human rights and the role of States in regulating 
and adjudicating business activities in this context.136 In 2008, Ruggie’s “protect, 
respect and remedy” framework was unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights 
Council and in 2011- following years of extensive consultation with a range of 
stakeholders- the framework was operationalised in the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights for implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework (hereafter the Guiding Principles).137  
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 The Guiding Principles are generally considered the most authoritative 
delineation of the human rights obligations of corporations in international law.138 
They are intended as a tool “to provide practical guidance both to states and to 
companies, in order to ensure that all the instruments at the disposal of both shall be 
used to improve compliance with human rights in the activities of business”.139 
Though not legally enforceable alone, the Guiding Principles are expected to be 
implemented by states and intergovernmental organisation through domestic or 
regional legislation.140 In contrast to the proceeding Draft Norms, the Guiding 
Principles represent a ‘bottom-up’ approach to law making, which “allows... business 
organisations to play an unprecedented role in defining the contours of the rules that 
were to apply to them”.141 Ruggie aimed to achieve more widespread consensus 
through an approach based on ‘principled pragmatism’;142 that is, a commitment to 
improving corporate compliance with human rights through the most practical means 
possible.  
 
1.4.3. The right to health legal framework 
 
1.4.3.1. AAAQ and the principle of equity 
 
General Comment 14 sets out the ‘AAAQ’ framework, which describes four 
interrelated and essential elements of the right to health: the availability, 
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accessibility, cultural acceptability, and quality of health facilities, goods and 
services.143 Availability requires the state to have functioning public health and 
health-care facilities, goods, services, and programmes in sufficient quantity. States 
must also ensure the accessibility of health facilities, goods, and services to all; this 
includes physical, economic, and information accessibility, as well as accessibility on 
the grounds of non-discrimination. Furthermore, health facilities, goods, and services 
must be culturally acceptable; that is, they must be culturally appropriate and 
respectful of medical ethics. Finally, they must also be good quality and scientifically 
and medically appropriate.144 
General Comment 14 further prescribes that economic accessibility should be 
based on the principle of equity. This demands that “payment for health-care 
services, as well as services related to the underlying determinants of health... 
whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially 
disadvantaged groups”,145 such that, “poorer households should not be 
disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer 
households”.146 The concept of equity in human rights law is thus closely related to 
status and power,147 social justice,148 and the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality.149 Though they are related, there is thus a crucial distinction between equity 
and equality; equity is an inherently normative concept, as it implies some kind of 
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judgement about whether the processes driving inequality are unjust or unfair,150 
whereas equality is “the metric by which health equity is assessed”.151 
 
1.4.3.2. Maximum available resources (MAR) 
 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states that all signatories to the Covenant agree “to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means...”.152 The duty to use maximum 
available resources (MAR) “means that a government must do all that it can to 
mobilize resources within the country in order to have funds available to 
progressively realise ESC rights”.153 This means governments have a legal 
obligation to use their resources both efficiently and effectively; that is, policies and 
programmes must be cost-effective, as well as delivering on their promise of 
improving human rights.154 Where necessary, states also have a duty to provide 
international assistance to countries that do not have the resources to meet their 
socio-economic rights responsibilities.155 
 
1.4.3.3. State accountability for the right to health 
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In the context of the right to health, accountability refers to “the process which 
requires government to show, explain and justify how it has discharged its 
obligations regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health”.156 
Though definitions of accountability differ in the right to health scholarship, I adopt 
Williams and Hunt’s tripartite conceptualisation of accountability as monitoring, 
review, and remedial action.157 
States are required to monitor all aspect of policy development and 
implementation on a continuous basis;158 reliable data is critical to this process,159 as 
is transparency, which provides rights-holders with the information necessary to hold 
the state accountable for violations of the right to health.160 Review has two 
components; analysis of the data collected through monitoring and assessment of 
whether commitments have been met.161 Review should be independent, highlight 
successes and shortcomings, provide recommendations for improvement, and 
extend to non-state actors.162 Finally, remedial action ensures that victims of 
violations of the right to health “should have access to effective judicial or other 
appropriate remedies at both national and international levels”.163 
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Accountability relies on the establishment of accessible, transparent and 
effective accountability mechanisms.164 An accountability mechanism is “the 
procedure through which government is answerable for its acts or omissions in 
relation to right to health obligations”.165 There are broadly five types of 
accountability mechanism; judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, political and 
social.166 Though accountability is frequently conflated with judicial accountability, 
non-judicial forms of accountability can also be effective, and different forms of 
accountability mechanism are mutually reinforcing and interdependent.167   
States also have a duty to protect the right to health from commercial actors 
under the Guiding Principles. This obligates states to protect against corporate 
human rights abuses in their jurisdiction by “taking appropriate steps to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, 
regulations and adjudication”.168 Operationalising the duty to protect requires that 
states enforce existing laws that require businesses to respect human rights- 
periodically assessing their adequacy and addressing any regulatory gaps- and 
ensure other laws governing businesses respect human rights.169 The Guiding 
Principles also require states to provide guidance to businesses on how to respect 
human rights, which should indicate expected outcomes, facilitate sharing of best 
practices and advise on methods like due diligence procedures. Furthermore, States 
should encourage businesses to communicate how they address human rights 
issues; this can range from “informal engagement with affected stakeholders to 
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formal public reporting”170 and should account for risks to the safety of individuals, 
commercial confidentiality and the size and structure of the company.171 
 
1.4.3.4. Corporate responsibility for the right to health 
 
Under the Guiding Principles, the corporate responsibility to respect means 
businesses “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should 
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.172 This 
requires that commercial actors avoid contributing to negative human rights impacts 
and address them when they occur.173 The Principles stress that these 
responsibilities apply to all business enterprises “regardless of their size, sector, 
operational context, ownership and structure”;174 however, they recognise that a 
company’s ability to address adverse human rights impacts might vary according to 
these factors. The responsibility to respect must be operationalised through the 
appropriate policies and processes, including a policy commitment to respect human 
rights, a human rights due diligence process, and processes to enable the 
remediation of human rights violations.175 
 
1.5. Contribution to the field 
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My thesis seeks to contribute to the field of human rights law by expanding 
the existing scope of human rights scholarship on health data and data-driven 
research, which has thus far focused predominantly on the rights to privacy and 
science. In doing so, I hope to determine the ramifications of data-driven research 
partnerships for the right to health, building upon the prefatory contributions of 
human right scholars and the CESCR in this area.176  
By considering the distributive implications of the partnership and their impact 
on the right to health, I also hope to contribute to the existing right to health 
scholarship surrounding financial accessibility, equity and resource availability, 
situating relevant debates in the context of commercial data-driven health research. 
Additionally, in assessing the implications of knowledge asymmetries in the 
partnership for the right to health, I seek to further understanding of state 
accountability and corporate responsibility for the right to health, contributing to key 
debates in business and human rights around the nature and scope of corporate 
human rights responsibilities in international human rights law. 
My thesis also contributes to political economic scholarship on PPPs. The 
PPP model has transmuted across space and time yet has faced common criticisms 
from political economists. My thesis seeks to develop critical political economic 
analysis of PPPs by focusing on a novel iteration of the PPP model- data-driven 
health research partnerships- highlighting commonalities and dissimilarities with 
other forms of PPP. In doing so, I hope to shed light on the distributive implications 
of the DeepMind-NHS partnership- and its ramifications for the credibility of the 
prevailing narrative of reciprocal benefit surrounding PPPs- and the capacity for both 
public and private sector accountability under such arrangements. 
                                               




My research further seeks to contribute to an emerging subsection of CDS 
literature on the political economy of health data-177 exploring the effects of data-
driven research partnerships for distributive data justice- as well as advancing 
understanding of Big Tech’s growing power and political influence. In particular, by 
focusing on the DeepMind-NHS case, I aim to further critical understanding of 
Google and its expansion into healthcare, responding to calls for closer scrutiny of 
the ‘Googlization’ of health research.178  
The interdisciplinarity of this thesis also affords the opportunity to generate 
dynamic and original insight into the topic of data-driven research and the multiple 
disciplinary branches it spans. Firstly, I hope to demonstrate how critical political 
economic analysis can illuminate socio-economic rights concerns in novel ways and 
how an interactive dialogue between these disciplines might benefit research in the 
field of international human rights law. Historically, human rights approaches have 
avoided engaging with economic questions, leading some critics to claim that the 
human rights movement has either failed to challenge or even been complicit in the 
emergence and proliferation of the neoliberal economic order.179  By directly 
addressing questions of political economy, the state-business nexus, and corporate 
power over human rights, my research is intended to make an early contribution to 
the nascent field of human rights and political economy, building upon the work of 
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those human rights scholars who advance an alternative, constructive vision of 
human rights as a counterforce to neoliberal inequalities.180  
The evolution of some human rights- notably the right to privacy- have 
received substantial attention from the UN and human rights scholars in the context 
of the data economy.181 However, the implications of this paradigm techno-economic 
shift for socio-economic rights like the right to health have not been explored to the 
same extent. By drawing on insight from CDS on the political economy of health 
data, I hope to demonstrate how an interdisciplinary socio-legal approach can 
illuminate the important implications of shifts in the technological landscape for 
socio-economic rights like the right to health. In doing so, I seek to contribute to a 
deeper understanding of so-called ‘postindustrial rights violations’ and the meaning 
of the right to health in the digital age, moving beyond the predominant focus a 
narrow subset of rights in this context.182  
The ethico-legal lens of international human rights law also offers a new angle 
on political economic and sociological issues. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff have 
suggested that PPPs may be a vehicle to promote good governance values like 
human rights;183 by approaching the DeepMind-NHS partnership through the lens of 
the right to health, I hope to contribute to scholarship on the ‘normative elements’ of 
PPPs,184 which have thus far remained marginal in discussions around the risks and 
benefits of PPPs. Furthermore, by framing questions of distributive justice and 
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accountability through the lens of socio-economic rights, my research seeks to 
explore the potential role of international human rights law in debates around ethical 
health data governance and regulation.185  
 
                                               





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. The Political Economy of Public-Private 
Partnerships in Health 
 
2.1.1. PPPs: Background Context 
 
The term ‘public-private partnership’ is widely associated with the proliferation 
of novel institutional arrangements between the public and private sectors beginning 
in the 1980s. Despite this, the question of what exactly constitutes a partnership 
remains subject to debate.186 This is partly due to the challenge of encapsulating the 
heterogeneity of public-private partnership forms under a single definition. However, 
some scholars suggest that the ‘politicisation’ of the term public-private partnership 
renders it nothing more than a rhetorical device intended to conceal the covert 
privatisation of public services.187 
For the purposes of this thesis, I adopt Hodge and Greve’s broad definition of 
PPPs as “cooperative institutional arrangements between public and private sector 
actors”.188 This definition encompasses a wide range of different partnership 
arrangements, enabling me to connect previously disparate political economy 
analyses of public-private partnerships in health infrastructure and services, global 
health and pharmaceutical provision and draw out commonalities.  
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PPPs for health infrastructure and services are rooted in the doctrine of the 
New Public Management (NPM) movement, a wave of public sector reforms ushered 
in by governments in the UK, US, Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s.189 NPM 
is based on neoliberal and managerialist theories, which argue that privatization and 
marketization are key to reforming the lethargic and bureaucratic state.190 In this 
context, PPPs were posited as mutually-beneficial arrangements with a number of 
benefits, such as improving public sector efficiency, providing value for money for 
taxpayers, facilitating innovation and sharing risks between public and private 
sectors.191 Furthermore, proponents argued that introducing private sector 
managerial practices- including more formal monitoring and reporting mechanisms- 
into public sector projects could help strengthen transparency and accountability.192 
PPPs were thus championed by policymakers as an innovative tool to leverage 
private capital for public sector initiatives and an alternative to more traditional 
procurement practices or outright privatization of public services.193 
Broadly speaking, PPPs in infrastructure and services “involve private companies 
in the design, financing, construction, ownership and/or operation of a public sector 
utility or service”.194 Though this definition covers a broad array of partnership 
models, the most prolific example of PPP in health infrastructure and services is PFI, 
which was widely instigated across the NHS from the late 1980s to the early 2000s 
to fund the building and servicing of NHS hospitals.195 
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PFIs were introduced by the Conservative government in 1992 and subsequently 
rebranded under the umbrella term ‘public-private partnerships’ by the successive 
Labour government in 1997.196 The initiative promised to improve the NHS’ 
dilapidated hospital infrastructure by delivering efficiency savings, improving health 
service quality, transferring risk to the private sector, and bringing private sector 
expertise and managerial skills to infrastructural projects.197 PFI projects typically 
necessitated long-term contracts lasting 20-35 years, during which time a consortium 
of companies would fund, construct, operate and maintain a project in exchange for 
an annual payment from their public sector partner.198  
 In addition to partnerships in the provision of health infrastructure and 
services, PPPs have become an increasingly significant source of finance for 
interventions in global health. These partnerships- often referred to as GHPs- grew 
in popularity from the 1980s to 2000s in response to the UN’s perceived inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness in tackling global health challenges and ensuring universal 
access to global public goods.199 Furthermore, the emergence of private 
philanthropic foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation represented a 
novel source of vast wealth and resource that innovators sought to capitalise on to 
address unmet needs in the global health landscape.200 
Much like PPPs in infrastructure and financing, GHPs are diverse and 
heterogenous; Buse and Walt broadly categorise them into three distinct types- 
product development, product-based and systems or issue-based.201 Fundamentally, 
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they involve collaboration between private corporations and governments, 
international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.202 High profile examples 
include the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the GAVI, The 
Vaccine Alliance, a multi-stakeholder collaboration intended to increase provision of 
and access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries.203  
 Both the Global Fund and GAVI are examples of what Buse and Walt term 
‘product development partnerships’; that is, PPPs initiated by the public sector and 
intended to incentivise the development of socially-valuable goods that would 
otherwise be neglected by commercial actors as their potential costs outweigh the 
opportunity cost of investment.204  Commercial actors may engage in product 
development partnerships to receive subsidies for research, assistance in 
conducting clinical trials or to pursue long-term interests like financial returns or 
proximity to regulatory processes. Product-development partnerships are particularly 
favoured by the UK government; in 2018, the UK provided $230 million of funding to 
product development for poverty-related and neglected diseases.205  
In addition to GHPs, the so-called ‘implicit public-private partnership’ in 
pharmaceutical R&D also facilitates the provision of medicines around the world.206 
The high costs and rates of attrition associated with the development of 
pharmaceuticals are significant barriers to innovation; PPP in pharmaceutical R&D is 
thus perceived to confront these challenges by integrating the capabilities and 
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expertise of a diverse range of stakeholders, shortening drug discovery times, 
reducing associated costs and improving drug success rates.207 Pharmaceutical 
innovation often receives public sector support in the form of grants, subsidies or tax 
breaks from bodies like the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) or the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) in the UK; as such, the public sector is a ‘cornerstone’ of 
the pharmaceutical industry, often investing in the risky early stages of innovation.208 
Collaboration between governments and the pharmaceutical industry also extends to 
the procurement of medicines; for example, in the UK, the Pharmaceutical Pricing 
Regulation Scheme (PPRS) regulates the introduction of medicines into the NHS, 
seeking to ensure patients have access to the most effective medicines at the best 
price while supporting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.209 Thus, partnership 
between the public and private sectors is present throughout the life-cycle of 
pharmaceutical provision, from the research and development of medicines to their 
procurement in public health systems.   
These PPP models are united by a common underlying philosophy: that 
collaboration between the public and private sectors is mutually beneficial and 
promotes shared risk-taking and innovation.210 Yet partnerships across health 
infrastructure and services, global health and pharmaceutical provision have also 
been subject to common criticisms surrounding their cost-effectiveness, inequitable 
outcomes, and lack of accountability. Furthermore, PPPs raise fundamental 
questions about the nature, values and roles of the public and private sectors and 
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the tension between public benefit and private profit-making.211 Here, I review critical 
political economy scholarship around PPPs in health, interrogating claims 
surrounding the benefits of partnership models and exploring common critiques of 
their political and economic implications. In doing so, I seek to situate data-sharing 
partnerships in the broader context of a critical political economy of public-private 
partnership models.  
 
2.1.2. The Question of Value 
 
2.1.2.1. Value for Money in Health PPPs 
 
Cost-effectiveness or value for money (VfM) are key criteria used to justify the 
use of PPP models in health. Mazzucato argues that this justification is based on the 
assumption that the private sector is inherently more efficient and innovative than the 
public sector, and thus better able to provide services or develop products at a 
cheaper price.212 The VfM rationale was central to the establishment of healthcare 
PFIs in the NHS; Pollock suggests proponents of the PFI model initially claimed it 
could boost investment in health infrastructure without increasing public sector 
borrowing.213 However, Shaoul highlights how their focus later shifted to the 
microeconomic case for PFI, arguing it could deliver greater VfM on the basis that 
the private sector is more efficient and takes on some financial risk.214 Similarly, the 
                                               
211 Hodge & Greve (n186). 
212 Mazzucato (n39) 47. 
213 Allyson M. Pollock et al ‘Private finance and “value for money” in NHS hospitals: a policy in search 
of a rationale?’ (2002) BMJ 324(7347) 1205-1209. 




National Audit Office- the UK’s independent public spending watchdog- claimed that 
PFI projects could improve operational efficiency, incentivising the private sector to 
build assets to budget and reduce long-term running costs.215 Others hoped that VfM 
appraisal- which utilized a well-established methodology to compare the costs of the 
PFI with those of conventional public procurement- could also increase the 
transparency of the public procurement process.216 
Buse and Harmer highlight how the VfM assumption is also frequently used to 
justify PPPs in the context of global health.217 The first comprehensive review of the 
impact of GHPs on health systems- undertaken by the World Health Organisation- 
found that they hold the possibility of improving efficiency and assuring value for 
money.218 Additionally, Lorenz argues that many GHPs themselves claim to be cost-
efficient;219 his observation is supported by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria’s commitment to obtaining the best VfM for goods and 
services and GAVI’s inclusion value for money as a key criterion for evaluation in its 
vaccine investment strategy.220 
Furthermore, Mazzucato and Roy argue that cost-effectiveness is one of two 
key metrics underlying value-based pricing in the pharmaceutical sector, which has 
become the prevailing narrative used to justify the prices of new medicines.221 VfM 
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Despite the shared notion that PPPs in health deliver VfM, numerous critical 
scholars have highlighted the problematic nature of the appraisal procedures through 
which VfM is assessed. In the context of PFI, both Shaoul and Hodge and Greve 
have drawn attention to the ambiguity of the term ‘value for money’, which obscures 
the political choices that underpin the selection of appraisal techniques and 
measures it encompasses.222 Their shared criticism refers to the fact that most PFI 
debt is classified as off-balance sheet and does not fall under official figures of public 
sector spending.223 Thus, as Hare contends, governments are incentivised to use 
PFI as “a way of getting more of the investment needed without adding to the public-
sector deficit or debt”.224 Pollock and Shaoul suggest that this short-term incentive 
obscures broader questions of long-term affordability and sustainability, resulting in 
an ‘affordability gap’ to be made up further down the line.225 Criticisms of VfM 
appraisal in PFI are thus widespread among political economists. 
Furthermore, value-based pricing systems- a common feature of the implicit 
PPP in the pharmaceutical sector- have faced criticism from Mazzucato and Roy, 
who argue that they obscure the impact of monopoly, financial markets, and 
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corporate value extraction.226 In a separate article, Mazzucato draws attention to the 
ways in which pharmaceutical companies utilise corporate share buy-backs to drive 
up the prices of drugs to disproportionate levels, enabling them to capitalise upon 
value-based pricing and abuse the pharmaceutical patents system.227 Rather than 
representing VfM, Mazzucato and Roy contend, drug prices instead reflect “a 
manifestation of “what society can bear” in the face of monopoly power”.228 
 
2.1.2.3. The Role of the State 
 
The VfM justification has been further challenged by some political 
economists on the grounds that it neglects the critical and often risky role that states 
play in investing in PPPs. Mazzucato’s seminal text, The Entrepreneurial State, 
made a critical contribution in this area; the author uncovered how corporate wealth 
extraction is facilitated by a system of socialized risk and privatized reward, whereby 
a select group of corporate actors reap disproportionate rewards from collective- 
often state-funded- risk-taking in public-private innovation processes.229 She argues 
for a theory of public-private innovation that more fully comprehends how value is 
created through a collective, cumulative and uncertain process.230 Mazzucato’s 
theory of the entrepreneurial state thus casts doubt on VfM claims underlying PPPs 
involving the development of new innovations, as the rewards are not distributed 
equitably between states and commercial actors.  
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In other articles, Mazzucato illustrates this theory at work in the 
pharmaceutical sector. In a co-authored article with Roy, the authors suggest that 
lack of appreciation of the public sector’s contribution to pharmaceutical innovation 
processes results in governments ‘paying twice’; once for the research underpinning 
the development of pharmaceutical products and again to procure these products at 
expensive prices.231  
Building on Mazzucato’s theory, other scholars have highlighted the neglected 
role of the state in GHPs. McGoey reveals how government grants and subsidies 
play a vital role in financing medical innovations in GHPs, which the private sector 
capitalises upon at the expense of governments’ ability to generate revenue or 
determine the cost-effectiveness of projects.232 In this light, the author argues, claims 
about GHP’s VfM are spurious.  
 
2.1.2.4. Financial metrics vs. public interests 
 
Another group of critical scholars argue that the predominant focus on the 
financial metrics of PPPs- like VfM- can overshadow consideration of broader public 
interests and social value. Boardman and Vining suggest that the criteria used to 
justify the use of PPPs- such as VfM and ‘off-budget’- are not necessarily aligned 
with the public interest and could have a deleterious effect on social value.233 Richter 
similarly argues for the need to centralise questions of public interest in PPPs; this 
requires “much more critical policy reflection where increased interactions between 
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public and business actors is likely to positively and negatively impact on the 
achievement of health for all”.234 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff make a critical contribution in this area;235 moving 
beyond scrutiny of the financial aspects of PPPs, the authors assess the extent to 
which partnerships deliver public benefits and advance good governance values like 
human rights. They highlight how, in practice, many PPPs do not achieve their 
purported benefits due to poor implementation, skewed incentives, or the production 
of unintended consequences like reduced long-term government capacity. The 
authors also argue that private sector benefits, while critical to incentivise corporate 
involvement in PPPs, are not necessarily aligned with social goals; for this reason, 
achieving the mutual benefits of partnerships requires an appropriate balance 
between public and private interests.236  
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff shine a light on the thus far underappreciated 
‘normative component’ of PPPs; that is, their potential as a mechanism for advancing 
good governance norms like basic freedoms and human rights. Where such 
principles are enacted in PPPs, they suggest, “inclusion, equity, transparency, 
accountability and ethical behaviours become integral to the partnership 
functions”.237 However, they argue that- in practice- the extent to which partnerships 
advance these goals varies widely.238 Together, this group of scholars draw attention 
to the need for claims about the financial benefits of PPP to be situated in the 
broader context of societal objectives and the public interest. 
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2.1.3. Health equity 
Beyond VfM claims, political economists highlight how PPPs in health often 
purport to target areas of critical need in health systems, with a view to improving the 
health of the most vulnerable. PFI projects focused on NHS hospitals requiring 
urgent infrastructural investment, which NHS trusts were unable to finance upfront. 
Similarly, Ruckert and Labonte observe that GHPs often have equity objectives;239 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff concur, arguing that many global health research 
consortia explicitly state their commitment to improving equity while those that do not 
may implicitly do so by focusing on developing treatments for conditions more 
common in low- and middle-income countries.240 Equity is also a vital consideration 
in public-private collaboration for pharmaceutical provision; Gardner et al contend 
that facilitating equitable access to medicines is the fundamental goal of state 
involvement in this area.241 These scholars’ contentions are supported by Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff’s observation that equity is often part of the explicit rationales of 
PPPs in health.242  
Despite the prevalence of equity as a justification for PPPs, some political 
economists suggest partnerships may have the opposite effect in practice. Clark and 
McGoey argue that GHPs are often directed towards the most profitable causes for 
the private sector, which do not necessarily align with areas of greatest health 
need.243 In a similar vein, Ruckert and Labonte suggest equity objectives in GHPs 
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may lack substance, as ‘pro-poor’ approaches are not necessarily incorporated into 
operational practices or monitoring activities.244 PPPs for pharmaceutical innovation 
face similar criticisms, as McGoey accuses pharmaceutical companies of prioritising 
profit-making over health equity by focusing on the development of ‘blockbuster’ 
drugs at the expense of commercially unappealing medicines that serve the needs of 
the poorest and most vulnerable.245  
Other scholars highlight how PPPs can undermine health equity through 
neglect of the broader health systems in which they operate. Shaoul argues that PFI 
projects may undermine sound decision-making at the national level and destabilise 
the health system, as the spiralling costs of PFI debts are ultimately met by the 
taxpayer.246 GHPs have faced similar critiques; Ruckert and Labonte highlight that 
GHPs are often narrow and targeted interventions that rarely address health systems 
strengthening or account for their wider implications.247 Pratt and Loff share their 
concern, highlighting how the regulation of research in global health is focused 
around commercially-appealing health needs that require high-tech, profitable 
solutions; this diverts funding from existing interventions and broader health systems 
strengthening.248 This body of scholarship thus suggests that, despite the inclusion 
of equity as a key objective in many PPPs, these models may prioritise corporate 
profit-making over public health needs or weaken the broader health systems in 
which they operate, leading to inequitable outcomes in practice. 
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2.1.4. Transparency and Accountability 
Some political economists argue that transparency and accountability are 
critical to the effectiveness and legitimacy of PPPs in health. For Hood et al, 
transparency in PPPs is vital to both public and private sectors, maintaining trust in 
the integrity and value of public investments on the one hand while giving confidence 
to capital markets on the other.249 PFI agreements, the authors argue, emerged in 
the context of a public rhetoric purporting to make government more open and 
accountable, of which target setting, monitoring and performance review were 
increasingly importance features. Transparency and accountability are also 
purported to be important features of GHPs; Reich argues that transparency allows 
learning and facilitates accountability, which assures public interest goals are 
achieved, improves organizational performance and contributes to public trust and 
democracy.250 Reich’s view is supported by Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff’s observation 
that accountability is often used as an explicit justification for PPPs.251 
2.1.4.1. Complexity of PPP structures 
Despite claims to transparency and accountability in PPPs in health, these 
collaborations are often characterised by complex financial and organisational 
structures, which some suggest are problematic for accountability. Flinders 
emphasises the hybridity of PPPs, highlighting how allocating responsibility for 
failure is a challenging task.252 Hodge similarly describes a changing of the guardian 
in PPPs from a simplistic accountability regime to a ‘complex network of 
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guardians’.253 In support of Flinders and Hodge’s view, Hood et al argue that this 
institutional complexity erodes “traditional Weberian notions of bureaucratic control 
and accountability”.254 
By comparison, Buse and Walt are more specific in their criticism, pointing to 
the autonomy of individual actors in GHPs as the compounding factor that can 
undermine accountability.255 Taken together, however, the views of scholars who 
highlight the complexity of PPP structures imply that this fundamental feature of 
PPPs presents a challenge to accountability.  
2.1.4.2. Opacity 
 
Lack of public sector transparency is a further criticism levelled at PPPs in 
health. Hodge and Greve contend that PPPs in health infrastructure have provided 
limited opportunities for meaningful transparency.256 Their contention is supported by 
evidence from PFI; Shaoul highlight how finding even basic data about PFI projects- 
including their number, size and costs- is hugely challenging.257 Hood et al argue 
that this lack of public sector transparency in PFI leads to a ‘democratic 
accountability deficit’.258 
The private sector’s use of commercial confidentiality laws has also been 
identified by some as perpetuating the opacity around PPPs in health. Hood et al 
argue that commercial actors are able to evade transparency through issues around 
appraisal and accounting, inadequate corporate reporting disclosure, and corporate 
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confidentiality agreements.259 Their concerns echo those of Flinders, who criticises 
the overuse of commercial confidentiality laws to prevent the disclosure of 
information that may demonstrate VfM and dispel public mistrust.260 
Beyond PFI, commercial confidentiality has also been criticised in GHPs; 
McGoey argues that private philanthropic foundations are not subject to the same 
disclosure requirements as the public sector, creating opacity around the cost-
effectiveness of GHPs and the allocation of funding towards corporate interests.261 
Together, these scholars cast doubt on the notion that PPPs in health necessarily 
facilitate transparency, instead demonstrating how lack of public sector transparency 
and commercial actors’ use of commercial confidentiality laws may in fact generate 
opacity.  
 
2.1.4.3. Lack of oversight and accountability mechanisms 
 
Lack of oversight and mechanisms to enforce accountability has been 
identified as a further barrier to transparency and accountability in PPPs in health. 
Hood et al criticise PFI contracts for lacking “the normal welter of oversight, 
regulatory, and scrutiny mechanisms that other public services face”.262 Brown’s 
view suggests GHPs may be similarly limited; the author highlights how the lack of 
global norms or frameworks to guide the regulation of GHPs results in the 
establishment of ad-hoc, largely unregulated partnerships.263 In a more nuanced 
observation, Hodge argues that- while managerial accountability may have improved 
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under the PPP paradigm- this has been at the expense of public accountability 
mechanisms like parliamentary control, quasi-judicial mechanisms, and 
transparency.264 Thus, despite claims to improved accountability- some of which, 
Hodge suggests, may be legitimate- PPPs in health may lack effective regulatory 
oversight and public accountability mechanisms.  
 
2.1.3.5. The covert expansion of private power 
 
Other critics have drawn attention to the ways in which PPPs in health 
facilitate the covert expansion of private interests and power. Some political 
economists argue that PPPs can fall victim to corporate bias and regulatory capture; 
Shaoul highlights how the Treasury’s project’s division- which oversaw PFI projects- 
was itself reconstituted as a PPP called Partnerships UK, whose structure, 
ownership and control was dominated by private interests with a vested interest in 
expanding PFI.265 
GHPs have faced similar accusations of corporate bias. Buse and Harmer 
have written extensively about the relationship between GHPs and public-private 
power relations; like Shaoul, they highlight how board compositions- alongside 
membership criteria and hosting arrangements- facilitate the expansion of private 
interests into the public domain, allowing corporations influence over the 
establishment of norms and standards in global health.266 They thus argue that 
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GHPs are an avenue through which the private sector attempts to exert power in 
intergovernmental forums, expand markets and enhance corporate citizenship.267 
Like Shaoul and Buse and Harmer, John Abraham has drawn attention to the 
problem of regulatory capture, but his focus is the pharmaceutical sector. The author 
suggests that corporate bias permeates policy development, implementation and 
interpretation in this context, operating via a ‘revolving door’ between regulatory 
agencies and industry and the use of corporate confidentiality legislation.268 
Beyond criticisms levelled at corporate bias and regulatory capture, other 
scholars suggest that PPPs in health afford the private sector significant influence 
over public health research agendas. Both Faubion et al and Reich draw attention to 
corporate-funded philanthropic foundations’ manipulation of research agendas 
through their financial and political might;269 in this context, Faubion et al argue, 
foundations have arguably become ‘de-facto agenda-setters’ in global health.270 
Clark and McGoey similarly heed warning about the role of corporate-funded 
philanthropic foundations in setting global health research agendas, using the term 
‘philanthrocapitalist’ to refer to the entrepreneurs who run such GHPs and gain 
influence and moral legitimacy from their public image as efficient and innovative 
‘technological wizards’.271 
Another set of scholars argue that the obfuscation of the public-private 
boundary in PPPs in health is a key enabling factor in the expansion of private 
power. Ruckert and Labonte suggest that GHPs are particularly problematic in 
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obscuring the divide between public and private, thus rearranging the boundaries of 
the public and private spheres in an effort to further entrench private interests.272 
Richter’s criticism particularly targets the use of the term ‘partner’, which- she 
argues- obscures key distinctions between the roles and obligations of different 
actors in GHPs.273 Richter describes this as “one of the most substantive losses of 
the partnership paradigm”274.  
Together, these scholars’ arguments suggest- as opposed to promoting 
greater corporate accountability- PPPs in health instead enable commercial actors to 
expand their power and influence through multiple avenues, including corporate bias 
and regulatory capture, control over research agendas, and the blurring of the public-




This section has reviewed critical literature on the political economy of PPPs 
in health. Collating critical scholarship on PPPs across different domains in health, it 
reviewed the literature surrounding three common claims that are made about them; 
that they provide value for money, improve health equity and facilitate accountability. 
In doing so, it revealed that common challenges and limitations underlie PPPs in 
health, illustrating how novel applications of the partnership model “may not be all 
that new” after all.275 In this respect, this body of scholarship draws attention to the 
so-called ‘politicisation’ of the partnership paradigm, which has evolved over space 
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and time to meet the political need of the moment.276 Furthermore, it reveals that- 
despite the rhetoric of mutual benefit surrounding PPPs- they often necessitate 
trade-offs in practice.  
As well as these common underlying themes, reviewing this body of literature 
has also shed light on areas that require further scholarly investigation. As 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff highlight, the broader impacts of PPPs on public interests 
and good governance values like human rights have received little attention, 
resulting in limited knowledge of the normative dimensions of this form of 
governance.277 Furthermore, there is little in-depth case study analysis of specific 
examples of PPPs in practice, meaning there is limited understanding of the impact 
of context on the political economy of PPP. In addition, the PPP model is used in a 
broader range of contexts in health than those addressed in the literature here; there 
is therefore a need to turn attention to novel iterations of the PPP model in health to 
deepen our understanding of its continued ‘politicisation’ today.  
The focus of my study- the DeepMind-NHS partnership- is one such novel 
iteration. Much like public-private collaboration in the pharmaceutical and global 
health sectors, data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS are purported 
to promote mutually-beneficial health innovation. However, the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership is also novel and distinct in that it relies on commercial access to public 
sector data. The emergence of the so-called ‘data economy’ underlying the 
revolution in data-driven and automated technological innovation is a paradigm shift 
with significant implications for the relationship between public and private sectors 
and the dynamics of innovation. As such, the following section reviews scholarship 
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from the sociological subdiscipline critical data studies, with a view to situating the 
DeepMind-NHS partnership in the broader political economy of health data.  
 




Since its inception in 2014, CDS has emerged as a distinct area of 
sociological enquiry concerned with “the unique cultural, ethical, and critical 
challenges posed by Big Data”.278 In contrast to empirical approaches- in which data 
are “presented as new and innovative, emerging ahistorically to revolutionize modern 
life”- 279 CDS scholars are concerned with ‘data assemblages’; a term coined by 
early contributors Kitchin and Lauriault to describe “the technological, political, social 
and economic apparatuses and elements that constitutes and frames the generation, 
circulation and deployment of data”.280 
One emerging branch of CDS focuses specifically on the political economy of 
data, a reflection of growing scholarly awareness of data as a valuable asset in the 
knowledge economy.281 Health data, Parry and Greenhough argue, warrants 
particular attention in this context, as they “inhabit two identities simultaneously: the 
first as highly personal and private data, the other as corporately owned property”.282 
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The commercialisation of health data has thus garnered attention in CDS from those 
who question who will benefit from these developments, how, and at what cost.283 
Driving this shift are technology giants like Google who seek to access health data 
for the development of algorithmic technologies. As Big Tech expand into healthcare 
markets, critical scholars have voiced concerns about their power, influence and lack 
of accountability.  
This section reviews CDS literature on the emerging political economy of 
health data. It begins by exploring issues of resource distribution or distributive data 
justice; that is, “the concern for who gets what as a result of data systems”.284 In 
particular, it considers how Big Tech’s business model facilitates corporate wealth 
extraction and monopoly, its implications for health equity and how concepts of value 
and public benefits are utilised in this context. The subsequent section explores 
literature on the power and politics of Big Tech, including the opacity surrounding the 
platform monopolies, the risks posed by their political influence, the trend towards 
ethical capitalism in data-driven health innovation, Big Tech’s lack of democratic 
accountability, and the particular role of Google. Together, this body of scholarship 
reveals how “digital data is becoming an increasingly important element in the 
production of knowledge, wealth, and power”.285 
 
2.2.2. The distributive effects of data-driven health innovation  
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2.2.2.1. Big Tech’s business model: monopoly and wealth extraction 
 
CDS scholars have drawn attention to Big Tech’s business model and the 
ways in which it facilitates corporate wealth extraction and monopoly. Mazzucato 
describes how the effects of modern digital networks and the characteristics of digital 
innovation tend towards monopoly, enabling just a few market leaders to extract 
value on an unprecedented scale.286 In particular, she highlights how dynamic 
increasing returns to scale and network externalities have facilitated the rapid 
expansion of Big Tech and their self-perpetuating market dominance, “placing an 
enormous concentration of market power in the hands of a few firms”.287 As a result, 
the author argues, “companies like Google are de facto monopolies”.288 
Mazzucato further suggests these effects are the product of the two-sided 
markets in which Big Tech operate, which results in an increase in the number of 
search engine or social network users boosting the company’s appeal to advertisers 
and thus its profitability. As a result, rather than viewing Google as providing user 
services for free, “it is users who provide Google with necessary inputs for the 
production process: their looks on ads and, most importantly, their personal data”.289 
Shoshana Zuboff describes this business model as a new economic paradigm that 
she labels ‘surveillance capitalism’,290 “a new economic order that claims human 
experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of extraction, 
prediction, and sales”.291 Like Mazzucato, Zuboff highlights how surveillance 
capitalism is ‘parasitic’- in that it feeds on human experience- rendering digital 
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connection through social networks “a means to others’ commercial ends”.292 
Evgeny Morozov has also been a vocal critic of the platform monopolies’ business 
models, which he terms ‘data extractivism’;293 that is, the notion that “users are 
valuable stocks of data; technology companies, in turn, design clever ways to have 
us part with that data — or at least share it with them”.294 
Birch et al describe this model as ‘data rentiership’, “the pursuit of innovation 
strategies designed to capture or extract value through ownership and control of data 
as an asset”.295 The authors draw attention to the  ‘innovation-finance nexus’- the 
increasingly blurred boundary between technoscientific innovation and finance- 
which is “characterized by the deliberate pursuit of economic rent extraction or 
regulatory rent-seeking through the extension of IP rights, monopoly control, network 
effects, and/or reconfiguration of techno-economic processes”.296 Big Tech’s 
business model, the authors argue, is fundamentally rooted in this innovation-finance 
nexus, such that “innovation is driven by the search for ways to create, extend, and 
reinforce the ownership and control of assets (i.e. rentiership) – especially personal 
data – while acquiring competitors who threaten monopoly positions or lobbying 
governments who threaten to introduce regulations”.297 Thus, they contend, the 
‘assetization’ of data- the transformation of personal data into a financial entity- has 
become the predominant logic driving scientific research and development, at the 
expense of the development of useful technologies and services that deliver societal 
benefit.   
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2.2.2.2. The inequitable effects of public-private data-driven health 
research 
 
In the context of health research, the transformation of health data into a 
commercial asset generates novel power asymmetries based on access to data and 
the technologies it is used to develop. Parry and Greenhough describe the case of 
Myriad Genetics, a private molecular diagnostics company in the US that was 
granted IP rights over the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes linked to breast cancer. By 
creating a monopoly over diagnostic testing kits, the company was able to raise 
prices, excluding many of the women involved in the original research to isolate 
BRCA genes from accessing the testing kits. Celera Genomics provides a further 
example; the company capitalized on the publicly-funded Human Genome Project to 
develop a draft human genome, later restricting access to the sequences to paying 
customers only despite promises to the contrary.298 
These cases highlight how the ‘assetization’ of health data can simultaneously 
enrich corporate actors while restricting public access to the technologies it is used 
to develop. They exemplify how the public ends up ‘paying twice’ for health 
technologies299; once through the dispossession of their data and again for access to 
the innovations it yields. Parry and Greenhough suggest this is particularly 
problematic for marginalized communities, who often have the greatest need for 
health improvements but remain least able and likely to benefit from them.300 This 
use of health data to generate corporate profits as opposed to serving the common 
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good, Mazzucato argues, “produces a new form of inequality- the skewed access to 
the profits generated from big data”.301  
 
2.2.2.3. Value and benefits in public-private data-driven health research: 
profits vs. public goods 
 
The ‘assetization’ of health data and its inequitable effects thus raise 
quandaries around the value and benefits derived from health data. Critical data 
scholars have highlighted the lack of clarity around the meaning of these terms in 
this context; Parry and Greenhough stress the complexity of value appraisal in the 
context of health data.302 Furthermore, while the notion of benefits was originally 
conceptualized as economic profits, the authors argue, it has now evolved to include 
public goods like improved testing, treatment, research and databases. 
Through deliberative workshops with members of the public, Aitken et al 
revealed that the public were sceptical as to whether appropriate mechanisms were 
in place to realise public benefits in data-driven health research.303 Their study 
further highlighted public opinion that commercial and political interests impede the 
benefits of health research. This reflects the contentions of Blasimme et al, who 
argue that the involvement of commercial actors in data-driven health research 
necessitates a trade-off between the economic value of health data and its public 
value as a scientific resource. They argue for trustworthiness, openness and 
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evidence as the basis for balancing the different interests at stake and recognise that 
all stakeholders have some legitimate interests.304   
Sharon explores these trade-offs in the context of public-private data-driven 
health research involving Big Tech.305 The author identifies a diverse range of moral 
repertoires or conceptions of the ‘common good’- termed the civic, market, industrial, 
project and vital narratives- which reflect a range of different motives for stakeholder 
engagement in data-driven research. Sharon concludes that acknowledging this 
‘panopoly of moral orientations’ is essential to understanding the trade-offs involved 
in data-driven research initiatives and to ensuring that civic values are embedded in 
future governance solutions and calls for closer consideration of how these different 
repertoires play out in legislation and policymaking around data-driven technologies 
in health.306 
 
2.2.3. The power and politics of Big Tech 
 
2.2.3.1. The ‘one-way mirror’ 
 
Some critical data scholars have denounced the secrecy surrounding the 
operations of the platform monopolies. In The Black Box Society, Pasquale draws 
attention to the ‘one-way mirror’ that enables tech corporations to simultaneously 
collect increasing amounts of data on citizens while shrouding their own actions in 
secrecy through “nondisclosure agreements, “proprietary methods,” and gag 
                                               
304 Blasimme et al (n70). 
305 Sharon “When digital health meets digital capitalism...’ (n41). 




rules”.307 Pasquale claims that, despite hopes that the Internet would bring about an 
era of openness and transparency, technology companies have “deployed strategies 
of obfuscation and secrecy to consolidate power and wealth”.308  
However, the author suggests that transparency alone is not a panacea, as it 
may conversely provoke complexity that continues to obscure corporate 
misconduct.309 Prainsack similarly highlights the need to avoid conflating 
transparency with accountability, suggesting this would obscure important nuances 
regarding different types of transparency and the role of inclusiveness in decision-
making.310  
 
2.2.3.2. Political influence and regulatory capture 
 
Critical scholars have also voiced concerns about political influence and the 
risks of regulatory capture from Big Tech. Ebeling condemns political rent-seeking- 
where “private organizations focus on lobbying government for policy and legislative 
changes, rather than on their internal research and development strategies”- 311 in 
her analysis of US health data protection regulation.312 She argues that corporate 
bias has shaped data protection legislation in favour of the interests of the private 
sector, highlighting how corporations benefit from a “vantage point of socio-political 
power” in which decision-making about health data occurs in private.313 This 
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supports Prainsack’s view that the tech giants have become key political players in 
the health domain.314 
Their influence, however, extends far beyond health alone; Nemitz illustrates 
how the tech giants engage in political rent-seeking around AI regulation.315 The 
author argues that technology companies have evaded responsibility in the field of AI 
through their influence in both the development and application of the law, stressing 
the need for transparency around potential conflicts of interest in the development of 
AI regulation. 
Cath echoes his calls for closer scrutiny of industry efforts to participate in or 
lobby for AI regulation; like Nemitz, she highlights how claims about the enigmatic 
nature of technologies like AI are often used to rationalize private sector involvement 
in regulatory efforts.316 The author further draws attention to the risk of regulatory 
capture from corporate interests in the governance of AI, pointing to the European 
Commission High-Level Expert Group of AI as an example; half the group’s 
members are from industry, compared to far fewer from academia and civil society. 
In order to counter their political influence, Cath highlights the need to scrutinize who 
sets the agenda for AI governance, what logic is realized as a result, and who 
benefits from it.317 
 
2.2.3.4. ‘Ethical’ capitalism in data-driven health innovation 
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As Big Tech expand into new markets, they face mounting pressure to 
demonstrate how their own objectives are aligned with public interest goals like 
improving health and wellbeing.318 In Personalized Medicine, Prainsack explores the 
complexities of this movement- which she terms ‘health-data entrepreneurism’- 
arguing it is characterised by an increasingly symbiotic relationship between profit 
orientation and idealist activism. Drawing on the example of online platform 
PatientsLikeMe, she demonstrates how data-driven health initiatives can defy 
simplistic dichotomies, instead representing “a multi-layered cluster of financial, 
political, and societal interests that do not merely coexist but that mutually reinforce 
each other”.319 However, Prainsack also highlights users’ lack of autonomy in 
decision-making on the platform, thus drawing attention to the potential pitfalls of the 
conflation of public and private interests.320   
   Sharon also highlights the need to reconsider the distinction between profit-
making and public benefit in discussions around data-driven health research, arguing 
that such initiatives are more accurately characterised by “a plurality of orders of 
worth and conceptualizations of the common good”.321 Referring explicitly to 
DeepMind, the author highlights how the company’s co-founder, Mustafa Suleyman, 
expresses sentiments that invoke both market and civic moral repertoires, 
demonstrating that “‘doing good’ is becoming an inalienable- not an additional- 
dimension of corporate activity”.322 
This form of ‘ethical capitalism’, Prainsack argues, often manifests in CSR 
initiatives or hybrid governance models like public-private partnerships, which claim 
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to fulfil both profit and non-profit objectives.323 CSR efforts in the area of data-driven 
health technology- particularly in the emerging field of AI- abound; in 2019, 
Mittelstadt counted at least 84 public-private initiatives developing principles and 
values to guide the development of AI.324 Though there is some global convergence 
around principles for ethical AI,325 such initiatives have been criticised for lacking 
common aims, methods for practical application, and robust professional and legal 
accountability mechanisms.326 Cath has highlighted the need to assess the aims, 
impact and process of ethical principles and remain critical of their broader impacts, 
like their potential to legitimize private-sector led norm development.327 Nemitz 
suggests that such efforts are “effectively delaying the debate and work on law for 
AI”,328 thus cutting out the democratic process, and are ineffectual in addressing the 
many conflicts of interests around the development and deployment of AI that exist 
between corporations and the general public.329 Arogyaswamy also points to the 
limited effectiveness of self-regulatory efforts, which “can quickly be overcome by the 
sheer magnitude of screening required, the demands of shareholders for growth and 
profits, acquiescent corporate cultures, and sheer hubris”.330 Vaidhyanathan similarly 
describes CSR as ‘toothless’ in the face of shareholder interests.331  
Critical scholarship of ‘ethical’ capitalism in data-driven health innovation thus 
simultaneously acknowledges the growing entanglement of profit and not-for-profit 
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incentives while remaining sceptical about the intent and efficacy of CSR efforts in 
light of commercial pressures.  
 
2.2.3.5. Big Tech: beyond democratic control 
 
The movement towards ‘ethical capitalism’ must also be considered in the 
context of Big Tech’s accumulation of knowledge and power, which renders them 
increasingly beyond democratic control. These companies have variously been 
described in the literature as ‘Big Other’ and ‘iLevithian’,332 terms indicative of their 
omniscient powers. Zuboff and Prainsack have drawn attention to the ways in which 
the platform monopolies’ excessive practices of data collection enable them to exert 
control over populations.333 Thus, despite the emancipatory rhetoric surrounding new 
technologies, 334 these may simultaneously function as instruments of discipline and 
control.335 This reaffirms Zuboff’s argument that the economic imperatives that drive 
surveillance capitalism “disregard social norms and nullify the elemental rights 
associated with individual autonomy that are essential to the very possibility of a 
democratic society”.336  
Furthermore, some scholars highlight how efforts to regulate Big Tech have 
sometimes proven ineffectual. In their critique of Big Tech from the standpoint of 
societal sustainability, Arogyaswamy suggests there are numerous, constantly 
evolving barriers to effectively regulating Big Tech; as such, these companies may 
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simply be too big to regulate and “regulation may do little more than slow down the 
damage to society, particularly since societal values and political preferences vary 
internationally.”337 This supports Prainsack’s view that Big Tech have “become de 
facto market regulators against whom public and civil society actors are powerless 
even when faced with stark ethical misconduct”.338  
 
2.2.3.6. Google  
 
Google has drawn particular attention from CDS scholars. In The Googlization 
of Everything, Siva Vaidhyanathan highlights how the company has capitalised on 
public failures to step into public sector roles, generating public goodwill and an 
image of corporate responsibility. This apparent benevolence, Vaidhyanathan 
argues, obscures the fact that Google is a publicly traded company obliged to act in 
the interests of its shareholders. Furthermore, in reality, Google’s monopoly was built 
on public resources; the company’s original search algorithm, for example, received 
substantial public subsidy.339 In order to pursue global civic responsibility and the 
public good, the author contends, we must dismantle the perception of Google as a 
‘force for good’ and scrutinise it as a commercial actor.340 
Google’s power and lack of accountability is also cause for concern; Zuboff 
highlights Google’s role as a pioneer of surveillance capitalism, which has enabled it 
to enjoy “extraordinary new asymmetries of knowledge and power, unprecedented in 
the human story”.341 Vaidhyanathan suggests this has enabled Google to quash 
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competition.342 The author further argues that Google operates in a ‘black box’, in 
which “it knows a tremendous about us, and we know far too little about it”.343 This 
supports Prainsack’s argument that Google is “not being subject to democratic 
control and public accountability in the same manner as public actors”.344  
Google’s expansion into healthcare markets is further cause for concern. 
Tamar Sharon explores how the company’s foray into health research generates 
novel power asymmetries between commercial actors, public health institutions and 
patients.345 The author draws attention to the possibility of tech corporations like 
Google emerging as “mediators, gatekeepers and proprietors” of health datasets, 
which risks them becoming ‘quasi-monopolies’ able to raise prices, restrict access 
and reshape research agendas.346 Sharon concludes that the ‘Googlization of health 
research’ should be closely examined and encourages further efforts to ensure its 




This section reviewed literature from critical data studies on the emerging 
political economy of health data, particularly around the distributive effects of data-
driven research in health and the power and politics of Big Tech. It revealed how the 
political economy of health data is reconfiguring the public-private nexus, such that 
the traditional public-private dichotomy does not accurately reflect the complexity of 
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today’s healthcare system;348 instead, ‘hybrid’ initiatives like public-private 
partnerships and corporate responsibility programmes are redefining the 
relationships between public benefit and private profit-making.349 Furthermore, this 
body of literature highlights the critical importance of collective issues like resource 
allocation and structural power in the health data economy350, emphasising the need 
for research that moves beyond an individualistic, privacy-centric lens and 
contributing to broader debates around data justice and politics in CDS.351  
 The political economy of health data gives rise to normative issues and 
regulatory challenges with significant ramifications for the normative underpinnings 
and legal framework of international human rights law. Thus, the following section 
explores the human rights implications of commercial data-driven health research, 
with a view to situating the DeepMind-NHS partnership in the context of the human 
rights scholarship on health data misuse, commercialization and profiteering.  
 
2.3. The Human Rights Implications of 
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Today, there is widespread acknowledgement that the development and 
implementation of new data-driven technologies has significant ramifications for 
human rights; this has been recognised by human rights organisations at all levels 
and by scholarship from a growing number of human rights institutes and 
organisations.352 Many of these efforts have focused on the implementation of new 
data-driven technologies like AI,353 which are set to profoundly impact a wide range 
of human rights. However, some human rights scholars- particularly advocates of 
civil and political rights and the right to science- have turned their attention to the 
risks associated with the research and development of data-driven technologies. 
In healthcare, data-driven research increasingly involves powerful technology 
companies, which has generated concerns about the misuse of health data among 
civil and political rights scholars. Data misuse is, however, just one concern 
associated with commercial actors in data-driven health research; health data 
commercialization and profiteering also pose risks to human rights, implicating a 
broader range of rights than health data misuse alone.354 In particular, the right to 
science framework- which deals directly with pertinent issues like IP- has been the 
focus of economic, social and cultural rights scholarship in this area.355 
This section reviews institutional and scholarly responses in human rights to 
commercial data-driven health research, focusing on the implications of health data 
misuse for the right to privacy and the risks of health data commercialization and 
profiteering for the right to science. It reveals how commercial data-driven research 
in health generates a number of concerns that span civil and political and economic, 
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social and cultural rights. However, despite acknowledgement of the relevance of the 
right to health in this area, it has received little attention from human rights scholars 
to date. In the final section, I highlight this gap in the literature, which this thesis 
seeks to address. 
 
2.3.2. Health data misuse: implications for the right to privacy 
 
2.3.2.1. The right to privacy in the digital age and its application to health 
data 
 
Health data has typically attracted special attention from privacy advocates 
due to its sensitive and personal characteristics.356 Furthermore, the protection of 
patient privacy in healthcare has long been subject to legal and ethical rules like 
confidentiality and consent.357 Despite this, the growing use of health data in medical 
and scientific research involving technology companies poses novel threats to the 
right to privacy, which have been a primary focus of the human rights community’s 
response to developments in data-driven health innovation.  
The right to privacy is enshrined in Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17(1) of 
the UN ICCPR,358 which states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
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attacks on his honour and reputation”. The content of the right to privacy has been 
expanded through the work of the Committee on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR).359 
Furthermore, the right to privacy legal framework has been strengthened through 
inclusion in regional human rights instruments and domestic human rights 
legislation.360  
Recent technological advances have proven vulnerable to surveillance and 
interception, generating renewed interest in the right to privacy ‘in the digital age’,361 
“a euphemistic term which emerged to encapsulate the relationship between privacy, 
surveillance and the protection of personal data—particularly in the context of digital 
technologies and the internet”.362 The right to privacy in the digital age has since 
been at the top of the agendas of both regional and international human rights 
mechanisms.363 In 2015, the UN appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Privacy in the Digital Age, Professor Joseph Cannataci, with a mandate to explore 
the promotion and protection of the right to privacy in the context of new information 
technologies.364 Since his appointment, the Special Rapporteur has addressed a 
number of concerns relating to commercial data misuse and the right to privacy, 
including health data. 
In his work on health data,365 the Special Rapporteur acknowledges the 
growing importance of digital data in preventing and treating health conditions and 
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our “shared interest in our dignity and autonomy being protected by the highest 
standards in health-data related scenarios”.366 He further acknowledges that health 
data has applications for other stakeholders beyond healthcare, resulting in tensions 
between different interests that give rise to social, legal and ethical issues.367 In 
response to these challenges, the Special Rapporteur- alongside the purposely-
established Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of Health-Related Data- 
published the Recommendation of the Protection and Use of Health-Related Data in 
December 2019,368 intended to serve as “a common international baseline for 
minimum data protection standards for health-related data”.369  
 The Recommendation describes the legal conditions for processing health 
data and addresses health data use in specific contexts, including scientific 
research. The recommendation on scientific research highlights the need for 
appropriate safeguards, consent, anonymisation and the right to “prior, transparent 
and comprehensible” information,370 and suggests researchers must weigh up a 
number of factors in evaluating health data processing; these include the purpose of 
the research, respect for ethical rules, its purported benefits and potential risks to the 
data subject or for group harm.371 
 The Special Rapporteur also addressed commercial misuse of health data in 
his end of mission statement on his visit to the UK in 2018. Here, he drew attention 
to the privacy risks of the DeepMind-Royal Free partnership, highlighting the 
decentralised nature of the NHS and inexperience of some trusts as a barrier to 
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negotiating effective data-sharing partnerships and arguing for “clear, strong 
guidelines on and oversight of any data-sharing agreement entered by the NHS”.372 
He thus concludes that, “while there are benefits to private-public partnerships, all 
data-sharing must be done with strict respect to the right to privacy of all patients and 
data-sharing standards including the Data Protection Act”.373   
 
2.3.2.2. Human rights scholarship on commercial health data misuse 
and the right to privacy 
 
This institutional response to commercial data-driven health research reflects 
the concerns of right to privacy scholars, who warn of the erosion of privacy that has 
accompanied advancements in biomedical and technological research in health. 
Petersen argues that the Big Data revolution has rendered health data- even in its 
anonymised form- far less private;374 thus, even where governments make concerted 
efforts to protect patient confidentiality, “we should assume those measures will be 
fallible”.375 Lobato de Faria and Cordeiro echo Petersen’s sentiment, describing the 
right to health data privacy as “more of an academic figure than a real protected 
right”.376 
For right to privacy scholarship in this area, the issue of transparency is a 
primary concern. Vayena and Tasioulas suggest that the opacity of commercial 
actors’ computational tools reinforce the importance of privacy protections against 
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corporate actors.377 This lack of transparency is also condemned by Dove and 
Özdemir,378 who argue that operating in a ‘black box’ will fail to establish public trust; 
any initiative wishing to do so, they contend, “must be willing and able to explain 
openly and clearly what data are being held, what proportionate privacy and security 
controls are imposed on them, with whom these data are being shared, and why, all 
reinforced and constantly updated with proper evidence”.379 
Dove and Özdemir also highlight the importance of accountability in protecting 
the right to privacy in commercial data-driven health research. The authors describe 
the close link between participation and accountability, arguing that, “any data 
initiative or data sharing system that is centered on holding the public’s trust must be 
willing and able to listen to, deliberate on, and respond to the questions and 
comments posed by publics, and potentially incorporate their input on a meta-
governance level”.380 These participation rights, they argue, “necessitate a priori 
transparency obligations”.381 The authors further argue that, for accountability to be 
effective, “one must be able to follow the lines of responsibility throughout the course 
of data flow (i.e., in whose hands it has been placed, and in whose hands it will be 
placed), and those actors involved in the flow must be able to explain and justify their 
conduct at all times in front of a forum that can pose questions and pass judgment, 
and impose consequences on those actors”.382 
 Right to privacy scholars have also drawn attention to the close relationship 
between privacy and other human rights in the context of commercial misuse of 
health data, particularly the right to non-discrimination. Ursin explains how health 
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data can be misused by companies to “control, deceive, or harm”,383 leading to the 
violation of the right to non-discrimination in medical research. Petersen 
substantiates this link in the context of health data related to disabilities, 
documenting how the misuse of data collected through voluntary contribution or 
wearable devices can lead to discrimination against disabled people by commercial 
actors in the finance, retail or employment sectors.384 She argues for a stronger 
enforcement model to dissuade commercial health data misuse and calls on 
governments to adopt a proactive approach in requiring private actors to disclose 
practices of re-identification and purchase of health data.385 
 The right to privacy in the context of commercial health data misuse is also 
closely related to economic, social and cultural rights like the rights to science and 
health. For some privacy scholars, this relationship is conceptualised as a tension 
between privacy protection and public health; for example, Di Iorio et al argue that 
the EU Data Protection Regulation- intended to strengthen the standing of the right 
to privacy- may restrict the ability of researchers to link data across sources, thus 
compromising the right to health.386 Chan et al also acknowledge this tension 
between societal benefits and privacy protection, praising the UK National Data 
Guardian as an exemplary regulatory model in balancing these interests.387 
Together, this body of scholarship and the work of Special Rapporteur on 
Privacy in the Digital Age highlight the novel risks that data-driven research in health 
pose to civil and political rights like the rights to privacy and the need for health data 
governance and regulatory systems to adapt accordingly. An exclusive focus on the 
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risks of health data misuse, however, neglects other important issues arising from 
the commercial use of health data in research, which implicate a broader range of 
economic, social and cultural rights. The following section thus shifts focus to the 
problematic consequences of health data commercialisation and profiteering for the 
right to science.  
 
2.3.3. Health data commercialisation and profiteering and the 
right to science 
 
2.3.3.1. The right to science 
 
The right to science is contained in both Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 
15(b) and (c) of the UN ICESCR388, which states, “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone... (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author”.389 Article 15(b) is inclusive of new technologies protected by 
patents;390 as such, UN committees and special mechanisms for the right to science 
have paid particular attention to issues around IP, which are integral to processes of 
health data commercialization and profiteering.  
In its statement on human rights and IP, the CESCR acknowledged “the 
broad significance of the creation, ownership and control of intellectual property in a 
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knowledge-based economy and the means that it can afford for promoting or 
inhibiting the enjoyment of human rights”.391 The report encouraged the development 
of IP systems in a ‘balanced manner’ and emphasised that “intellectual property is 
ultimately a social product and has a social function”:392 to facilitate human well-
being.  
The former Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights has also 
addressed the relationship between IP and the right to science.393 In a 2015 report, 
she highlighted tension between the two clauses of the right to science, arguing that 
the right to protection of the moral and material interests of authors should not 
override the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and other related human 
rights like the right to health. Thus, she states, “the objective of intellectual property 
rights law is not to provide the maximum possible return to rights holders, but to 
strike the proper balance of private and public interests”.394 The Special Rapporteur 
further stressed the importance of transparency in relation to IP, encouraging 
companies to disclose financial information about their R&D activities. The human 
rights approach to patents, she claims, draws attention to important but otherwise 
overlooked issues such as the social function of IP, the public interest, participation 
in policymaking, the promotion of innovation and the impact of patent regimes on 
marginalised groups. 
In this report, the Special Rapporteur also emphasised the risks patent policy 
poses to health equity, underscoring the imperative for states to ensure access to 
essential technologies for all- particularly the most marginalized- and arguing that a 
human rights perspective may judge patent exclusivity to be arbitrary, discriminatory 
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or disproportionate on the basis of the extent of its rights violations or facilitation of 
corporate profiteering. Ensuring access to technologies through the appropriate 
funding structures and processes, she suggests, is particularly important where 
research has received subsidy from states, intergovernmental organizations or 
NGOs.395   
In April 2020, the CESCR reaffirmed the close relationship between IP, 
access to health technologies and the right to science in General Comment 25.396 
The Committee drew attention to the growing involvement of commercial actors in 
scientific research, highlighting how IP can have negative impacts on the enjoyment 
of the right to science by redirecting research towards profitable projects as opposed 
to those addressing fundamental socio-economic rights and allowing patent holders 
to set high prices that compromise the financial accessibility of new scientific 
innovations.397 The Committee encourages states to counteract the risks of IP 
systems by providing adequate financial support to research that advances socio-
economic rights, balancing IP and open access and sharing of scientific benefits, 
and preventing unreasonably high costs of scientific products.398  
 
2.3.3.2. Right to science scholarship on health data commercialization 
and profiteering  
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Right to science scholars have drawn attention to the risks that IP systems 
pose to the right to science in data-driven health research. Vayena and Tasioulas 
highlight how IP rights may limit the dissemination of the fruits of data-driven 
research, which “risks according disproportionate weight to one part of the right, 
thereby making the other part of it impossible or unduly burdensome to exercise”399. 
The authors acknowledge competing IP interests in health data and their outcomes, 
arguing that these should not compromise other interests or rights that warrant 
protection.400   
 One such interest is equitable access to health technologies. Harris and 
Wyndham stress that the results of data-driven research in health should be used in 
a way that benefits everyone.401 Similarly, Knoppers et al propose accessibility as a 
key criterion to govern data sharing in commercial data-driven research; by properly 
acknowledging the use of data resources, the authors argue, commercial data users 
are discouraged from using patents to block access to data or the benefits drawn 
from it.402   
 Right to science scholars have further highlighted the obligation for states to 
generate the maximum possible benefits from data-driven health research. In 
contrast to privacy scholars- who have tended to focus on the State’s obligations to 
protect the right to privacy- right to science scholars have keenly emphasised the 
State’s positive obligations with regards to the use of health data in research. 
Knoppers et al contend that data sharing is essential for ensuring scientific research 
maximises benefits to public health and society;403 they regard it both as part of “the 
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efficient and proper stewardship of funds” and a means of ensuring “a just return on 
public investment and participation”.404 Donders similarly underscores the essential 
nature of scientific and technological research for advancing the right to health, 
arguing that States have a legal obligation to “invest, to the maximum possible, in 
scientific and technological advancement and share the benefits”.405 
 Transparency and accountability are also critical concerns in this literature. In 
their human rights approach to data sharing, Harris and Wyndham call for 
transparency in “the processes and regulatory systems established to manage data 
collection, storage and dissemination”406. Knoppers et al’s code of conduct focuses 
primarily on transparency in commercial dealings, demanding that policies on 
publications, IP, commercial involvement and information on progress and results 
are made available to the public through accessible websites.407 
For some, fostering accountability is deemed a particular strength of the 
human rights approach to commercial data-driven health research. Knoppers et al 
suggest that “ethical norms alone lack the articulation of the force of governmental 
and other regulatory stakeholder duties and standards of accountability” associated 
with human rights,408 encouraging the establishment of flexible oversight and 
monitoring systems and ongoing public engagement.409 This is supported by Mann 
and Schmidt, who emphasise the importance of states engaging in participatory 
health research, which actively involves all stakeholders and ensures their voices are 
prominent in discussions around priority-setting.410 However, commercial actors also 
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have right to science obligations in data-driven health research;411 Knoppers et al 
stress that non-state actors like commercial organisations should also respect 
regulatory efforts based on the human rights framework in this context.412  
 Right to science institutional and scholarly responses to commercial data-
driven health research highlight how health data commercialisation and profiteering 
implicate human rights beyond the bounds of civil and political rights. Furthermore, 
by framing data-driven health research “as a public good that enhances human 
capabilities and economic productivity”413 and “an ethical and scientific 
imperative”,414 right to science scholars shift emphasis to the state’s positive 
obligations with respect to health data. Their contributions also demonstrate the 
potential utility of the international human rights legal framework in balancing 
competing interests in health data and governance efforts in this area.  
  
2.3.4. The right to health in commercial data-driven health 
research 
 
The preceding sections reveal how the involvement of commercial actors in 
data-driven health research poses economic and political risks that implicate civil 
and political and economic, social and cultural rights. Across this literature, a number 
of scholars suggest the right to health may be particularly relevant in the context of 
commercial data-driven health research.415 Furthermore, many of the key issues 
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identified here implicate cross-cutting human rights principles that are also key 
components of the right to health, implying that commercial data-driven health 
research may also significantly impact the right to health. 
The importance of the connection between the right to health and data-driven 
innovation is supported by the CESCR’s publication of General Comment 25 in April 
2020,416 which explores the relationship between science and economic, social and 
cultural rights. Here, the Committee acknowledge the significance of new 
technologies like AI for socio-economic rights like the right to health, arguing that 
“States parties have to adopt policies and measures that expand the benefits of 
these new technologies while at the same time reducing their risks”.417 The 
Committee emphasise the need for the development and use of these technologies- 
and the regulation and governance of the data underlying their development- to be 
guided by the international human rights framework.418  
Despite its clear relevance in this context, however, the implications of 
commercial data-driven health research for the right to health had scarcely been 
explored in the human rights literature until as late as December 2020, when the 
Health and Human Rights journal published a special issue on the relationship 
between AI, big data and the right to health.419 Davis and Williams’ introduction to 
the special issue acknowledges how exploration of the impact of technologies on 
social rights to date has been limited and summarises the subsequent articles, many 
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of which touch upon issues related to commercial data-driven health research and 
the right to health.420 
Sekala et al assess the human rights dimensions of digital public health 
surveillance of COVID-19.421 The authors identify four primary human rights 
concerns arising from digital surveillance tools in the COVID crisis; their efficacy, the 
involvement of private actors, discrimination and the exacerbation of inequality, and 
the risks of context transgression. Of particular relevance here, they argue that the 
involvement of commercial actors in digital health technologies poses questions of 
accountability and that the commercialization of health data risks future 
discriminatory exclusions and differential pricing by insurance companies.  
For digital health surveillance tools to comply with human rights, the authors 
contend, they must be “evidence based, contribute to a comprehensive public health 
surveillance system, include sunset clauses, be non-discriminatory, and ensure 
mechanisms for greater transparency and accountability, including those aimed at 
nonstate actors such as private companies”.422  Appropriate transparency and 
accountability mechanisms include “increased participation from a diversity of end 
users in the design and rollout of apps, independent oversight through civil society 
organizations, increased research into the human rights effects of these apps, and 
greater accountability for the holders of data, including third parties”.423 The authors 
further draw attention to the potential of national action plans as a means of 
strengthening the realization of human rights through public policy and technology 
companies’ responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence. They conclude that 
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further empirical research into accountability in this context is necessary, particularly 
where data may be commercialized or deanonymized in the future and call for 
relevant UN Special Procedures and treaty bodies to give greater attention to the 
growing role of private corporate actors in digital health surveillance. 
Sun et al’s article focuses more generally on the relationship between human 
rights and digital health technologies.424 Like Sekalala et al, these authors 
summarise the key harms relating to digital health technologies, including data 
breaches, bias and discrimination, and function creep; partnerships between 
governments and private technology companies, they suggest, have raised alarms 
relating to function creep where data may be exploited for surveillance or commercial 
purposes.  
The authors state that the adoption of digital health technologies must be 
aligned with the right to health, including the AAAQ framework. They argue that 
emerging technologies raise particular concerns relating to the accessibility and 
availability of technologies, which may inadvertently exacerbate inequalities and 
widen digital divides. To address these risks, they propose that states and 
technology companies proactively identify risks of discriminatory outcomes, states 
hold companies accountable for identifying, mitigating and redressing these risks, 
and ensure transparency and accountability in the development, adoption, 
implementation and evaluation of digital health technologies.  
Sun et al propose three opportunities to assess whether ethical principles and 
human rights protections have been given sufficient consideration in the adoption of 
digital health technologies; health technology assessments, national digital health 
strategies, and judicial review. They further emphasize the need for governments to 
                                               




directly address inequities in access and advance transparency through digital health 
interventions. Leveraging the potential of digital health technologies, they conclude, 
“requires the meaningful adoption of standards and principles that ensure that these 
technologies truly protect rights, empower individuals, and do no harm”.425 
Sara Davis’ article adopts Philip Alston’s concept of a ‘trojan horse’ to 
highlight how the rapid proliferation of digital health technologies in global health is 
accompanied by serious and often covert social effects that require greater 
consideration by states.426 Among the risks she identifies, David argues that 
digitization in health may prove a trojan horse for the private sector, highlighting how 
technology companies can benefit significantly from public-private partnerships in 
which there is no immediate financial gain, raising questions about the appropriate 
use of taxpayer funds. She concludes that “it is critical that respect for human rights 
move to the center of digital health governance and not be left as an afterthought”.427 
By contrast to these articles, which focus predominantly on identifying the 
risks emerging from digital health technologies, Williams focuses on developing a 
guide for health rights impact assessments as a means of strengthening the 
realization of the right to health in artificial intelligence projects.428 She highlights the 
now widespread use of AI in healthcare and argues that, regardless of the context, 
AI health projects must be proceeded by a systematic health rights impact 
assessment that moves beyond civil and political rights concerns to consider the 
effect it will have on right to health principles and the broader health system. Its 
purpose, the author suggests, is both to strengthen AI projects to ensure they are 
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aligned with broader health system objectives and to strengthen health systems at 
large by ensuring AI projects are sustainable and advance the right to health. 
Williams’ proposed framework includes questions on a broad range of 
impacts, including legal context, health services, goods and facilities, health 
workforce, health information systems, medical products, vaccines and technologies, 
national financing and governance and leadership. She argues that her framework 
deliberately looks beyond the ‘technocratic’ aspects of the health system to consider 
the impact of AI projects on key right to health principles, including participation, 
accountability, equality and non-discrimination, non-retrogression, and international 
cooperation. In this respect, her work provides the most comprehensive and holistic 
tool to assess the right to health impacts of commercial data-driven research projects 
to date.429  
As a whole, the right to health scholarship relating to commercial data-driven 
research reveals shared concerns about the risks that data-driven research poses to 
the right to health, particularly equitable access to healthcare and accountability. 
However, as most of the literature to date focuses largely on preliminary exploration 
or mapping of these risks, there is little empirical evidence or case study analysis of 




This section reviewed the human rights scholarship on commercial data-
driven research in health. First, it explored the relationship between health data 





misuse in data-driven health research and the right to privacy, arguing that the 
privacy scholarship and the work of Special Rapporteur on Privacy in the Digital Age 
highlight novel risks that data-driven research in health pose to civil and political 
rights. It then turned to the commercialization of health data and its implications for 
the right to science, revealing an emerging body of socioeconomic rights scholarship 
that shifts emphasis to the state’s positive obligations with respect to the use of 
health data. Finally, it reviewed the limited right to health literature relating to 
commercial data-driven research in health, arguing that it both reveals common 
underlying concerns around equity and accountability while also lacking empirical, 








Chapter 3: Methods 
3.1. Methodology 
My research adopts a case study methodology, focusing in on one exemplary 
data-driven research partnership; the collaboration between DeepMind Health and 
the NHS. The case study is “an empirical inquiry that... investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.430 
I adopted the case study methodology to answer my research question as it 
enabled me to explore the multitude and complexity of facets that make up data-
driven research partnerships, painting a rich picture of a contemporary phenomenon 
that is as-of-yet little theorised in academic scholarship. This was facilitated by my 
use of an interdisciplinary framework, through which I synthesized findings on the 
case study from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Further to this, my research 
explores questions of political economy and socioeconomic rights, which necessarily 
implicate political, economic and legal systems. Case study methodology enabled 
me to retain important contextual characteristics of the DeepMind-NHS collaboration- 
including its political, economic and legal context- thus lending itself to the analysis 
of the structural implications of data-driven research partnerships. Together, the rich, 
contextual picture generated by my use of case study produces the in-depth insights 
necessary to answer my research question, which is exploratory in nature.  
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3.2. Research Methods 
My methodological approach combined documentary analysis of grey 
literature and semi-structured interviews. In total, I analysed over 150 documents431 
and conducted 19 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in the 
DeepMind-NHS partnership and opinion-leaders in the area of data-driven research 
partnerships. This combination of research methods enabled me to triangulate 
findings across different sources, thus reducing bias present within each data set.432 
This methodological approach stems from my project’s epistemological basis 
in the interpretivist paradigm. In contrast to the positivist epistemology underlying the 
natural sciences- which posits that there is a natural reality distinct from social 
interaction which can be observed in a detached, value-free way-433 interpretivists 
propose that the understanding of causation is developed through an interpretative 
understanding of social action as opposed to the identification of consistencies and 
regularities.434 As such, interpretivists are concerned with “culturally derived and 
historically situated interpretations of the social life-world”.435 Interpretivism is 
predicated on the ontological premise that reality is socially constructed, multiple and 
relative; thus, phenomena can only be understood through the contextual 
understanding and interpretation of different actors’ perspectives or perceived 
knowledge.436  
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3.2.1. Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis refers to “a systematic procedure for reviewing or 
evaluating documents- both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-
transmitted) material”.437 This entails the examination and interpretation of 
documents in order to decipher meaning, gain understanding and produce empirical 
evidence. Document analysis is predicated on the idea that documents are ‘social 
facts’ or ‘artefacts’;438 that is, they are created for a specific purpose and function, 
and are thus the embodiment of actions and interactions within social settings. In this 
sense, documents are socially produced and consumed and both “resources to be 
mined and topics to be studied”.439 This calls for researchers to go beyond 
determining the existence and accessibility of documents to analyse their 
authenticity and usefulness and consider their original purpose, context and intended 
audience.440  
 I chose to use document analysis as it enables the researcher to produce a 
rich description of a specific phenomenon or event, making it well-suited to case 
study research.441 This was particularly true of the DeepMind-NHS case as- 
unusually for a commercial deal of this kind- much of the grey literature surrounding 
the case was publicly available due to the investigative work of journalists and other 
stakeholders. Document analysis in this context thus provided both an extensive and 
novel source of data on data-driven research partnerships. Document analysis also 
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offers the practical advantage of being more efficient than other research methods, a 
factor I deemed particularly important in light of the need to keep pace with real-time 
developments in the case study.442  
 
3.2.2. Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews are a form of qualitative interview in which the 
researcher uses an interview guide but is free to adapt this to fit the flow of 
conversation;443 thus, “far from being an impersonal data collector, the interviewer, 
and not an interview schedule or protocol, is the research tool”.444 In semi-structured 
interviews, the researcher must adopt a conversational tone and ask open-ended 
questions that are designed to elicit ‘rich talk’; that is, inviting interviewees to speak 
at length about their experiences, memories, reflections and opinions, and develop 
their thoughts as they wish.445 
 I chose to use semi-structured interviews in support of my document analysis. 
The confidentiality of the interview setup provided an opportunity to elicit novel 
insights into the DeepMind-NHS case, as participants could disclose information 
unavailable in the public domain. Conducting semi-structured interviews thus helped 
to overcome the limitations of document analysis alone, which relies on publicly-
accessible information. This was particularly important given the controversial and 
politically charged nature of the DeepMind-NHS case. 
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Further to this, the spontaneous and dialectic nature of semi-structured 
interviews can also encourage participants to engage critically and interactively with 
the research topic, with the potential to generate entirely novel insights.446 Using 
semi-structured interviews thus enabled me to elicit critical perspectives on the 
DeepMind-NHS case that helped me to identify the key issues it raised. Interviews 
are also a useful tool to reconstruct past events;447 they therefore also helped to 
corroborate factual information surrounding the timeline of the partnership.  
 
3.3. My Methods 
3.3.1. Document analysis 
 
My document analysis focused on the grey literature surrounding the 
DeepMind-NHS collaboration; this includes contractual agreements, magazine and 
newspaper articles, website material from DeepMind and the NHS (including press 
releases, blogs, and reports) and articles, blogs and reports from non-governmental 
organisations and regulatory bodies.448 I selected which literature I would include on 
the basis of its relevance to the DeepMind-NHS case, the level of information it 
provided and its public availability. I also tried to include a wide range of sources that 
represented the views of a diversity of stakeholders to provide the richest possible 
picture of the case study. 
However, as the case study unfolded in real time, the availability of different 
sources varied throughout the project, posing a challenge to my analysis. In 
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particular, contractual agreements between the NHS, DeepMind and Google- which 
were at one time published on DeepMind’s website- were taken down, preventing 
me from accessing them further. Where such instances occurred, I mitigated their 
impact by sourcing these documents through alternative avenues, including online 
Freedom of Information requests made by other researchers.  
Further to this, in November 2016 and January 2018, DeepMind Health ran 
public and patient engagement events, which would have provided a first-hand 
account of the company’s participatory efforts and a rich source of documentary 
data. Despite this, the events were not open to the general public at large and I was 
therefore unable to attend. To make up for this, I was able to access videos of both 
these events on the company’s Youtube channel, allowing me to refer to their 
content in my document analysis.449 
 
3.3.2. Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
I began recruiting interviewees by instigating contact with key stakeholders in 
and commentators on the DeepMind-NHS case, which I identified through 
preliminary online research. I chose to recruit key stakeholders as they provided an 
internal perspective on the case to shed light on its details, while commentators 
provided an external, more reflective viewpoint that helped me to draw out the key 
issues it raised. This initial interviewee selection instigated a process of snowball 
sampling, through which my early contacts facilitated further introductions to relevant 
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colleagues and acquaintances. This gave me access to a diverse range of 
interviewees spanning academia, policymaking, patient advocacy groups, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists, the NHS and DeepMind’s own 
Independent Review Panel (see table below). 
My interviewee pool represents a wide range of perspectives on the 
DeepMind-NHS case. Despite this, I was unable to secure an official interview with 
representatives from DeepMind or the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust. In my 
view, these stakeholders were less willing to participate due to their direct implication 
in the controversial aspects of the case. This highlights how critical voices were 
disproportionately more willing to participate in my research than those  
directly implicated in controversial aspects of the case, a fact I have tried to mitigate  
through the inclusion of grey literature representing the views of DeepMind and the 
Royal Free.  
 Further to this, I chose not to interview NHS patients directly in my research, 
as I felt they were not best placed to shed light on the details of the case- which 
requires insider knowledge- nor to comment on the key political economic issues it 
raises, which relies on relevant expertise in this area. Instead, I tried to incorporate 
the patient perspective by interviewing representatives of two patient advocacy 
groups, who possessed the knowledge and expertise necessary to voice the 
concerns of patients in relation to the specifics of the DeepMind-NHS case.  
The following table lists the names of interview participants (using 
pseudonyms for those who wished to remain anonymous), the interest group they 






Name Occupation Date of Interview 
Dr Subhajit Basu 
Associated Professor in 
Information and Technology 
Law 12th January 2018 
P2 Academic 23rd January 2018 
Sam Smith 
Policy Lead at 
MedConfidential 22nd February 2018 
Dr Tamar Sharon 
Assistant Professor at 
Radboud University 23rd February 2018 
Theresa Harris 
Project Director in the 
Scientific Responsibility, 
Human Rights and Law 
Program in the AAAS 26th February 2018 
Hal Hodson 
Journalist at The New 
Scientist 22nd March 2018 
Dr Natalie Banner 
Lead for Understanding 
Patient Data 20th March 2018 
P8 
Researcher at independent 
research institute 13th April 2018 
Professor Julian Huppert 
Head of DeepMind's 
Independent Review Panel 19th April 2018 
Eleonora Harwich 
Head of Digital and Tech 
Innovation at Reform 29th May 2018 
Javier Ruiz 
Policy Director at Open 




P12 NHS clinician 15th August 2018 
P13 Patient advocacy group 30th September 2018 
P14 Academic 1st October 2018 
Vivek Kotetcha 
Research Manager at the 
Centre for Health and the 
Public Interest (CHPI) 8th October 2018 
P16 Academic 17th October 2018 
P17 Think tank 30th October 2018 
Annemarie Naylor MBE 
Director of Policy and 
Strategy at Future Care 
Capital 11th January 2019 
Harry Evans 
Policy Researcher at the 
King's Fund 15th January 2019 
 
I conducted 19 interviews in total, each lasting an average of approximately 
60 minutes and varying in length depending on the participant’s availability. The 
interviews were all conducted in person or over video conference call except one, 
which took place over the telephone as this was the interviewee’s preferred 
communication method.  
For each interview, I prepared a set of guiding questions. Some questions 
were intended to elicit information about the details of the case study; for example, 
“could you describe to me what happened in the DeepMind-Royal Free deal?”. 
Others were intended to shed light on some of the key issues it raised. I developed a 
list of key issues based on my early research into the partnership, particularly 




consent, intellectual property, equity, participation, transparency, and accountability. 
I tailored my guiding questions for each interviewee depending on their specific 
knowledge and expertise. I recorded all interviews on an audio recorder and later 
transcribed them myself.  
 
3.3.3. Coding my data 
 
Once I had transcribed my interviews and collected my grey literature, I 
downloaded the interview transcripts and documents into the computer programme 
NVivo, which I used to help me organise and code my data. The coding process 
began by developing a loosely-defined coding schema of ‘nodes’ based on key right 
to health themes of interest, as identified in my theoretical framework. As relevant 
passages of the text were coded under these headings, further sub-themes 
emerged, which were then incorporated into this coding schema. The coding schema 
was therefore adapted and refined on a continuous basis, developing in its richness 
and complexity.   
This is exemplified by the keywords that made up this coding schema. The 
initial version of the coding schema included the following keywords; Equity, 
Resource Availability, Transparency, Accountability, Corporate Responsibility. In the 
final version of the coding schema, each of these broad categories contained at least 
two levels of subcategories; for example, under ‘Equity’ were the keywords ‘pricing’, 
‘fragmentation’ and ‘digital maturity’, and under ‘pricing’ was ‘redactions’ and ‘public 
statements’. The evolution of my coding schema throughout the coding process 
reflects the development and refinement of my thoughts and arguments, and helped 







My methodology and research methods are subject to certain limitations. 
Critically, the case study methodology does not usually produce scientifically 
generalizable results;450 as such, rather than suggest my findings apply to all data-
driven research partnerships, I instead argue that the DeepMind-NHS case 
highlights the potential implications of such partnerships for the right to health.  
 Furthermore, document analysis can be limited by the fact that documents 
may provide insufficient detail as they are not created for research purposes.451 In 
my research, I found that certain forms of document- notably contractual 
agreements- were more challenging to interpret due to the use of technical 
language. Furthermore, some documents were hard to retrieve or had parts 
redacted. Bowen suggests that “the absence, sparseness, or incompleteness of 
documents should suggest something about the object of the investigation or the 
people involved”;452 in this vein, I have interpreted the inaccessibility of certain 
information as a research finding. Biased selectivity is a further limitation of 
document analysis; for example, “in an organisational context, the available 
(selected) documents are likely to be aligned with corporate policies and procedures 
and with the agenda of the organisation’s principals”.453 I have tried to mitigate the 
risks of biased selectivity by referring to wide range of documents produced by 
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authors and organisations with divergent aims and interests in the DeepMind-NHS 
case.  
 Semi-structured interviews are also limited by interviewer bias and the 
variability of rapport between interviewer and interviewee,454 which I discuss more 
fully in the subsequent section on reflexivity. However, the use of document analysis- 
which is unobtrusive and non-reactive- helps counter such concerns.455 Furthermore, 
there is a risk that interviewees generate ‘unreal’ responses, such that they are able 
to fabricate, exaggerate or distort information in their responses.456 My use of 
document analysis in conjunction with semi-structured interviews helps to overcome 
this issue, enabling me to triangulate my research findings and corroborate evidence 




The central role of the researcher in interpretative research calls for reflexivity 
or the researcher’s recognition of the “partial, provisional and perspectival nature of 
knowledge claims”.457 Though there is no absolute consensus on how one might 
practice reflexivity, Mauthner and Doucet provide useful guidance on the topic; the 
authors suggest interpretivist researchers consider how the data collection and 
analysis processes are influenced by their own social location and emotional 
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responses to participants, their academic and personal history, and the 
interpersonal, political and institutional contexts in which they are embedded.458  
With regards to my own social location, my age and status as a doctoral 
student had the strongest influence on my document analysis and interactions with 
interview participants. Throughout the process of conducting interviews in particular, 
I was conscious of being younger and less experienced than many of the 
stakeholders and opinion leaders I interviewed. This may have caused me to be less 
authoritative or commanding in my interviewing style, thus impacting the types of 
answers participants generated. However, interviewees predominantly gave 
insightful and enthusiastic responses to interview questions. Furthermore, my age 
and relative inexperience enabled me to be genuinely inquisitive and open-minded to 
interviewees’ ideas.  
Additionally, my own academic history in anthropology and human rights and 
my personal history of employment in health and human rights NGOs has impacted 
my collection and analysis of documentary and interview data. In particular, my 
experience researching corporate human rights abuses has inevitably caused me to 
treat the claims of corporate actors with caution. However, I have tried to critically 
evaluate all documents equally, questioning their reliability and credibility where 
there is evidence that it is appropriate to do so. My association with the University of 
Essex’s Human Rights Centre and the Human Rights, Big Data and Technology 
project will also have influenced the willingness of interviewees to participate in my 
research and possibly affected the types of answers they provided; this likely 
contributed to the lack of engagement from actors directly implicated in the 





partnership, who may be more averse to engaging with scholars adopting a critical 
human rights perspective. 
Finally, my data have been shaped not only by my own perspective but by the 
interaction between the interpersonal, political and institutional biases of research 
participants and the politically-charged DeepMind-NHS case. This influence was 
particularly strong given the proximity of some participants to the case study and its 
unfolding in real time. This inevitably affected the responses of interviewees and 
their willingness or ability to comment on or criticise particular aspects of the case.  
 
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
 
 As my research involved collecting primary interview data, I was required to 
apply for ethical approval from the University of Essex’s Ethics Committee. I 
submitted copies of my participant information sheet, which provides participants 
with details of the interview procedure, and my consent form, which I developed from 
the University’s suggested framework. I also submitted an ethical approval form, 
which detailed my research outline and plans and addressed important ethical 
considerations. 
 Informed consent is a critical requirement in primary qualitative research 
methods like interviews.459 This involves providing participants with information about 
the purpose of the research, who it is funded by, who the researchers are, how 
interview data will be used, and what is required of them.460 Researchers should gain 
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consent from participants multiple times throughout the research project;461 for 
example, consent is required prior to undertaking interviews, but should also be 
sought if participants have opted to look over the use of their interview data prior to 
publication, or if interview data is reused for another purpose beyond the initial 
research aims. Anonymity and confidentiality were also key ethical concerns 
associated with my semi-structured interviews; where participants opted to remain 
anonymous, the researcher must avoid identifying them either directly or indirectly 
and code audio recordings and transcripts to protect participant identities.462 
  I provided each interviewee with a consent form and participant information 
sheet prior to their interview. The information sheet told them about the project, 
funders, researchers, interview protocol, and the procedures around data collection, 
storage and use. The consent form required participants to give written consent to 
the conditions of the project and also gave them the various options regarding 
anonymity, including: 1. I would like my real name to be used, 2. I am happy for my 
real name to be used but would like to check over the use of any quotes before 
publication, 3. I would not like my real name to be used, 4. I would not like any 
identifying details to be used in the above. All those who opted to be named or to 
check over quotes used prior to submission were contacted to ensure they were still 
happy to be named and those who wished to check over quotes were given the 
opportunity to do so and to amend them as they saw fit. I coded all recordings and 
transcripts to avoid breaches of confidentiality and ensured they were stored on the 
university’s cloud system. 
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 As interviewees were participating in a professional capacity, the predominant 
risks of unintentional harms were to the employment and reputation of participants. I 
described these risks in the participant information sheet. Furthermore, I tried to 
avoid asking personal questions beyond confirming participants’ occupations and 
how they came to know about the DeepMind-NHS case study. Where information 
was disclosed that might have put participants’ jobs or reputations at risk, I have 
been careful to exclude it from the thesis.  
 I also took measures to avoid unintentional risks to myself when conducting 
interviews. In my face-to-face encounters with participants, I arranged to meet them 
either in a public place or in the participant’s workplace. This created an atmosphere 
of mutual professionalism and respect. Given the politically sensitive nature of the 
topic and the direct involvement of some interviewees in the case study, I was 
conscious of provoking emotional responses from participants. However, I only 
encountered a strong and unexpected emotional reaction in one interview, shortly 
after which I chose to bring the interview to a close to avoid causing the participant 
distress. I have since discussed the incident with the interviewee to establish what 
interview material they are happy to be included in the thesis.   
 Finally, access and permission were key considerations in relation to my 
document analysis. Fortunately, as a result of the efforts of individuals and 
organisations that preceded me in investigating the DeepMind-NHS case, much of 
the grey literature surrounding the partnership was in the public domain. This 
included documents that were at one time confidential, such as contractual 
agreements that had been subject to freedom of information requests. As a result, I 
was able to draw upon a wide range of publicly available grey literature without the 




Chapter 4: The DeepMind-NHS case: 
implications for political economy 
This chapter explores the DeepMind-NHS case in depth and its political-
economic implications. It includes sections on the promise of DeepMind-NHS, 
resource asymmetries, knowledge asymmetries and a conclusion. The terms 
‘resource asymmetries‘ and ‘knowledge asymmetries’ describe two different forms of 
power asymmetry- a concept common to critical data studies and political economy- 
arising from the DeepMind-NHS partnership. I chose to categorize my findings under 
these terms as they allow me to distinguish between asymmetries in the distribution 
of resources and material wealth on the one hand and the distribution of information 
and knowledge on the other. This distinction facilitates subsequent discussion of the 
implications of DeepMind-NHS for the right to health in terms of its provisions 
concerned with resources distribution- including equity and resource availability- and 
those that are implicated in the asymmetric distribution of knowledge- including 
transparency, accountability and corporate responsibility. 
4.1. The promise of DeepMind-NHS 
4.1.1. Public benefits 
 
Throughout DeepMind’s collaboration with the NHS, both parties have touted 
the potential mutual benefits of the partnership. In the MOU between DeepMind and 
the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust, both sides committed to “establishing a broad 




activity and maximising the potential to work on genuinely innovative and 
transformational projects”.463 Thus, as is typical of PPP models, the notion of mutual 
benefit is a key underlying rationale in the DeepMind-NHS collaboration.464   
This implies that the partnership will deliver public benefits. In Clause 6.4.3. of 
the MOU between DeepMind and the Royal Free, the trust describes its hope to 
benefit from “a place at the vanguard of developments in what is widely viewed as 
one of the most promising technologies in healthcare, with the potential for great cost 
savings...”.465 This idea was supported by comments from one interviewee, who 
stated, “An app like Streams can help and will free up doctors’ time- there is no 
doubt about it”. 
This sentiment was echoed by other NHS trusts who partnered with 
DeepMind Health. In Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS Foundation Trust’s online 
announcement of its collaboration with the company, a Moorfields clinician 
suggested DeepMind Health’s AI will provide faster diagnosis and more timely 
treatment.466 Similarly, on the NHS University College London Hospital Foundation 
Trust’s website, the trust describes its hope that their collaboration with DeepMind 
will ensure that the segmentation of CT and MRI scans “can be done more rapidly”, 
which could “free up clinicians to spend even more time on patient care, education 
and research”.467 Together, these statements suggest that collaboration with 
DeepMind Health is expected to deliver public benefits in the form of improvements 
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in the efficiency of health services in the NHS. This reflects the importance placed on 
neoliberal values like cost-cutting and time-saving in the NHS.468 
 In addition to efficiency gains, improvements in the quality of NHS care is also 
an anticipated public benefit of the partnership. DeepMind’s website states their 
commitment to “support and strengthen the delivery of exemplary care in the NHS” 
and ensuring that “its talented clinicians get the tools and support they need to 
continue providing world-class care”.469 DeepMind’s NHS partners also tout potential 
improvements in quality of NHS care; for example, Moorfields suggest DeepMind’s 
algorithm will lead to more accurate diagnosis of preventable eye conditions.470 
These statements imply that improvements in the health and wellbeing of patients 
are a key objective of DeepMind-NHS, appealing to the so-called ‘vitalist’ narrative 
underlying data-driven health innovation.471  
The disruptive potential of new data-driven technologies and the reputational 
gains of working with a well-known technology company like DeepMind are also 
viewed by some as a key public benefit arising from the collaboration. Clause 6.4.2. 
in the MOU between DeepMind and the Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust outlines 
the trust’s hope to benefit from “reputational gain from a strategic alliance with an 
unrivalled partner of the highest profile and expertise, focused on a highly impactful 
mission”472. Furthermore, the Health Secretary Matt Hancock has publicly praised 
DeepMind’s work with Moorfields, praising the ‘transformative’ potential of 
DeepMind’s work and their advancement of innovation through good data 
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management.473 These gains in innovation appeal to the so-called ‘project’ repertoire 
in data-driven innovation, which is often used to justify collaboration with large tech 
companies like Google.474  
Despite this wealth of perspectives on the anticipated public benefits of the 
partnership, the MOU between DeepMind and the Royal Free reveals one notable 
omission; Clause 6.4.1.- the first, two-part clause describing what the trust hopes to 
gain from the partnership- has been redacted in the publicly-available version of the 
agreement.475 Thus, despite the public accessibility of the MOU, some of the 
anticipated public benefits of the partnership- which may be of a commercially-
sensitive nature- remain undisclosed to the general public, raising questions around 
the transparency of the deal.  
 Taken together, these findings reveal that DeepMind-NHS is expected to 
deliver public benefits in the form of improvements in the efficiency and quality of 
NHS services, the development of disruptive innovations and reputational gains for 
NHS partners. This illustrates how PPPs are framed as publicly beneficial and 
demonstrates how research collaborations involving large technology companies like 
Google are characterised by a ‘panopoly of moral orientations’, meaning these public 
benefits are framed in a diversity of ways.476 The potential public benefits of 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS may thus offer a means to advance the right to 
health.  
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4.1.2. DeepMind Health’s engagement with CSR and ethics 
 
DeepMind’s website projects an image of a socially-responsible research 
organisation acting primarily in the public interest. This is reflected in their mission 
statement- to “make the world a better place”-477 and commitment to “research and 
build safe AI systems that learn how to solve problems and advance scientific 
discovery for all”.478 
This image is supported by DeepMind’s lack of profitability to date; the 
company’s losses tripled to almost £94 million in 2017.479 One interviewee explained 
how the company had compromised its short-term profitability in pursuit of its 
mission: 
 
“We need to remember, of course, that DeepMind’s aim is really blue sky; it’s really 
esoteric. It is developing artificial general intelligence and they say that without any 
irony... That is a very blue-sky endeavour. DeepMind Health is really the most 
pragmatic and practical part of their organisation which is really trying to do applied 
stuff; AI for some sort of practical good. The real driving factor is this ‘blue-sky’ 
project of developing artificial general intelligence and to do that, you’re going to 
have to want or be comfortable with having to lose some money because there’s no 
immediate commercial payback on that type of endeavour.” 
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This initial lack of focus on commercialisation led the company’s own 
Independent Review Panel- to which I turn my attention subsequently in this section- 
to suggest in their annual report that DeepMind may be better conceived of as a 
‘research lab’, ‘not for profit’ or ‘charitably-minded venture’ as opposed to a 
commercial entity.480 
The comments of one interviewee, who wished to remain anonymous, 
supported this view, likening the company to a social enterprise: 
 
“If they want to act like social enterprises, that’s fantastic. Wouldn’t it be great if all 
companies wanted to act like social enterprises and combine the profit incentives 
and the efficiencies that you get from that with that kind of sense of purpose?” 
 
 The image of DeepMind as a socially-responsible, non-commercial 
organisation has been further fuelled by public perception of the company’s co-
founders, Demis Hassabis and Mustafa Suleyman. One interviewee spoke warmly of 
the company’s bosses: 
 
“They are lucky that they can do research and they have the financial might of 
Google to back them up. Also- and I think this is a credit to Mustafa and Demis- they 
were always very academically and AI-for-good minded. They both have very 
interesting backgrounds which are quite different from other founders. I think it’s a 
testament to their strength of character and the type of personality they have in the 
organisation that the company took on that approach.” 
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 Other interview participants also drew attention to this positive perception of 
DeepMind’s leadership; Tamar Sharon described how Suleyman is seen as a ‘civic 
activist’ due to his experience working in the NGO and human rights sectors. These 
comments illustrate how DeepMind’s co-founders are viewed not only as tech 
entrepreneurs but also philanthropists, pointing to the increasingly blurred distinction 
between private profit-making and public benefit in the data economy.481  
DeepMind is also engaged in a number of corporate social responsibility 
initiatives intended to promote the ethical development and use of AI among 
companies working in the sector. Notably, the company was a founding member of 
the Partnership on AI, a technology industry consortium with the mission to “benefit 
people and society” through developing best practices, advancing public 
understanding of AI, and serving as an ‘open platform’ for engagement and 
discussion around AI-related issues.482 The company have also partnered with NGO 
Article 36 to “explore the risks of intelligent systems in international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law”.483 This focus on corporate responsibility further 
contributes to the company’s public image as a socially-responsible research 
organisation. 
Beyond this general perception of DeepMind’s public image, DeepMind 
Health took a number of notable steps to demonstrate their commitment to socially-
responsibly behaviour, particularly since the public controversy surrounding the data 
transfer under the Royal Free Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. When DeepMind 
Health was established in 2016, it appointed an Independent Review Panel (IRP) 
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with the goal “to maintain a publicly accountable profile that ensures we act with the 
greater public interest in mind”.484 The IRP was tasked with producing an annual 
report detailing areas in which DeepMind could be commended or should seek to 
improve, which was published in June 2017.485 In this report, the IRP described itself 
as “entirely independent” and “self-governing”, subject to no binding secrecy rules or 
non-disclosure agreements.486  
During my interview with Professor Julian Huppert- who lead the IRP at the 
time of the interview- he explained how it operated: 
 
“Nine of us were appointed. We’re currently eight in strength and recruiting. We have 
access to whatever they’re doing. We go in, talk to them, see things. We’re not under 
any confidentiality requirements- that’s quite important- and we have a budget to 
investigate them, which is almost unheard of.” 
 
His remark speaks to the novelty of this kind of voluntary accountability 
mechanism in the context of a commercial organisation. Another interviewee’s 
comments reaffirmed this view: 
 
“It’s a credit to them that they set up the Independent Review Panel. I think it’s 
probably a unique model. I think it was given £100,000 by DeepMind to spend as it 
wanted. It had absolute right to go in at any point unannounced and then inspect any 
aspect of DeepMind’s operations; the only minor caveat being seeing individual 
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patient data, obviously. It gave DeepMind’s board two days’ notice of its report 
before it was about to publish it to make sure there wasn’t any time for DeepMind to 
surreptitiously change their practices before the report came out. It was very much 
an investigatory type of panel and I think they went about it in the right way.” 
 
In addition to the IRP, DeepMind also made notable efforts to promote patient 
and public participation in their work. In the wake of the Royal Free controversy, the 
company organised a number of participatory activities, including an event with over 
130 patients, carers and members of the public on 20th September 2016 and a 
Collaborative Listening Summit with 50 patients, NHS stakeholders and members of 
the public on 31st January 2018.487 The stated purpose of these events was to 
involve patients and the public in determining how the company should conduct 
participatory work and to develop a set of principles to guide technology companies 
working in the NHS. Through this work, DeepMind Health co-designed a strategy for 
involving patients and the public in their work.488 
Together, these findings highlight how DeepMind Health has generated a 
public image of a benevolent, socially-responsible research organisation. DeepMind 
Health’s public image exemplifies the rise of what Prainsack terms ‘health data 
entrepreneurism’, where “many organizations in the health domain, and particularly 
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those whose activities revolve around health information and digital health, do not fit 
into traditional binary categories such as public versus private, ethical versus 
unethical, or bottom-up versus top-down”489. It further highlights how “’doing good’ is 
becoming an inalienable- not an additional- dimension of corporate activity”.490 In 
addition to this, DeepMind Health’s establishment of an independent accountability 
mechanism to oversee its work with the NHS and engagement with public and 
patient participation implies that public-private partnerships between technology 
companies and public health systems may advance good governance values like 
transparency and accountability, as posited by some political economists.491 
 
4.2. Resource asymmetries 
4.2.1. Private sector benefits: Google Health’s exclusive 
intellectual property rights 
 
Despite claims that DeepMind-NHS will deliver mutual benefits, including 
public benefits to the NHS, the details of the contractual agreements underlying the 
collaboration give reason to question this. Clause 16.2. of the services agreement 
between DeepMind and the Royal Free Hospital NHS Foundation Trust states that: 
 
“DeepMind shall own all the IPR subsisting in or covering (i) the FHIR API; (ii) the 
DeepMind Software; (iii) the Documentation; (iv) the Developments; and any 
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improvements, modifications, developments to and/or derivative works of any of the 
foregoing and including, for the avoidance of doubt, any other IPR which may be 
developed or created by or on behalf of DeepMind in the design, development and/or 
deployment of the FHIR API or the DeepMind Software or otherwise in the provision 
of the Services.”492 
 
Under its collaboration with the Royal Free, DeepMind thus has the right to 
retain all developed intellectual property relating to the Streams application. This 
corroborates Powles and Hodson’s concern that DeepMind will keep all IP 
developed through its collaboration with the NHS, meaning “the knowledge 
DeepMind extracts from these public resources will belong exclusively to 
DeepMind”.493 
Further to this, more recent contracts between Google Health UK and the 
NHS- which arose out of DeepMind Health’s merger with Google Health- similarly 
allocate all developed IP relating to the Streams application to the commercial 
organisation; Clause 16.2. of Google Health’s restated services agreements with the 
Royal Free and Taunton and Somerset NHS Foundation Trust echoes the wording of 
the original services agreement between DeepMind and the Royal Free.494 
Additionally, the company’s AI research collaborations with the NHS are also 
set to provide exclusive intellectual property rights to Google Health UK. Clause 7.3. 
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of the amended research collaboration agreement with Moorfields Eye Hospital NHS 
Trust entitles Google Health UK to “IP residing in the results and any technology, 
designs, works, inventions, software, data, techniques, algorithms, know-how or 
other materials developed as part of the research”.495 Further to this, Clause 7.4. 
gives the company “the exclusive right to Commercialise the Developed IP”.496  
In my interview with journalist Hal Hodson, he explained the implications of 
the company’s rights to IP and its commercialisation: 
 
“The thing is that all the intellectual property from that deal belongs to Alphabet. 
That’s fine- that’s how it should work, of course, because DeepMind belongs to 
Alphabet- but what it means is that if... Alphabet launches a product through Verily or 
something, Moorfields gets nothing.” 
 
His comment highlights how granting technology companies exclusive IP 
rights prevents the NHS from sharing in any future commercial benefits resulting 
from the collaboration. However, it also highlights a further concern; that any IP 
rights assigned to DeepMind or Google ultimately belong to their parent holding 
company, Alphabet Inc. As a result, partnerships like DeepMind-NHS risk facilitating 
the accumulation of intellectual property- and scientific knowledge- in the hands of 
just a few powerful technology companies.   
Together, these findings reveal that the DeepMind-NHS partnership has 
granted exclusive rights to developed IP- and with it entitlements to any scientific and 
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commercial benefits of the collaboration- to Google Health. They exemplify how 
technology companies like Google pursue an innovation strategy of ‘data rentiership’ 
“designed to capture and extract value through ownership and control of data as an 
asset”.497 These findings further support the view that corporations are able extract 
wealth through a system of socialized risk and privatized reward in public-private 
innovation, whereby they reap disproportionate rewards from collective innovation 
processes.498 They highlight that technology companies’ data-driven business 
models not only pose risks to the privacy of patients but also their ability to access 
the scientific and commercial benefits of their data’s use. Affording Google Health 
exclusive IP rights to collaboratively-generated innovations thus calls into question 
the UK government’s resource availability obligations under the ICESCR.  
 
4.2.2. Public sector benefits: future costs to the NHS and 
inequitable access to technologies 
 
In the publicly-available copy of the original services agreement between 
DeepMind Health and the Royal Free Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, Clauses 10.1 
to 10.4 under the heading ‘Charging and Invoicing’ are redacted.499 Similarly, in the 
transfer of the services agreement with Taunton and Somerset NHS Foundation 
Trust to Google Health, Clause 6- which details the costs of the collaboration- has 
been omitted in the version available online.500 Furthermore, in Schedule 1 of the 
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research collaboration agreement between Google Health and Moorfields Eye 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, Clause 2.1 under the ‘Fees and Financial 
Contributions’ section is also redacted.501  
These contractual agreements share a common feature; that clauses relating 
to payment and the costs of Google’s services have been redacted under 
commercial confidentiality requirements. This prevents the public from accessing 
information about the price of the company’s technologies and their long-term costs 
to the NHS. 
In an interview with Digital Health magazine in March 2017, DeepMind co-
founder Mustafa Suleyman suggested that prices would “default to market rate” after 
initial contracts with NHS trusts end.502 In the same interview, as well as the 
Independent Review Panel’s 2018 report, the possibility of an outcome-based 
payment model was also posited as a potential future pricing model.503 Despite these 
vague statements, the price Google Health UK will charge NHS trusts for access to 
its technological innovations ultimately remains unclear.   
In light of Google Health’s exclusive rights to all developed IP under the 
partnership, this lack of clarity and transparency around pricing has problematic 
implications for access to these technologies in the NHS. In the pharmaceutical 
sector, time-limited monopoly rights over new drugs have enabled pharmaceutical 
companies to raise the prices of medicines to levels that are unaffordable to 
resource-scarce health systems, preventing vulnerable patients in developing 
countries from accessing medicines they need. The case of Myriad Genetics 
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exemplifies this risk; the company was granted monopoly rights over diagnostic 
testing kits for breast cancer, enabling it to inflate their price and restrict access, 
even to some of those women involved in the original research to develop them.504 
By similarly granting Google Health an intellectual monopoly on developed IP without 
delineating clear conditions relating to future pricing, DeepMind-NHS risks corporate 
price-gouging that renders any technological innovation unaffordable to some- if not 
all- NHS trusts.  
I raised the question of access in my interview with the Wellcome Collection’s 
Natalie Banner, who explored one hypothetical scenario: 
 
“One of the challenges we have is that if you have companies like DeepMind going 
into NHS trusts... let’s say they are developing a machine learning algorithm for a 
particular function, right? That is incredibly valuable because they’re training it on 
real patient data. As messy as that is, they are training something that can then work 
in other contexts. They can then offer that service for free or for a reduced price for a 
certain length of time to that NHS trust. They can then go to a different NHS trust 
and charge them full price.” 
 
 Her response highlights the potential for Google Health UK to charge 
differential, inflated prices that are unaffordable to NHS trusts with greater resource 
constraints. It draws attention to the inequitable impacts of fragmentation in the 
health service- the direct result of decades of neoliberal reforms since the 1980s- 
and the resulting ‘innovation lottery’ in the NHS, in which avoidable variation in 
                                               




access to new technologies prevents optimal health outcomes.505 This inequity in 
access to technologies is particularly problematic in light of the correlation between 
financial performance and quality of care in NHS trusts, as patients in greatest need 
of health improvements through new technological innovations are least likely to 
benefit from them.506 
 
The risks that price-gouging poses to equitable access to Google Health’s 
technologies in the NHS are further exacerbated by the issue of digital maturity. 
Digital maturity refers to “how well... providers... are making use of digital technology 
to achieve a health and care system that is paper-free at the point of care”.507 Data 
collected by NHS England reveals significant variation in the digital maturity of NHS 
trusts;508 this impacts their ability to adopt new algorithmic technologies, which rely 
on well-functioning digital infrastructure and relevant technical expertise.509  
This problematic relationship between digital maturity and equitable access to 
technologies was reflected in my interview with Professor Julian Huppert, in which I 
questioned how DeepMind Health had selected which NHS Trusts to work with: 
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“Within the UK, if we park the rest of the world where this information is different, a 
lot of it is about which hospitals are up for doing it. The main capacity constraint is on 
the hospital side. Do the hospitals have- I’m talking Streams only here- do the 
hospitals have a project management team- it doesn’t need to be their own people- 
who could implement it. At the moment, they’re only doing it in places that want to do 
it. Now, that’s not perfectly equitable of course. More dynamic hospitals are, in 
general, better. But if you’re piloting, there’s no point in piloting a new project with a 
bunch of people who don’t want to have it; they won’t use it. We know that.” 
 
 His response highlights how an NHS trust’s readiness and capabilities- both 
key indicators of digital maturity-510 are critical precursors to partnership with the 
company. This is further evidenced by DeepMind Health’s choice of NHS partners to 
date, which are predominantly research-focused, university-linked hospitals or NHS 
Global Digital Exemplars.511 The importance of digital maturity in the establishment 
of data-driven research partnerships thus illustrates how these collaborations may 
generate new inequities in the NHS in the form of digital divides between the ‘Big 
Data rich’ and ‘Big Data poor’.512 
 These findings suggest that the lack of assurances surrounding the future 
pricing of Google Health’s technologies fails to prevent the possibility of corporate 
price-gouging that results in inequitable access to the health benefits of the 
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collaboration. They demonstrate how- where due consideration is not given to the 
context of the health systems in which they are embedded- data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS may contribute towards rather than mitigate 
inequity in health systems, echoing criticisms of other forms of PPP like GHPs and 
PPPs in pharmaceutical innovation.513 They further give weight to right to health 
scholars’ views that emerging technologies raise concerns around accessibility and 
availability and the exacerbation of digital divides.514 
These findings also highlight the ways in which neoliberal reform in the NHS- 
which has simultaneously fragmented the system and propagated partnerships with 
commercial actors to deliver health goods and services- generates health inequity. 
This inequity is further exacerbated by the need for digital maturity as a precondition 
to engaging in data-driven research partnerships with technology companies, 
revealing the emergence of novel forms of health systems inequity in the digital age. 
Together, these findings have significant implications for equitable access to 
healthcare under the right to health. 
 
4.2.3. The resource trade-off: benefits for whom? 
 
 My analysis thus far highlights how, despite claims that the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership will deliver mutual benefits, the contractual agreements that form the 
legal basis of the collaboration give Google Health exclusive rights to all developed 
IP and its scientific and commercial benefits, and with it the power to restrict NHS 
patients’ access to any resulting health technologies. These asymmetries in the 
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distribution of resources under DeepMind-NHS call into question the incentives 
driving NHS trusts to enter into agreements that appear to disproportionately benefit 
Google Health. 
 One significant finding arising from my analysis is the promise of access to 
technology for free. Through a Freedom of Information (FOI) request, one journalist 
at The Register determined that the Royal Free and other NHS trusts using Streams 
are able to access the application for free for the duration of their initial contract with 
the company, provided their costs do not exceed £15,000 a month.515 The 
company’s AI research partnerships appear to follow a similar pattern; under the 
Moorfields collaboration, the trust’s hospitals have free access to any resulting 
algorithms and technological innovations for the five-year duration of the initial 
contract.516  
In our interview, Dr Tamar Sharon explained how this offer of technology for 
free obscures the real deal underlying data-driven research partnerships:  
 
“We hand over these publicly-funded datasets for companies to use to feed into AI 
because machine learning needs a lot of data to train it. The business model is not 
that Google would sell this data- which is its business model in advertising- but that it 
develops new services that it then sells back to the public sector. We give away this 
data and- further down the line- we’ll have to pay for these services. That will be at a 
cost again.” 
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Her comment reveals how patients inadvertently pay for both the development 
and deployment of Google Health’s technological innovations, first through their 
commercially-valuable data and then with NHS funding to gain access to the end 
product.  
Javier Ruiz of the Open Rights Group elaborated on this point in our interview, 
drawing comparisons with the Google Books partnership: 
 
“Going back to the question of cost- the investment- part of the problem here is the 
way this is framed. It’s very, very similar to the whole debate with archives, libraries, 
digitisation and public-private partnerships. The main incentive is for hospitals not to 
have to invest so they are lured in. For a public organisation not to have to put 
money aside and to have someone doing it for free in exchange for some future 
cost- it’s very, very tempting. We’ve seen it in other sectors and it’s very, very hard to 
stop the power of free. 
 
Should we force an NHS manager to say, “Sorry, no, you cannot do a free deal with 
DeepMind. You have to now find millions and put out a tender and then find some 
companies and now pay DeepMind or IBM or whoever for what they are doing”? 
Because of the way that public sector finance works, it’s tricky. 
 
I mean, they’re presented as having no cost to the public. They definitely have long 
term costs and the longer-term costs can be a lot higher. The theory is that when 
people sign this kind of partnership, they get an idea of what the value for money is 
and that they’re getting a fair exchange. The reality is that, as long as it’s free, they 





His concerns were echoed by Vivek Kotetcha, Research Manager at the 
Centre for Health and the Public Interest, who highlighted the political appeal of this 
‘credit card approach’ to spending for trusts wishing to ‘get something for nothing’. 
Together, these findings highlight how the short-term incentive of access to 
technology for free can overshadow consideration of the long-term costs and 
broader implications of research collaborations like DeepMind-NHS for public sector 
healthcare providers. In light of the controversial history of public-private 
partnerships in the NHS- in which the manipulation of value appraisal procedures 
has facilitated corporate wealth extraction-517 and evidence that many PPPs fail to 
achieve their purported benefits, this lack of accurate and transparent appraisal is 
problematic.518   
These findings also draw attention to the novel ‘data extractivist’ model 
through which technology companies like Google Health are able to capture value 
through PPP.519 In exchange for the promise of technology for free, NHS trusts that 
provide technology companies with free access to patient data inadvertently end up 
‘paying twice’; with both their patients’ data- which has scientific, technological and 
commercial value- and their precious funds.520 The DeepMind-NHS partnership thus 
facilitates a process of ‘data rentiership’, which enables technology companies “to 
capture or extract value through ownership and control of data as an asset”.521  
Together, these findings uncover the real resource trade-off underlying 
DeepMind-NHS; that beneath the rhetoric of mutual benefit and the promise of time-
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limited access to technology for free is a partnership model that allocates the long-
term scientific and commercial benefits- as well as the power to control access to 
their health applications- solely to Google Health. It demonstrates how- much like in 
other PPP models- the notion of value in data-driven research partnerships can be 
construed in ways that serve commercial over public interests.522 The issue of value 
appraisal is further complexified in such partnerships by the ambiguity and ethical 
pluralism surrounding this terminology in the context of data-driven innovation.523 
This resource trade-off underlying DeepMind-NHS calls into question the UK 
government’s socioeconomic rights obligations in data-driven research partnerships, 
demonstrating that more is at stake in data-driven research partnerships than patient 
privacy alone.  
 
4.3. Knowledge Asymmetries 
4.3.1. Public sector secrecy: the lack of transparency 
surrounding DeepMind-NHS 
 
In November 2016, the initial partnership between DeepMind Health and the 
Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust was first publicly announced on DeepMind’s 
website.524 This announcement of the collaboration was made an entire year after 
the data transfer had commenced in November 2015 and at least six months after 
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Hodson’s New Scientist article exposed its controversial impacts on patient 
privacy.525  
Despite the eventual public announcement of the Streams collaboration, 
DeepMind Health had always intended the scope of its partnership with the NHS to 
be significantly more wide-ranging. The Memorandum of Understanding between 
DeepMind and the Royal Free states the parties’ intention to establish a “wide-
ranging collaborative relationship for the purposes of advancing knowledge in the 
fields of engineering and life and medical sciences through research and associated 
enterprise activities”.526 In Clause 4.3, both parties recognise that the collaboration 
“may involve a number of project-related transactions”, and Clause 5.1 goes on to 
list numerous potential areas of future collaboration beyond the scope of the 
Streams project, including bed and demand management, financial control products, 
reading of medical images, task management and junior doctor deployment, and 
more.527 Furthermore, in a public engagement event in November 2016, DeepMind 
co-founder Mustafa Suleyman disclosed the company’s ambition to develop a 
multipurpose, patient-centred collaboration platform for clinical use in the NHS and a 
patient portal to make this data directly available to patients; these are significantly 
more grandiose plans than those made available to the public on the company’s 
website.528 These findings highlight how, as early as January 2016, both parties had 
far greater ambitions for the collaboration than the Streams project alone. They 
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support Hodson’s suggestion that DeepMind-NHS “goes far beyond what has been 
publicly announced”.529 
Sam Smith of MedConfidential drew attention to Hodson’s critical role in 
uncovering the details of the deal:   
 
 “Why did the DeepMind-Royal Free deal get away with the things they got away 
with? Because they thought they could... It’s only through Hal’s work in requesting 
the contract- i.e. one journalist asked a question- that this came out. What people get 
upset about is the consequence of people using this secrecy. Basically, get rid of the 
secrecy!” 
 
 His comment implies that, without Hodson’s investigative work, the data 
transfer may have remained undisclosed to the public, highlighting the critical role of 
the media in exposing privacy breaches by public actors.  
Describing his investigation, Hodson explained that the Royal Free deal 
provided an unusual opportunity to gain insight into DeepMind’s work: 
 
“This was the first opportunity that I had seen to have a public surface area for 
freedom of information requests because, normally, DeepMind’s not going to give 
you their contracts with private businesses. The hospital has to give you the 
contracts barring certain restrictions” 
 
 Furthermore, under the MOU between DeepMind and the Royal Free, the 
company committed to assisting and cooperating with the trust to fulfil its disclosure 
                                               




obligations under the FOIA.530 This highlights how public-private partnerships like 
DeepMind-NHS may provide an opportunity to gain access to what is usually 
confidential information surrounding commercial operations, providing weight to the 
view that PPPs in health can facilitate greater transparency.531  
 However, the journalist went on to describe the complex nature of the 
information he uncovered: 
 
“It was quite interpretive because the data sharing agreement is not the database- 
it’s just the contract that governs that sharing of the database- so there was quite a 
lot of just figuring out data protection law in order to figure out what they were talking 
about and figuring out NHS lingo for HL 7 and Fire APIs and all that kind of stuff.” 
 
 His observation suggests that, even where mechanisms to facilitate 
transparency exist, they may continue to obscure corporate misconduct through their 
complexity, highlighting the importance of meaningful transparency.532   
 Further to this, the use of commercial confidentiality laws acted as a barrier to 
disclosure of the commercial details of the partnership. In a proceeding section of 
this chapter, I highlighted how sections relating to pricing and costs in the publicly-
available contractual agreements between Google Health and the NHS have been 
redacted. In our interview, Eleonora Harwich, Head of Digital and Tech Innovation at 
Reform, questioned why clauses relating to the exchange of money had been left 
blank in the company’s published contracts. Another interviewee drew attention to 
tech companies’ use of non-disclosure agreements, stating that these companies 
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“aren’t going to stop people signing NDAs- but I think they should because it holds 
back the public debate about what we want”. This illustrates how- even where 
transparency mechanisms exist- the use of corporate confidentiality laws enables 
technology companies to prevent the disclosure of critical information necessary to 
assess the value and cost-effectiveness of partnerships like DeepMind-NHS.533  
 Some interviewees suggested that the DeepMind-NHS collaboration sheds 
light on a more systemic lack of public sector transparency surrounding commercial 
deals in the NHS. The Wellcome Trust’s Dr Natalie Banner commented: 
 
“There are a lot of commercial partnerships already in the NHS. You don’t 
necessarily talk about them, but they do exist. One of the most telling things that 
came out of that situation was- I think it was the press officer for the Royal Free- who 
said, “we’ve got 1500 of these sorts of agreements. We don’t really see what the 
problem is.” That was just horrifying, right? The idea that you’ve got these 
agreements going on all over the place, because we don’t tend to talk about 
commercial involvement in the NHS very much.” 
 
 Annemarie Naylor of Future Care Capital similarly described the difficulties of 
trying to obtain information about commercial deals with technology companies in 
the NHS. Their comments echo political economists’ frustrations at the ‘democratic 
accountability deficit’ surrounding PFI projects,534 in which uncovering even basic 
data about the number, size and cost of PFI deals was problematic.535 They also 
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highlight the lack of oversight of commercial technology partnerships like DeepMind-
NHS, which has proven a barrier to effective accountability in other forms of PPP.536  
 Together, these findings suggest that the DeepMind-NHS partnership has 
suffered from a lack of transparency that both obscured the details of the original 
data transfer- enabling a serious privacy breach that was unbeknownst to the public- 
as well as the commercial aspects of the collaboration, preventing accurate public 
assessment of its long-term risks and benefits. This is problematic in light of the view 
that openness is fundamentally important in establishing public trust in data-driven 
research and PPPs more generally.537 These findings suggest that- despite their 
potential to facilitate greater access to information- data-driven research partnerships 
may fail to advance good governance norms like transparency in practice.538 Given 
the critical importance of transparency to accountability for the right to health in 
international law, these findings imply that data-driven research partnerships like 
DeepMind-NHS have significant implications for the right to health. 
 
4.3.2. The ’Googlization’ of DeepMind Health 
4.3.2.1. The DeepMind-Google relationship 
 
Throughout the course of my research, it became evident that DeepMind’s 
close relationship to Google had been the source of much of the public controversy 
surrounding DeepMind-NHS. This is encapsulated in the following comment from 
one anonymous interviewee:  
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“This whole fuss has been made because it is Google. That is one thing we really 
need to understand. There is a concern about data sharing and there is a concern 
about how the agreement was drawn up but one thing I can tell you- if it was not 
Google, there would not have been this much of an uproar.” 
 
 Another interview participant consolidated and elaborated upon this view: 
 
“People immediately react quite viscerally to the idea of Google or Amazon having 
access to healthcare data. The important word there is ‘visceral’; there’s a very 
emotive problem with that.” 
 
 These insights reveal widespread public concerns about the power and 
trustworthiness of Big Tech and their expansion into healthcare markets. 
DeepMind’s proximity to Google had troubled critics from the start of the 
DeepMind-NHS collaboration. Multiple interviewees highlighted that the original ISA 
with the Royal Free was signed by Google, not DeepMind, raising questions about 
the degree of separation between the two. In our interview, Professor Julian 
Huppert- at the time Head of DeepMind’s IRP- expressed concerns about the 
companies’ close relationship: 
 
“I think how DeepMind Health show their clear separation from Google is a very big 
issue. They are very careful to do that internally. Do people believe that is a big 
problem? One of my concerns is what happens if somebody else comes in and runs 




things and then the next person comes and says, “okay, well I have a different view 
on the world. I’m going to do it like this”. I think there are some real issues around 
how you solidify that.” 
 
Huppert’s comments were also reflected in the IRP’s 2018 annual report, 
which recommended that DeepMind make efforts to robustly entrench their 
separation from Google.539 
Despite this, for some time, DeepMind remained secretive about the business 
model it intended to pursue under its partnership with the NHS. This issue was 
raised by Javier Ruiz in our interview: 
 
“The biggest problem here is that DeepMind- even with all their efforts at discussing 
ethics and asking all these big questions- they’re not really explaining what their 
business model is. That might be ok back when Google appeared but now, in 2018, I 
don’t think you can have a technology company that doesn’t explain what their 
potential business model is. The precautionary principle right now should be that if 
you cannot explain your business model, we have to assume you’re going to be the 
worst case. We need to assume that their business model is going to be to capture 
public health processes that- at the moment- are open.” 
 
His concerns were also reflected in DeepMind’s 2018 Independent Review 
Panel report, which encouraged the company to be more transparent to reassure the 
                                               




public their revenue was coming from a legitimate source and quash suspicions they 
had perverse motives.540 
In my interview with Dr Tamar Sharon, she explained the implications of this 
opacity: 
 
“The business models aren’t very clear, who is profiting and how exactly is not at all 
clear.” 
 
Further to this, DeepMind Health had made a concerted effort to distance 
itself publicly from Google; the company avoided using Google’s branding to 
promote its own work and publicly claimed that “data will never be connected to 
Google accounts or services or used for any commercial purposes like advertising or 
insurance”.541 
 
4.3.2.2. The Google takeover 
 
The Google conglomerate is a ‘de facto’ monopoly with enormous market 
power;542 Alphabet’s annual revenues would make it the 59th wealthiest state in the 
world by gross domestic product (GDP) were it a country.543 This concentration of 
market power has been facilitated by the acquisition of corporate competitors, on 
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which Google and Alphabet have jointly spent tens of billions of dollars over the past 
two decades.544 
One interviewee discussed the implications of this venture capital (VC) culture 
for the DeepMind-NHS partnership: 
 
“Anon: We all think we’re supporting the small fish to fight against the big companies 
when, actually, the VC funding model for start-up companies goes something like 
this. “I have a model. Here’s $5 million. In the next year, I want you to make that 
model the most effective possible”. They go and find data, make an effective model, 
and then you get to exit time and the exit strategy for most start-ups- 95 to 99% of 
them- is to sell to a big company. 
 
A: Like DeepMind? 
 
Anon: Exactly. We think we are creating competition by supporting smaller start-ups 
but actually the start-ups will all get acquired by the big companies. We’re ending up 
with an aggregation of all the IP- the IP from the NHS, the IP from the machine 
learning algorithms- all going into these four or five companies across the world. 
That’s kind of scared me in the first instance.” 
 
Their insights highlight how Big Tech utilise mergers and acquisitions to 
quash competition and capture IP. The result of this, one interviewee suggested, is 
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the concentration of power in the hands of “a very select group of white, middle-class 
men in Silicon Valley”.  
During the course of my research, this culture of strategic mergers and 
acquisitions played out. In November 2018, DeepMind made the shock 
announcement that the DeepMind Health unit would be subsumed under Google 
Health.545 This required the transfer of all contracts between the NHS and DeepMind 
to Google Health; all partnering NHS trusts- excluding Yeovil District Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust- subsequently completed this transfer of contracts.546 DeepMind 
justified the merger on the basis of commercial interests, claiming it would provide 
the opportunity to scale-up the company’s technologies and bring them to the wider 
world.547 
In one interview- which took place soon after the merger- the participant 
reflected upon the legitimacy of these justifications: 
 
“The sad truth... is that I think even DeepMind are on borrowed time to a certain 
extent. I don’t know the details of the Streams move but I suspect that was guided by 
commercial considerations. The point is that DeepMind don’t have the know-how to 
commercially scale-up Streams and that’s why Google took it on.” 
 
Their comment highlights that- despite suggestions to the contrary- DeepMind 
remains a commercial venture subject to corresponding incentives, pressures and 
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shareholder interests. This underscores the need to scrutinise technology companies 
as commercial actors and not simply ‘forces for good’.548  
The merger also saw the abandonment of the IRP, which DeepMind 
suggested was “unlikely to be the right structure for the future” given the company’s 
global expansion.549 One interviewee expressed disappointment at the decision: 
 
“The real shame is that the panel is now being wound down with the movement of 
Streams to Google. I’ve said this publicly- I think that’s a bad development. I really 
regret that that is the decision they’ve taken and I hope that maybe they’re still trying 
for that decision to be reversed.” 
 
 The merger exemplifies how the ‘Googlization’ of health is facilitated by 
research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS, which enable Big Tech to further expand 
their monopoly powers into the health sector. 
One interviewee contemplated the future of this expansion into healthcare 
markets: 
 
“I think the longer-term thing is going to be people wearing sensors and interacting 
with applications and you see that in the approach that Amazon and Google are 
taking. They’re starting to build direct customer services, where basically you wear 
your sensors, they hold that information forever- you can’t get that back.” 
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This view is supported by Google’s acquisition of Fitbit in 2018 for $2.1 
billion,550 cementing the company’s intention to capture the wearables market and 
further expanding its powers of surveillance and profitability.551  
Technology companies like Google also have a competitive advantage in 
developing AI in healthcare. One interviewee explained the source of this first-mover 
advantage: 
 
“The reason why they have these monopolies is because they have the data. These 
are the five companies that have just so much data that whatever machine learning 
techniques they build are just going to be better and it’ll be really hard to compete.” 
 
 Their comment highlights how companies like Google benefit from the 
network effects of digital markets which- in combination with increasing returns to 
scale- amplify their monopolistic effects, “placing an enormous concentration of 
market power in the hands of a few firms”.552  
Javier Ruiz, Policy Director at Open Rights Group, expressed concern that 
this first-mover advantage might position the company to shape NHS information 
technology (IT) systems to fit its own needs, a fear shared by Head of DeepMind’s 
former IRP, Professor Julian Huppert: 
 
“I would be very concerned- and this is something we pushed in the last report and 
we kept going on about- if DeepMind Health’s approach was to do with lock in... A 
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very standard tech approach is we set up a system, we charge you a lot, and then 
we make it very hard for you to change to somebody else. I would be extremely 
alarmed if that was how things went. There’s a big difference between saying we will 
provide you with a thing and it’s really good but if you want to have someone else 
provide you with a thing, you can; you stay with us if we’re the best and the 
cheapest. That I have no problem with and I think it would be odd to say the private 
sector can’t ever offer that. Lock in- completely different.” 
His comments echo Powles and Hodson’s warning that this first-mover 
advantage might enable Google to gain an “entrenched market position” in the 
NHS.553   
Thus, by enabling Google’s takeover of DeepMind Health and the company’s 
stealthy expansion into healthcare markets, DeepMind-NHS risks affording the 
company ever more expansive powers to “build, own and control networks of 
knowledge about disease”.554 The lack of transparency surrounding DeepMind’s 
close relationship to Google exemplifies how technology companies have “deployed 
strategies of obfuscation and secrecy to consolidate power and wealth”.555  
 
4.3.2.3. Google’s lack of accountability 
 
Concerns about Google’s encroachment on healthcare markets has been 
fuelled by the company’s disregard for privacy norms and seeming lack of legal 
accountability. Alongside the other major platform monopolies, the privacy 
implications of Google’s business model- which relies on controversial mass data 
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collection and analysis and surveillance practices- have been heavily criticised by 
civil society organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and 
United Nations mechanisms like the Special Procedures.556 This business model of 
‘surveillance capitalism’,557 as Zuboff has argued, is characterized by economic 
imperatives that “disregard social norms and nullify the elemental rights associated 
with individual autonomy that are essential to the very possibility of a democratic 
society”.558 
Criticism of Google’s business model has been further fuelled by the 
company’s implication in numerous privacy scandals over the past decade. These 
include high-profile data breaches and privacy concerns surrounding the company’s 
various tools and applications, including its search engine, Gmail, and Google 
Streetview.559 Some of the company’s controversial practices have been 
successfully challenged by data protection authorities; in France, for example, 
Google was fined 50 million euros for failing to properly disclose to users how data is 
collected across its services to show personalized advertisements.560 However, other 
cases- including so-called Project Nightingale, a partnership agreement with private 
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US healthcare provider Ascension in which Google secretly gained access to tens of 
millions of identifiable patient records without patients’ knowledge or consent-561 fall 
within the bounds of legality despite their unscrupulous nature. The Ascension story 
is reminiscent of DeepMind’s exploitation of ambiguities in the data controller/ 
processor distinction in the DeepMind-NHS case, highlighting how disparities 
between legal and ethical categories have left the public with limited means to hold 
technology companies to account for intrusive data practices. 
Further to this, in recent years, Google has received multiple multibillion-dollar 
fines for violating anti-trust legislation.562 The company has also faced numerous 
accusations of tax evasion; for example, in 2017, Reuters reported it had illegally 
shifted $23 billion to a tax haven in Bermuda in an effort to reduce its overseas tax 
bill.563 In our interview, Eleonora Harwich drew attention to the inequity of Google’s 
purported tax evasion in the context of DeepMind’s collaboration with the NHS: 
 
“What is disturbing is that DeepMind are part of Alphabet and Alphabet doesn’t pay 
tax. To me, when you talk about making sure that these partnerships actually benefit 
society, that is an extremely unfair thing. If you think about any other company in the 
UK, you could still abide by the rationale of “okay, they provide jobs, they pay tax 
here”, so they’re already giving back that benefit on top of improved health 
outcomes. Some people might actually argue, “why would you do a revenue sharing 
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agreement, if you’re already taxing them”. But when you talk about the DeepMind 
case, it’s just like, “well, they actually don’t pay their taxes”. Or, at least, Alphabet 
doesn’t.” 
 
Considering the critical role that public investment has played in Google’s 
success- the company’s original search engine algorithm was supported by a grant 
from the National Science Foundation-564 these accusations of tax evasion are 
particularly scandalous. Google’s seeming disregard for the law demonstrates how 
the company is “not being subject to democratic control and public accountability in 
the same manner as public actors”.565  
Another common concern among interviewees was the increasingly 
prominent role that both DeepMind and Google occupy in data-driven technology 
policymaking circles. One interviewee commented on the privileged position 
technology companies like Google enjoy in regulatory debates around AI: 
 
“In the case of AI, what I find really concerning is that- and this doesn’t hold for all 
regulators because some are very technically savvy- that they tend to naturally see 
industry as the right partner to have at the table. I can assume that it has something 
to do with the fact that these are the companies that are driving the field. These are 
the companies that have the data. These are the companies that are building the 
infrastructure needed to do effective machine learning techniques. So these 
companies are naturally invited to come and then academics are invited, and then 
the rest of us are all an afterthought- civil society organisations, human rights people, 
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affected communities- they’re all not necessarily perceived as experts. That means 
that whatever shape the regulation takes is going to be influenced heavily by industry 
needs and industry needs don’t always map on to societal values or societal needs. I 
think this is what the whole DeepMind-NHS kerfuffle showed.” 
 
 Another participant emphasised the need to engage commercial actors in 
regulatory debates but concurred that the government was heavily influenced by Big 
Tech: 
 
“You can’t make good public policy without some engagement with industry because 
you just don’t know how it works so you’ll never get the practicalities rights. You’ve 
got to have some. It’s clearly much easier for big companies to get the ear of 
government and I think it’s inherently quite hard to know how to counter that 
influence.” 
 
 One interviewee drew comparison between Big Tech and other powerful 
corporate lobbies: 
 
“The biggest lobbyers of government in the modern day are no longer Big Oil or Big 
Tobacco- it’s Big Data.” 
 
These findings support Powles and Hodson’s argument that Big Tech “are 
already in key positions in policy discussions on standards and digital reform”.566 
This level of influence is problematic in the context of corporate bias in PPPs, as it 
                                               




risks enabling companies to evade responsibility and expand corporate interests into 
the public domain.567 
Further to this, both DeepMind and Google’s influence extends far beyond 
policymaking; my analysis reveals the companies have also made significant 
investments in academic and public research institutions. In 2017 alone, the 
company spent £8.1 million on academic donations, including grants to New York 
University, University College London, Imperial College London and the University of 
Alberta.568 They are also supporting research at the Universities of Cambridge and 
Oxford; in 2018, they gave Cambridge an ‘undisclosed sum’ to appoint a DeepMind 
Chair of Machine Learning and support a number of master’s students.569 Beyond 
funding technical research in machine learning, the company has also provided 
support to the Oxford Internet Institute, which conducts research on AI ethics and 
regulation; this conflict of interest has led to criticism of some of the Institute’s 
academics, who failed to publicly declare the company’s financial backing in their 
publications.570  
Some company employees are also teaching at highly respected universities 
like Oxford and University College London and are encouraged to openly publish 
their research in academic journals.571 DeepMind have even created their own 
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internal research branch, DeepMind Ethics and Society, tasked with anticipating, 
mitigating and addressing the risks of AI,572 raising questions around in-housing.573 
Parent company Google have also been funding research at universities for over a 
decade; Oxford University alone is purported to have received more than £17 million 
from the company.574  
In our interview, Dr Tamar Sharon explained how Big Tech are able to shape 
research agendas through partnership in and funding of scientific research: 
 
“These companies’ inroads into health and medical research are currently mostly 
collaborative — partnering with public research institutes who turn to them mostly for 
their technical expertise in data collection, management and analysis. But they are 
not just facilitating research, they are also carrying out research themselves, and as 
they become important actors in research, we should also expect that they will begin 
to influence research agendas.” 
 
Her comment implies that DeepMind and Google’s interests in research may 
ultimately enable these companies to shape research agendas in their own 
interests.575 Much like corporate-funded philanthropic foundations- who utilized 
public-private partnership to manipulate global health research priorities to become 
‘de facto agenda setters’-576 these companies may seek to redirect research 
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agendas towards profitable causes, which are not necessarily aligned with public 
health needs.577   
Together, Google’s privacy violations, utilisation of regulatory loopholes to 
evade taxation and anti-trust legislation, and the influential position that both 
DeepMind and Google occupy in regulatory debates surrounding AI reveal the lack 
of accountability surrounding large technology companies like Google. One 
interviewee summarised this succinctly: 
 
“The scary thing is each individual has signed a deal with the devil. What do we do as 
a nation thinking beyond the current institutionalised model into what happens in the 
future where we’ll retain no control? Because were the government to collect this kind 
of data on people and analyse and act on it and monetise it and use it to advertise and 
influence politically, everyone would go mental. Yet supranational, multinational 
corporations, which are beyond the rule of law, do not act to any democratic standard, 
can’t be voted out, are doing it without any problem.” 
 
Their comment speaks to emerging power asymmetries between companies, 
governments and the general public in the area of data-driven health research.578 
Furthermore, these findings draw attention to the limitations of regulatory 
efforts for Big Tech,579 which render these companies “de facto market regulators 
against whom public and civil society actors are powerless even when faced with 
stark ethical misconduct”.580 It suggests that Big Tech have become key political 
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players in the health domain,581 exemplifying the growing entanglement of public and 
private sectors in the health data economy.582 As the BHR community is currently 
grappling with the question of how to mitigate the power and unlawful behaviour of 
commercial actors, international human rights law may have a significant role to play 
in holding companies like Google publicly accountable.  
 
4.3.2.4. The knowledge trade-off: collaboration with whom, at what cost? 
 
My findings in this section revealed that DeepMind-NHS suffered from a lack 
of public sector transparency. Furthermore, the partnership enabled controversial 
technology monolith Google to covertly expand its reach further into healthcare 
markets, generating concerns about the company’s lack of transparency and lack of 
legal and political accountability. These findings suggest that DeepMind-NHS 
generates knowledge asymmetries between commercial technology companies, 
health systems and their patients, supporting the view of critical data scholars and 
political economists who argue that public-private partnerships are reconfiguring the 
public-private nexus.583 
These knowledge asymmetries cast doubt on DeepMind Health’s public 
image as a socially-responsible research organisation and its establishment of 
voluntary accountability and participatory mechanisms. They reveal that the 
DeepMind-NHS partnership is characterised by an underlying knowledge trade-off; 
that collaboration with a seemingly publicly-accountable and socially-responsible 
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technology research organisation obscures the covert expansion of the monopoly 
powers of controversial technology monolith, Google. 
This knowledge trade-off implies that the purported benefits of so-called 
‘health data entrepreneurism’ may necessitate compromising the public 
accountability of data-driven technological research in health.584 It further points to 
the ‘toothlessness’ of voluntary corporate responsibility- which relies entirely on 
corporate good will- in the face of shareholder interests,585 highlighting the 
importance of remaining critical of the effectiveness of such initiatives and 
underscoring the need for robust accountability mechanisms.586 These findings thus 
have important ramifications for state accountability and corporate responsibility for 




 This chapter explored the political economy of DeepMind-NHS. It argued that, 
despite the seeming potential of DeepMind-NHS to deliver public benefits and 
facilitate collaboration with a socially-responsible, publicly-accountable research 
organisation, the underlying political economy of the partnership reveals 
asymmetries in the distribution of resources and knowledge between the company, 
the NHS and its patients. 
These resource asymmetries arise from Google Health’s exclusive rights to all 
developed IP under the partnership and the lack of clarity around the future price of 
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any resulting technologies, which risks corporate price-gouging that restricts access 
to these technologies and exacerbates the innovation lottery in the NHS. 
Furthermore, these knowledge asymmetries are the product of the lack of 
transparency surrounding the partnership, DeepMind Health’s merger with Google 
Health and Google’s lack of accountability, as evidenced by the company’s privacy 
violations, utilisation of regulatory loopholes and influential position in regulatory 
debates surrounding AI.  
These asymmetries reveal the real trade-offs underlying data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS; that beneath the veneer of mutual benefit, all 
scientific benefits and their applications are rewarded to commercial actors, and 
behind the promise of collaboration with a socially-responsible, publicly-accountable 
research organisations lies the covert expansion of the powers of Big Tech. These 
findings have significant implications for the realisation of the right to health in data-





Chapter 5: Resource asymmetries: 
implications for the right to health  
5.1. Economic accessibility 
5.1.1. Access to technologies 
 
The previous chapter argued that the DeepMind-NHS partnership risks 
exacerbating inequities in the NHS by making any resulting technological innovations 
more accessible to trusts with greater digital maturity and resource capacities, 
leaving those in greatest need of technological and health improvements least likely 
to benefit from them. It argued that fragmentation of the health system and the 
propagation of partnerships with commercial actors- both symptoms of neoliberal 
reform in the NHS- have contributed to this so-called ‘innovation lottery’ that 
determines access to technologies. My findings echo critics of the pharmaceutical 
industry- who condemn how powerful monopolies render drugs inaccessible through 
corporate price-gouging-587 and give weight to critical data scholars’ observation that 
novel forms of health inequity are emerging in the data economy.588 Furthermore, 
much like the issue of access to medicines, these findings call into question the 
obligations of the state with respect to accessibility and equity under the rights to 
health and science.  
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5.1.2. Economic accessibility under international human rights 
law  
 
General Comment 14 describes four interrelated and essential elements of 
the right to health, often called the ‘AAAQ’ framework: the availability, accessibility, 
cultural acceptability, and quality of health facilities, goods and services.589 
Accessibility requires that States make health facilities, goods, and services 
accessible to all; this includes physical accessibility, economic accessibility, and 
information accessibility, as well as accessibility on the grounds of non-
discrimination. Economic accessibility or affordability is therefore a key component of 
the right to health. 
General Comment 14 further prescribes that economic accessibility should be 
based on the principle of equity. This demands that “payment for health-care 
services, as well as services related to the underlying determinants of health... 
whether privately or publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially 
disadvantaged groups”,590 such that, “poorer households should not be 
disproportionately burdened with health expenses as compared to richer 
households”.591 The concept of equity in human rights law is thus closely related to 
status and power,592 social justice,593 and the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality.594 Though they are related, there is a crucial distinction between equity and 
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equality; equity is an inherently normative concept, as it implies some kind of 
judgement about whether the processes driving inequality are unjust or unfair,595 
whereas equality is “the metric by which health equity is assessed”.596 
States also have a duty to protect the right to health, which requires them to 
ensure that privatisation in the health sector does not constitute a threat to the 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and 
services.597  
Further to this, States have obligations with respect to the accessibility of 
health technologies under the right to benefit from scientific progress and its 
applications. As specified under General Comment 25, the applications of scientific 
progress refers to the material results of scientific research, including vaccinations, 
fertilizers and technological instruments.598  As a result, the CESCR has stressed, 
the right to science is instrumental in realizing the right to health and states must 
“ensure that their legal or other regimes for the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary or artistic productions constitute no 
impediment to their ability to comply with their core obligations in relation to the 
right(s) to... health...”.599  
 The CESCR has further emphasised the critical role of intellectual property in 
mediating the relationship between the rights to science and health, arguing that 
intellectual property “may, in some cases, pose significant obstacles for persons 
wishing to access the benefits of scientific progress, which may be crucial for the 
enjoyment of other economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to 
                                               
595 Braveman & Gruskin (n593). 
596 Paula Braveman ‘Social conditions, health equity, and human rights’ (2010) Health Hum Rights 
12(2) 31-48. 
597 General Comment 14 (n46), para 35. 
598 CESCR General Comment 25 (n87), para 8.  




health”.600 Where patents grant patent holders exclusive rights to exploit the product 
or service they have invented, the Committee states, they can determine a price for 
these products and services which, if set high, may restrict access for low-income 
persons or developing countries.601 This is problematic for the right to science, which 
obligates State parties to “ensure that everyone has equal access to the applications 
of science, particularly when they are instrumental for the enjoyment of other 
economic, social and cultural rights”.602 
 
5.1.3. Access to health technologies: implications for the right 
to health 
 
In light of the UK government’s obligation to make health goods and services- 
including new medical applications resulting from scientific research- accessible to 
all NHS patients on an equitable basis, the DeepMind-NHS partnership risks 
infringing upon the rights to health and science by generating inequities in access to 
technologies between NHS trusts and their patients. It highlights how the NHS’ 
‘innovation lottery’603 has serious implications for NHS patients’ socioeconomic rights 
and casts doubt on the DeepMind-NHS trust-level, demand-driven partnership model 
as a means for the UK government to realise equitable access to health technologies 
and advance the rights to health and science. This finding exemplifies Chapman’s 
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argument that the fragmentation of health systems like the NHS complicates 
realisation of the right to health.604 
Further to this, my political economic analysis suggests that DeepMind’s role 
in the provision of data-driven technologies- in particular, the company’s claims to 
exclusive intellectual property rights- may compromise the accessibility of these 
technologies by enabling corporate price-gouging that renders them unaffordable to 
some or all NHS trusts and their patients. As a result, the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership could also infringe upon the UK government’s duty to protect the 
financial accessibility of health technologies under the right to health, supporting the 
view that “the commercialization of health care in some cases shapes and in others 
aggravates the inequitable distribution of health facilities, goods, and services”.605 
Together, these findings point to the risks that DeepMind’s exclusive 
intellectual property rights pose to the accessibility and equitable provision of health 
technologies under the rights to health and science, reinforcing the instrumental role 
of the right to science in realising the right to health in the digital age. Much like the 
longstanding tension between corporate profit-making and the right to health in the 
access to medicines debate, in which pharmaceutical monopolies’ patent rights over 
new drugs have enabled corporate price-gouging and restricted access to life-saving 
drugs for many of the world’s most vulnerable people, the emerging issue of access 
to data-driven technologies in health raises similar questions around the appropriate 
relationship between the public and private sectors, the just allocation of 
responsibilities between them and the mechanisms necessary to facilitate this.606 It 
                                               
604 Audrey Chapman, ‘The impact of reliance on private sector health services on the right to health’ 
(2014) Health Hum Rights 16(1) 122-33. 
605 Audrey Chapman, ‘Global Health, Human Rights, and the Challenge of Neoliberal Policies’ (2016, 
Cambridge University Press), 105 
606 Lisa Forman & Jillian Clare Kohler, ‘Chapter One: Introduction: Access to Medicines as a Human 




highlights how the IP system in its current form presents a persistent challenge to the 
realisation of the right to health, reinforcing calls for IP rights to be considered within 
a broader legal framework that includes international human rights law.607  
Despite these similarities, my findings also highlight the novel challenges 
posed by access to data-driven technologies in health, particularly the issue of digital 
divides. They demonstrate how neoliberal reforms to fragment the NHS not only 
generated financial inequity between trusts but also differences in digital 
infrastructure and expertise that further exacerbate the inequitable provision of 
health goods and services across the system. My findings thus provide support for 
Sun et al’s view that emerging technologies may exacerbate inequalities and widen 
digital divides, raising particular concerns around accessibility under the right to 
health, and highlight the need for greater consideration of the impact of AI projects 
on the broader health systems in which they are implemented.608 
  
5.2. Resource availability  
5.2.1. Data extractivism through DeepMind-NHS 
 
The previous chapter revealed that the DeepMind-NHS partnership grants 
exclusive rights to developed IP- and with it entitlements to any scientific and 
commercial benefits of the collaboration- to Google Health. This finding exemplifies 
how technology companies like Google pursue an innovation strategy of ‘data 
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rentiership’ “designed to capture and extract value through ownership and control of 
data as an asset”,609 which renders them increasingly wealthy “de facto 
monopolies”.610 It further supports the view that corporations capitalise on 
collaborative public-private innovation processes to extract wealth through a system 
of socialized risk and privatized reward, enabling them to reap disproportionate 
rewards.611 This finding calls into question the UK government’s resource availability 
obligations under the ICESCR.  
 
5.2.2. Resource availability in international human rights law 
 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states that all signatories to the Covenant agree “to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means...”.612 The duty to use maximum 
available resources (MAR) “means that a government must do all that it can to 
mobilize resources within the country in order to have funds available to 
progressively realise ESC rights”.613 This means governments have a legal 
obligation to use their resources both efficiently and effectively; that is, policies and 
programmes must be cost-effective, as well as delivering on their promise of 
improving human rights.614 Where necessary, states also have a duty to provide 
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international assistance to countries that do not have the resources to meet their 
socio-economic rights responsibilities.615 
The financial component of MAR- and particularly the close connection 
between MAR and budgetary analysis- has been the primary focus of much of the 
scholarship on available resources,616 reflecting a tendency to view available 
resources in purely or predominantly financial terms.617 However, available 
resources also include a range of non-financial resources, which have received less 
attention from human rights scholars. Robertson argues for a broader conception of 
resources, including financial, natural, human, technological and information 
resources.618  However, no list can be truly definitive, the author argues, as “the 
ongoing process of economic and social evolution is constantly creating different 
resource needs”;619 his comment highlights the need for analysis of MAR to be 
responsive to economic and social development. 
Skogly suggests that the current quantitative approach to resource 
availability- which focuses primarily on the availability of financial resources- may 
have excused states from implementing human rights to their maximum potential.620 
Instead, the author calls for a renewed focus on the qualitative dimensions of MAR; 
that is, a focus on the means of implementation of resources as opposed to the 
quantity of resources themselves. Adopting this approach, Skogly calls not only for a 
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more expansive understanding of resources- as encompassing natural, human, 
cultural, scientific, technological, financial and legislative means- but also for the 
creative and effective use of existing resources as a more efficient and sustainable 
means of advancing socio-economic rights.  
Human rights scholars have drawn attention to a potential role for the private 
sector in making resources ‘available’ for the realisation of socio-economic rights. 
Robertson argues that the state’s obligations extend beyond those resources over 
which it has direct control; thus, “in addition to allowing and encouraging voluntary 
use of private resources, states must also consider strategies for their 
appropriation”.621 Along similar lines, Skogly suggests that states can better 
implement socio-economic rights by including financial contributions from private 
sources.622 Balakrishnan et al are more specific, proposing that private contributions 
to the fulfilment of socio-economic rights might be ‘leveraged’ through co-
responsibility or public-private partnership.623   
 
5.2.3. Data extractivism through DeepMind-NHS: implications 
for resource availability 
 
The data extractivist model underlying DeepMind-NHS- in which Google are 
able to capture all the scientific and commercial value of publicly-funded patient 
data- raises questions about the nature and value of health data and its relationship 
to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
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Socioeconomic rights scholars have argued that Article 2(1) should be 
interpreted expansively to include natural, human, cultural, scientific, information, 
technological, financial and legislative resources.624 Under the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership, the patient data shared with DeepMind is a source of information, 
scientific advancement, technological innovation and financial gain, reflecting the 
complexity of valuing health data in the context of an emerging health data economy. 
Thus, under an expansive interpretation of available resources, patient data may be 
categorised as an information, scientific, technological or financial resource, placing 
concomitant obligations on the UK government with respect to Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR. 
Conceptualising the patient data shared under DeepMind-NHS as an 
available resource that the UK government should use to progressively realise 
socioeconomic rights draws attention to the problematic nature of the data 
extractivist model underlying the partnership. Socioeconomic rights scholars have 
argued that PPPs may be used by states as a means of leveraging private sector 
contributions to advance socioeconomic rights.625 However, my analysis of the 
political economy of DeepMind-NHS suggests that, to the contrary, the collaboration 
facilitates a form of data extractivism that enables the corporate capture of any 
scientific and commercial benefits. Thus, instead of leveraging its data resources 
through PPP, the UK government instead risks failing to realise its resource 
availability obligations under the ICESCR by squandering the value of health data in 
ways that infringe upon the realisation of socioeconomic rights.  
                                               
624 Skogly (n620); Robertson (n618) 




 This calls into question the effectiveness of data-driven research partnerships 
like DeepMind-NHS as a means of realising the value of NHS data resources and 
advancing socioeconomic rights, highlighting the need for the UK government to 
consider how alternative arrangements may prevent socioeconomic rights 
infringements by commercial actors and enable the state to fulfil its resource 
availability obligations under the ICESCR. That health data is valuable in a multitude 
of ways suggests its potential utility as a resource to advance socioeconomic rights 
is great. This is particularly true of NHS data, whose universality, longitudinal nature, 
and use of single patient identifiers make it especially attractive to technological 
innovators.626 In light of the NHS’s budgetary and resource constraints, patient data 
resources may thus have an important role to play in the progressive realisation of 
socioeconomic rights in the UK, reinforcing Skogly’s calls for states to use their 
existing resources creatively and effectively to meet their socioeconomic rights 
obligations.627 
Conceptualising health data as an available resource to realise the right to 
health does, however, raise some ethical and practical issues. Firstly, the extent to 
which we can describe data as ‘available’ is dependent on a number of practical 
factors like data quality. Harry Evans, policy researcher at The King’s Fund, drew 
attention to the issue of data quality in our interview: 
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“Data quality is really important at the moment and is not being talked about nearly 
enough... We talk about this vast treasure trove of patient data but it’s not really in a 
mineable form at the moment. We need to put quite a lot of effort into getting that 
dataset into a position where you can use it for some of these kinds of analyses. I’ve 
heard of companies having to hire hospital consultants to do a whole load of labelling 
and coding of data just to get the dataset to a state where they can start using it for 
their analysis.” 
 
 His comment underscores the critical importance of data quality in 
determining the potential of health data as a resource to advance the right to health, 
reinforcing Skogly’s calls for greater focus on the quality of available resources.628 
Furthermore, risks of health data misuse may lead to violations of the right to 
privacy or other civil and political rights, particularly where commercial actors are 
involved.629 In light of the privacy scandal surrounding DeepMind-NHS and the 
controversial data practices of companies like Google, any determination of the 
availability of data resources as a means of realising the right to health must urgently 
consider potential risks and balance different human rights considerations 
accordingly.  
My findings point to the limitations of macroeconomic analysis in assessing 
resource availability under the ICESCR in the context of the emerging health data 
economy, in which the value of patient data is both increasing and becoming ever 
more complex to ascertain. It thus provides weight to the case for a more expansive 
interpretation of available resources, highlighting the need for socioeconomic rights 
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scholars to remain responsive to technological change and to interpret 
socioeconomic rights frameworks accordingly.630  
 
5.3. The resource trade-off and the right to health 
paradox 
  
The proceeding chapter argued that DeepMind-NHS is expected to deliver 
mutual benefits, including public benefits such as improvements in the efficiency and 
quality of NHS services, the development of disruptive innovations and reputational 
gains for NHS partners. These claims are significant with respect to the right to 
health as they suggest the partnership has the potential to improve the availability, 
accessibility and quality of health goods and services, which are key components of 
the AAAQ framework.631 This points to the possibility that data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS could advance the right to health, giving weight to 
the views of right to health scholars who highlight the potential of digital technologies 
to improve healthcare and support the realisation of the right to health.632 
 Despite this, my analysis has revealed how the partnership in fact gives rise 
to resource asymmetries between Google and the NHS, allocating the scientific and 
commercial benefits of the collaboration- and the ability to control access to resulting 
health benefits- to Google, with detrimental impacts for accessibility, equity and 
resource availability under the right to health. Underlying this resource trade-off is 
thus a right to health paradox; that the promise of advancing the right to health 
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through the development of new digital technologies with commercial actors may 
conversely prove detrimental to its realisation. This supports Davis’ contention that 
digital health technologies may be a ‘trojan horse’ for the private sector, enabling 
commercial actors to covertly benefit significantly from PPPs at the expense of the 
state’s ability to discharge its right to health obligations.633  
 This finding highlights how neoliberal policies- including the expansion of IP 
systems, the fragmentation of health systems, and the introduction of PPP 
governance models- generate a political economic reality that constrains the 
realisation of the right to health. Though such policies do not amount to direct or 
egregious human rights violations, they nonetheless significantly shape the 
capacities of states and non-state actors to discharge their socio-economic rights 
obligations. Partnerships like DeepMind-NHS thus illustrate the risks that economic 
violations- that is, “those acts, by states or businesses, that breach relevant 
doctrines through economic practices that adversely affect access to rights”-634 pose 
to socioeconomic rights like the right to health. This exemplifies Birchall’s view that 
corporate actors can exert structural power over human rights through materialities 
“as a mediating site through which uneven power relationships are exploited”,635 
highlighting the importance of political economy in shaping the material conditions 
underlying the realisation of the right to health and reinforcing calls for greater 
attention to political economy in human rights analysis.636 
 Further to this, the right to health resource paradox underlying DeepMind-
NHS reveals how the distributive requirements of the right to health have evolved in 
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the data economy. It reinforces the significance of digital divides in realising the right 
to health benefits of digital technologies and also highlights the need for states to 
acknowledge the importance of health data as a public asset, utilising it to advance 
the right to health and protecting it from commercial exploitation accordingly. The 
shortcomings of DeepMind-NHS in addressing these challenges for the right to 
health in the digital age highlights the need for the UK government to consider 
alternative models for data-driven innovation, demonstrating how international 
human rights law has a significant role to play in critical data scholarship and its 




 This chapter analysed asymmetries in the distribution of resources in 
DeepMind-NHS through the lens of the right to health, focusing on the state 
obligations to make health technologies financially accessible on an equitable basis 
and to use maximum available resources to progressively realise the right to health. 
It argued that Google’s exclusive intellectual property rights under the partnership 
pose a risk to the accessibility and equitable provision of health technologies under 
the rights to health and science, raising questions about the relationship between 
and responsibilities of public and private sectors in facilitating access to technologies 
and highlighting the persistent challenge that IP systems pose to the right to health. 
It further argued that the data extractivist model underlying the partnership highlights 
the need for health data to be conceived of as a resource to progressively realise the 
right to health and called into question the effectiveness of DeepMind-NHS in 




resource trade-off underlying DeepMind-NHS reveals a right to health paradox, such 
that the promise of collaborating with commercial actors to advance the right to 
health through data-driven innovation may conversely prove detrimental to its 
realisation, reinforcing the close connection between structural power in the political 
economy and the right to health and highlighting the evolving nature of the 






Chapter 6: Knowledge asymmetries: 
implications for the right to health 
6.1. Transparency 
6.1.1. Public sector secrecy 
 
In Chapter Five, my analysis of the political economy of DeepMind-NHS drew 
attention to the lack of transparency surrounding the collaboration. The partnership 
with the Royal Free Hospital NHS Foundation Trust was first publicly announced in 
November 2016, over a year after the data transfer took place and six months after 
Hodson’s revelatory New Scientist article. In addition, both DeepMind and the NHS 
had far greater ambitions for the collaboration than the Streams project alone, which 
were not clearly made known to the public. Further to this, details of the collaboration 
were only revealed through the investigatory work of journalist Hodson, who relied 
upon the use of FOI requests that were often complex to interpret. The use of 
commercial confidentiality laws also acted as a barrier to disclosure of important 
commercial details of the collaboration. This opacity was further exacerbated by the 
systemic lack of public sector transparency surrounding commercial deals in the 
NHS.  
 





In the context of the right to health, accountability refers to “the process which 
requires government to show, explain and justify how it has discharged its 
obligations regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health”.637 
Though definitions of accountability differ among right to health scholars, I adopt 
Williams and Hunt’s tripartite conceptualisation of accountability as monitoring, 
review, and remedial action.638 
Transparency is a critical component of state accountability for the right to 
health. States are required to monitor all aspect of policy development and 
implementation on a continuous basis;639 this process relies on reliable and 
transparent data, which provides rights-holders with the information necessary to 
hold the state accountable for violations of the right to health.640 This data is then 
analysed and used to review whether a state’s human rights commitments have 
been met; 641 this process should be independent, highlight successes and 
shortcomings, provide recommendations for improvement, and extend to non-state 
actors.642 Finally, remedial action ensures that victims of violations of the right to 
health “should have access to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both 
national and international levels”.643 
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6.1.3. Public sector secrecy: implications for transparency and 
the right to health 
 
In light of the UK government’s right to health accountability obligations and 
its duty to protect the right to health from corporate transgressions, the lack of 
transparency surrounding the DeepMind-Royal Free deal and the subsequent 
partnerships between the company and the NHS are problematic. Effective 
monitoring and review of the state’s right to health obligations relies on access to 
reliable and transparent data. The difficulty of obtaining access to and interpreting 
reliable information about the details of DeepMind-NHS thus restricts the ability of 
rights-holders to hold the state accountable for its right to health obligations in the 
partnership and prevents the state from effectively monitoring and reviewing the 
progress of the partnership in advancing the right to health.  
The impact of this transparency deficit on monitoring and review draws 
attention to shortcomings in the UK government’s accountability for the right to 
health under data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS. It supports the 
views of right to health scholars who argue that opacity surrounding scientific 
innovation is detrimental for right to health accountability and emphasise the need for 
disclosure surrounding PPPs in the provision of health goods and services.644 It 
further highlights how neoliberal policy- including strict commercial confidentiality 
protections and the rollback of state oversight and regulation of commercial actors- 
can act as a barrier to socioeconomic rights accountability.    
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6.2. Corporate responsibility to respect and state 
duty to protect the right to health 
6.2.1. DeepMind Health’s engagement with CSR and ethics 
 
My analysis of the political economy of DeepMind-NHS highlighted how the 
company’s lack of profitability and blue-sky mission, philanthropic leadership, 
establishment of an Independent Review Panel, and engagement with patient and 
public participation and AI ethics generated an image of the company as a 
benevolent research organisation operating in the public interest, exemplifying the 
rise of health data entrepreneurism in the data economy and revealing the potential 
for PPPs to advance good governance values.645 
Despite this, the DeepMind-NHS partnership also generated knowledge 
asymmetries; it lacked adequate public sector transparency and covertly enabled 
Google to expand its reach into healthcare, despite the company’s lack of 
transparency and accountability. These knowledge asymmetries cast doubt on 
DeepMind Health’s public image as a socially-responsible research organisation, 
shedding light of knowledge trade-off underlying DeepMind-NHS; that collaboration 
with a seemingly publicly-accountable research organisation comes at the expense 
of the covert expansion of the power and influence of the monopolistic technology 
giants. They point to the ‘toothlessness’ of voluntary corporate goodwill in the face of 
                                               




shareholder interests, highlighting the need to remain critical of such initiatives and 
to ensure robust accountability mechanisms.646 
 
6.2.2. Corporate responsibility to respect and State obligation to 
protect the right to health under human rights law 
 
Under the Guiding Principles, the corporate responsibility to respect means 
businesses “should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should 
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.647 This 
requires that commercial actors avoid contributing to negative human rights impacts 
and address them when they occur.648 The Principles stress that these 
responsibilities apply to all business enterprises “regardless of their size, sector, 
operational context, ownership and structure”;649 however, they recognise that a 
company’s ability to address adverse human rights impacts might vary according to 
these factors. 
 The Principles state that the responsibility to respect must be operationalised 
through the appropriate policies and processes, including a policy commitment to 
respect human rights, a human rights due diligence process, and processes to 
enable the remediation of human rights violations.650 The statement of policy should 
be endorsed by senior management of the corporation, be informed by internal 
and/or external expertise, stipulate human rights expectations of key stakeholders, 
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be publicly available, and be embedded in the corporation through operational 
policies and procedures.651 
Corporate human rights due diligence processes should cover all adverse 
human rights implications the corporation is directly or indirectly linked to, vary in 
relation to features of the corporation- such as size, risk of human rights impacts, 
and the nature of context of its operations- and be ongoing, “recognizing that the 
human rights risks may change over time as the business enterprise's operations 
and operating context evolve”.652 The process of identifying and assessing human 
rights risks should draw on internal and/or external human rights expertise and 
involve meaningful engagement with relevant stakeholders and affected groups.653 
This process may be incorporated into other assessment processes- though must 
include all human rights- and should be undertaken periodically, when instigating a 
new activity, relationship, operational decision, and where the operating environment 
changes.654  
Findings from human rights impact assessments (HRIA) must be integrated 
into business practices and their effectiveness tracked,655 and commercial actors 
should communicate their findings externally.656 All communications should be of an 
appropriate form and frequency and available to their intended audience, provide 
information sufficient to assess the company’s response to human rights risks, and 
not pose risks to stakeholders or to ‘legitimate requirements’ of corporate 
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confidentiality.657 Commercial actors are also obligated to contribute to or provide 
remediation where rights violations have occurred.658 
Human rights due diligence is also an important component of the state duty 
to protect the right to health from infringements by third parties. The Guiding 
Principles require states to provide guidance on how to respect human rights, which 
should indicate expected outcomes, facilitate sharing of best practices and advise on 
methods like due diligence procedures. Furthermore, States should encourage 
businesses to communicate how they address human rights issues; this can range 
from “informal engagement with affected stakeholders to formal public reporting”659 
and should account for risks to the safety of individuals, commercial confidentiality 
and the size and structure of the company.660 
 
6.2.3. DeepMind Health’s engagement with CSR and ethics: 
implications for corporate and state right to health obligations 
 
In light of its responsibility to respect human rights under the UN Guiding 
Principles, DeepMind Health’s voluntary accountability and participatory mechanisms 
and engagement with corporate social responsibility falls short of its right to health 
responsibilities. The Guiding Principles require business enterprises to provide a 
human rights policy statement;661 DeepMind made no such commitment to respect 
human rights, despite its purported commitment to using AI ethically and for societal 
good. Human rights are mentioned briefly in the Partnership on AI’s tenets, which 
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states that all signatories will oppose the “development and use of AI technologies 
that would violate international conventions or human rights and promoting 
safeguards and technologies that do no harm”.662 However, this selective 
commitment falls far short of the comprehensive policy statement on human rights 
that the Guiding Principles recommends, which would demonstrate the company’s 
commitment to all human rights, including the right to health. It thus supports Soh 
and Connelly’s view that technology corporations selectively utilise and reinterpret 
human rights to be compatible with their business models.663 
 By contrast, Google has made an explicit policy commitment to human rights, 
in which it claims that, “in everything we do, we are guided by internationally 
recognised human rights standards...”, including the UDHR and the Guiding 
Principles.664 Though this explicit commitment is important, the company provides no 
further clarity on how it expects to operationalise these rights throughout the 
organisation, including Google Health. Google has also committed to respect civil 
and political rights through the Global Network Initiative-665 a multi-stakeholder 
platform to promote the rights to privacy and freedom of expression in the technology 
sector- and its own set of AI principles.666 The AAAS’ Theresa Harris drew attention 
to this point in our interview: 
 
“Google is a member of the Global Network Initiative, which has all these statements 
about the right to privacy, the right to freedom of expression... but they haven’t 
necessarily looked at some of the other human rights.” 
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Her comment highlights how- despite such initiatives being a welcome 
development- their sole focus on civil and political rights means that the impacts of 
new technologies for other human rights, including the right to health, are neglected. 
This lends weight to Soh and Connelly’s argument that the Global Network Initiative 
is focused predominantly on government surveillance and thus fails to address the 
negative consequences of corporate profit-making.667 This predominant focus on civil 
and political over socioeconomic rights supports the view that risks tend to be 
prioritised over ‘soft’ impacts in discussions around technology policy.668  
Further to this, though the company did conduct Privacy Impact Assessments 
(PIAs) when entering into partnership with the NHS, their restrictive focus on data 
protection and patient privacy does not amount to the wide-ranging, ongoing human 
rights due diligence obligations explicated in the Guiding Principles.669 In addition, 
since DeepMind’s contracts with the NHS have been transferred to Google Health, 
no evidence has emerged of Google engaging in any human rights due diligence 
processes. Given the controversy surrounding DeepMind’s dealings with the NHS 
and the fact that companies can inherit human rights risks through mergers and 
acquisitions,670 this lack of due diligence appears at odds with Google’s policy 
commitment to human rights. In the absence of a HRIA, no information about the 
human rights risks of the partnership has been made publicly available by DeepMind 
or Google; this acts as a substantial barrier to the company’s ability to mitigate any 
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human rights risks or integrate these findings into company functions and processes, 
as is recommended by the Guiding Principles.  
Assessing DeepMind Health’s voluntary accountability mechanisms and 
corporate social responsibility through the framework of the Guiding Principles 
reveals that- despite its public image as a socially-responsible research organisation- 
the company failed to respect its right to health responsibilities in the DeepMind-NHS 
collaboration. This absence of human rights due diligence further calls into question 
the UK government’s duty to protect the right to health from infringements by 
commercial actors. 
These findings highlight how DeepMind Health’s engagement in ‘ethical’ or 
socially responsible behaviour does not mean the company has effectively 
discharged its right to health responsibilities under the Guiding Principles. They draw 
attention to the important distinction between the business and human rights 
framework- which benefits from a strong legal foundation and a prescriptive 
procedural framework-671 and the notion of corporate social responsibility, the 
foundations, nature and scope of which are less clearly defined. 
Voluntary corporate social responsibility and ethical initiatives in the area of 
emerging technologies abound; though such efforts are welcome, socially 
responsible behaviour does not absolve technology companies like DeepMind of 
their human rights responsibilities under international human rights law. Furthermore, 
corporate engagement with CSR may risk inadvertently obscuring non-compliance 
with the Guiding Principles where the distinction between socially-responsible 
behaviour and soft law human rights responsibilities is not acknowledged and 
reinforced by states and commercial actors. My findings thus support the view that 
                                               




technology companies should prioritise compliance with their legal responsibilities 
under the Guiding Principles rather than viewing them as an adjunct to or component 
of their broader CSR agenda.672  
Despite this, DeepMind and Google’s neglect of their responsibility to respect 
human rights also exemplifies the limitations of the Guiding Principles’ voluntarism, 
which enables commercial actors to disregard and/or violate human rights with 
impunity. This highlights how- despite their differing ideological, legal and procedural 
bases- corporate social responsibility and the current business and human rights 
framework are both similarly limited in their capacity to hold companies liable for their 
actions. The following section explores this and other limitations of the Guiding 
Principles as they apply to DeepMind-NHS in greater depth.  
 
6.3. The limitations of corporate right to health 
responsibilities 
6.3.1. The ‘Googlization’ of health 
 
 My analysis of the political economy of DeepMind-NHS revealed how the 
partnership has covertly expanded the power and influence of Google. Critics had 
been cautious of DeepMind’s relationship to Google from the offset; however, for 
some time, DeepMind remained secretive about its business model and emphasised 
its separation from sister company Google. In November 2018, this illusion was 
shattered when DeepMind Health was subsumed under Google Health, exemplifying 
                                               




how the technology giants utilise a ‘one-way mirror’ and a culture of strategic 
mergers and acquisitions to expand into healthcare markets. Google’s takeover of 
DeepMind-NHS is especially problematic when we consider the company’s disregard 
for privacy and anti-trust law and its increasingly prominent role in policymaking and 
research, evidence of its lack of accountability and the limitations of efforts to 
effectively regulate Big Tech.  
 
6.3.2. Limitations of corporate responsibility for the right to 




The Guiding Principles grew out of a recognition that multinational 
corporations were becoming ever more powerful and were increasingly implicated in 
human rights abuses, pointing to the need for greater corporate accountability. 
However, some human rights scholars argue they have failed to achieve this aim.673  
Muchlinksi characterizes the Guiding Principles as a form of ‘institutionalized 
voluntarism’ that represents a compromise between greater procedural commitments 
to mitigate human rights risks in commercial activities and full legal liability under 
international law.674 As such, despite creating the necessary conditions to improve 
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corporate adherence to human rights, the author argues that Guiding Principles 
remain rooted in corporate voluntarism.675 
Wettstein is sceptical of the Guiding Principles’ voluntarism, highlighting how 
the use of weak terminology indicates different levels of expected commitment 
between corporation and state.676 The Guiding Principles, he argues, thus “fall prey 
to the very problem they were supposed to fix, that is, the problem of growing 
governance gaps between companies’ increasing sphere of activity and 
governments’ decreasing ability or willingness to regulate them”.677 
Deva similarly condemns the use of weak terminology in the Guiding 
Principles, which has ‘diluted’ the responsibilities of business and undermined their 
normative value.678 Furthermore, the instrument’s focus on consensus-building, the 
author argues, afforded companies significant influence in the drafting process, 
legitimising their role in international law-making while rendering their human rights 
obligations under international law ‘almost non-existent’.679 This highlights how the 
Guiding Principles themselves are the product of what Birchall terms ‘corporate 
power over knowledge’; that is, “the power that a corporation has to shape 
knowledge of human rights and the wider epistemic framework in which human 
rights exist”.680 
Bilchitz highlights that giving effect to voluntary, soft law instruments like the 
Guiding Principles relies on corporate goodwill and requires businesses to navigate 
the tension between their long-term social impact and short-term objective to 
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maximise profit. In practice, he argues, there is wide recognition that this approach is 
flawed.681 
The limitations of the Guiding Principles’ voluntarism have led to mounting 
calls for stronger, legally-binding human rights regulation for corporations.682 These 
have culminated in the proposition to develop a legally-binding UN Treaty on 
business and human rights, with an explicit focus on corporate accountability. This 
Treaty, proponents have argued, could move beyond the Guiding Principles’ 
voluntarism to provide recognition, articulation and clarification of the legally-binding 
obligations of businesses under international human rights law.683 
In June 2014, the UN Human Rights Council established an 
Intergovernmental Working Group (IGW) to “to elaborate an international legally 
binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises”.684 In 2018, the IGW 
issued a preliminary draft of the Treaty- the ‘Zero Draft’685- described as a ‘key 
milestone’ in the Treaty movement.686  
The Zero Draft’s focus was exclusively on transnational business operations 
and all corporate obligations were to be imposed indirectly through binding state 
duties. It enshrined state obligations with regards to the rights of victims of 
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transnational corporate human rights abuses, legal liability, due diligence and mutual 
legal assistance, and proposed the creation of a committee of experts to monitor and 
promote implementation of the treaty.687 The Zero Draft was praised for its strong 
emphasis on comprehensive, mandatory corporate human rights due diligence.688 
However, following a period of consultation and amendment, a revised draft was 
released in July 2019;689 this expands the scope of the Treaty to include “all 
business activities, including but not limited to those of a transnational character”.690  
However, the revised treaty in its current state falls short of recognising direct 
corporate human rights obligations. In light of critiques of the Guiding Principles’ 
inability to hold businesses accountable, the revised treaty thus reinforces the 
predominant state-centric paradigm of international human rights law and with it the 
notion that corporate human rights responsibilities are distinct from state obligations 
in their voluntariness and normative basis. This suggests the Treaty may be limited 
in its ability to address the fundamental problem of “growing governance gaps 
between companies’ increasing sphere of activity and governments’ decreasing 
ability or willingness to regulate them”.691  
By contrast, some scholars remain unconvinced that direct, legally-binding 
obligations are the solution to the corporate accountability gap. Van Ho suggests that 
the lack of enforcement of existing obligations is responsible for this deficit, arguing 
for an expansion of the jurisdiction of states as opposed to reformation of human 
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rights instruments themselves. 692 The author contends that state-centrism offers the 
necessary tools to enforce greater corporate accountability- as well as greater 
authority and clarity than direct corporate obligations- and that the Treaty should not 
stray from this approach. Similarly, De Schutter supports the idea of a ‘hybrid’ model 
that clarifies the state duty to protect- including extraterritoriality- and imposes duties 
of mutual legal assistance on states but nonetheless adheres to the existing state-
centric paradigm.693 
The divergent views of BHR scholars on the question of binding corporate 
human rights obligations exemplify how the community remains divided on the best 
means to strengthen corporate human rights compliance. 
6.3.2.2. Human rights minimalism 
Critics of the Guiding Principles have also argued that the restrictive scope of 
corporate human rights responsibilities under this instrument provides inadequate 
protection for economic, social and cultural rights, leading to growing calls for a more 
extensive conception of corporate human rights responsibilities that obligate 
business to positively contribute towards the realisation of human rights.694 
Aguirre highlights that the Principles’ restrictive obligations have “little or no 
relevance within a global system dominated by economic factors and appeals to the 
bottom line of profit maximisation and economic growth in order to facilitate change 
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regarding the realisation of ESCR”.695 The author argues that corporations are 
uniquely placed to promote human rights by “increasing employment, increasing 
available capital, technology, knowledge, improved management and positive 
contributions to labour relations and administration”.696 Similarly, Wettstein suggests 
that recognition of corporations as political actors implies that “an adequate account 
of responsibility that matches this reality must extend far beyond merely doing no 
harm”.697 Birchall also draws attention to the fact that the Guiding Principles are 
rarely applied to economic violations in practice, with a focus on egregious and overt 
human rights violations.698 Despite this, Ruggie’s ‘human rights minimalism’ 
continues to predominate efforts to strengthen corporate human rights obligations 
under international law, including the proposed Treaty.699 
The Guiding Principles have also been criticised for limiting the scope of 
corporate responsibility by requiring businesses only to respect human rights and not 
to protect or fulfil them. This restriction, critics argue, amounts to the responsibility to 
avoid violating human rights or to ‘do no harm’;700 in other words, it imposes only 
negative responsibilities on commercial actors. For these critics, the Principles’ 
restrictive scope or ‘human rights minimalism’ thus undermines the collective and 
collaborative problem solving that is necessary for the realisation of human rights.701 
This restrictive scope is also particularly problematic for socio-economic rights like 
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the right to health, as recognition of violations of the obligation to respect human 
rights relies on clear identification of violation, violator, and potential remedy, which 
“is best achieved when misconduct can be portrayed as arbitrary or discriminatory 
rather than a matter of purely distributive justice”.702 Economic violations are often 
the consequence of structural processes which implicate multiple actors and different 
forms of corporate power, meaning they are not easily remedied.703 Limiting 
corporate responsibility to the obligation to respect thus provides limited 
accountability for violations of socio-economic rights like the right to health. 
Furthermore, the separation of duties in the context of economic, social and cultural 
rights is itself fuzzy,704 which raises questions about the practical application of 
corporate responsibilities and the legitimacy of the rigid separation of duties in this 
context.705 
 
6.3.3. The ‘Googlization’ of health: implications for the 
limitations of corporate right to health responsibilities 
 
In light of critiques of the limitations of the UN Guiding Principles as a soft law 
instrument, Google’s lack of accountability under DeepMind-NHS raises some 
fundamental challenges for the existing, state-centric system. 
The company’s growing influence over policymaking and regulatory efforts in 
the field of health data governance and data-driven technologies in the UK suggests 
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the government’s duty to protect the right to health under the Guiding Principles- 
which requires the state to use effective policies, legislation and regulation- may be 
compromised by corporate bias. This gives weight to Birchall’s claims that the 
Guiding Principles are limited in their capacity to address corporate power over 
institutions, which nonetheless impacts the realisation of socioeconomic rights.706 
The limited capacity of the UK government to protect the right to health in 
DeepMind-NHS is further challenged by Google Health’s strategic merger with 
DeepMind Health. The merger exemplifies both the complex organisational structure 
and supranational commercial operations of the Alphabet conglomerate, which 
complicates the clear assignment of human rights obligations under the existing 
state-centric framework.707 This raises further questions about the adequacy of the 
Guiding Principles’ state-centrism in addressing the human rights risks posed by 
technology companies like Google.  
Further to this, Google’s disregard for privacy norms and anti-trust and tax law 
suggest that the company’s soft law responsibilities under the Guiding Principles are 
unlikely to be respected and may prove ineffectual in altering the company’s 
controversial behaviours. The proceeding section of this chapter provides evidence 
to support this, arguing that Google has not made serious efforts to implement the 
Guiding Principles in the DeepMind-NHS collaboration nor been penalised for failing 
to do so. This gives weight to the view that the dilution of corporate human rights 
responsibilities under the Guiding Principles acts as a barrier to compliance.708 
Together, these findings draw attention to the limitations of the existing state-
centric model as it applies to increasingly powerful technology companies, 
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exemplifying the fact that the Guiding Principles were not designed with digital 
companies in mind.709 They support Wettstein’s view that that Guiding Principles fail 
to address governance gaps between commercial actors’ growing spheres of 
influence and the inability or unwillingness of states to regulate them.710 
The DeepMind-NHS case also gives reason to question the limitations of 
corporate human rights responsibilities on the grounds of human rights minimalism. 
My analysis argued that Google’s power over material resources in DeepMind-NHS 
generated resource asymmetries that amount to economic violations of the right to 
health. This is significant in light of critiques of the Guiding Principles’ human rights 
minimalism, which suggest that the instrument fails to adequately address questions 
of structural power that can lead to violations of socioeconomic rights like the right to 
health. It implies that, even if the Guiding Principles were operationalised by Google, 
they may prove limited- if not ineffectual- in realising the right to health in data-driven 
research partnerships. This highlights the need to consider whether commercial 
actors like Google have right to health obligations beyond the minimal 
responsibilities contained in the Guiding Principles. 
My research findings reveal evidence of the evolving societal role of Big Tech, 
which could support calls for a more general expansion of positive corporate human 
rights obligations. There is a strong pragmatic case for positive corporate human 
rights obligations, as evidenced by Google’s power over material resources. The 
company is extraordinarily wealthy, its annual revenues exceeding the GDP of many 
states.711 Furthermore, as exemplified by the company’s growing influence over 
policymaking and research, technology companies also exercise power over 
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institutions, enabling them to become key political players in their own right.712 This 
accumulation of material and political power is significant in light of the argument for 
imposing positive human rights obligations on commercial actors; it reinforces 
Aguirre’s contention that powerful corporate actors are in a ‘unique position’ to 
promote socio-economic rights like the right to health,713 and gives weight to the view 
that “an adequate account of responsibility that matches this reality must extend far 
beyond merely doing no harm”.714  
 The justification for more expansive human rights obligations for tech 
companies is further strengthened by persuasive normative justifications relating to 
the societal responsibilities of Big Tech. My findings revealed that DeepMind have 
made efforts to engage in voluntary accountability and CSR initiatives in a bid to 
demonstrate their commitment to deliver public benefits. Their actions typify a 
broader societal movement towards ‘health data entrepreneurism’,715 in which 
technology companies increasingly seek to position themselves not only as 
corporations but as socially-conscious actors committed to advancing the ‘common 
good’.716 DeepMind’s eagerness to voluntarily engage in CSR thus signals shifting 
societal expectations of companies, confirming Sharon’s observation that “‘doing 
good’ is becoming an inalienable – not an additional – dimension of corporate 
activity”.717 These evolving societal expectations of technology companies are 
significant in light of the principal justification for the restrictive corporate 
responsibilities contained in the Guiding Principles- the ‘social expectation’ of 
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businesses.718 In this context, the human rights responsibilities contained in the 
Guiding Principles- which are limited to the corporate duty to ‘do no harm’- appear 
unjustifiably limited and morally baseless.  
Despite the pragmatic and normative justifications for positive corporate 
human rights obligations for Big Tech, the most promising development to 
strengthen the legal framework for corporate human rights obligations- the draft 
Treaty on business and human rights-719 reinforces the Guiding Principles’ ‘human 
rights minimalism’.720  
My findings- that Google’s involvement in DeepMind-NHS reveals the 
limitations of the company’s non-binding, restrictive human rights responsibilities 
under the Guiding Principles- highlight the need to reconsider the nature and scope 
of corporate human rights responsibilities in the digital age. They demonstrate how 
the growing institutional and material power of technology companies like Google is 
not tempered by the Guiding Principles, themselves the product of corporate 
influence and power over knowledge. These findings thus exemplify Birchall’s view 
that laying bare different forms of corporate power helps to expose the linkages 
between them; in this case, that corporate power over knowledge- which led to a 
weakening of the scope and enforceability of the Guiding Principles- enables power 
over material resources and institutions that remains unchallenged by human rights 
commitments.721 This reinforces the critical need for greater attention to the 
relationship between political economy and the BHR movement.722  
                                               
718 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie’ (7 April 2008) 
A/HRC/8/5, para 54. 
719 Revised Draft (n689) 
720 Wettstein (n46). 
721 Birchall (n653) 53. 






 This chapter explored the implications of knowledge asymmetries in 
DeepMind-NHS for the right to health under international human rights law. The first 
section argued that the lack of transparency surrounding the partnership acts as a 
barrier to the UK state’s ability to monitor and review the collaboration and thus to be 
held accountable for its right to health obligations in this context. Furthermore, 
though DeepMind Health engaged in a number of social responsibility and ethical 
initiatives, including establishing its own accountability and participatory 
mechanisms, these efforts fall short of the company’s right to health responsibilities 
under the Guiding Principles, demonstrating that socially responsible and ethical 
behaviour should be conceptualised as complementary rather than equivalent to 
corporate human rights responsibilities. The final section argued that DeepMind-NHS 
laid bare the limitations of the Guiding Principles as a non-binding instrument with a 
restrictive focus on doing no harm, highlighting how Google’s growing material and 
institutional power give reason to question the Guiding Principles’ underlying 
justifications in the digital age.  
 My findings suggest that the kinds of knowledge asymmetries engendered by 
DeepMind-NHS act as a barrier to effective right to health accountability and even 
call into question the existing allocation of responsibilities at the state-business 
nexus, giving weight to the view that the involvement of commercial actors in digital 
health technologies raises questions of accountability.723 Furthermore, it exemplifies 
how technology companies exercise power through the medium of institutions in 
                                               




ways that mutually reinforce their power over material resources yet are beyond the 
scope of existing human rights instruments, despite evidence that these activities 
significantly impact the realisation of the right to health.724 This finding reinforces the 
need to strengthen socioeconomic rights protections in data-driven research 
partnerships and to reconsider the existing allocation of human rights responsibilities 
at the state-business nexus as they apply to increasingly powerful and profitable 
technology companies.  
                                               




Chapter 7: Recommendations to help data-
driven research partnerships advance the right 
to health 
           The two proceeding chapters interpreted my analysis of the DeepMind NHS 
case and its political-economic implications within the framework of the right to 
health under international human rights law. They revealed how resource and 
knowledge trade-offs underlying partnerships like DeepMind-NHS have significant 
implications for the realisation of the right to health. In light of these findings, this 
chapter considers potential solutions or ways forward, exploring the potential and 
limitations of the right to health framework to mitigate power asymmetries in data-
driven research partnerships. 
 
7.1. Mitigating resource asymmetries in data-
driven research partnerships 
7.1.1. Alternative commercial models 
 
Since the establishment of DeepMind-NHS, the UK government has 
introduced a number of new policies with respect to data-driven technological 
innovation in the NHS, which take significant steps towards tackling the inequitable 
distribution of resources in data-driven research partnerships. In July 2019, the 




driven health technology- intended to “enable the development and adoption of safe, 
ethical and effective data-driven health and care technologies”- and a set of guiding 
principles to realise the benefits of NHS data.725 These policy frameworks- though 
not legally binding- mark a significant step towards the UK government’s realisation 
and protection of socioeconomic rights in data-driven research partnerships like 
DeepMind-NHS.726 
While not prescribing any particular commercial model, the Code of Conduct 
recommends that NHS trusts “consider only entering into commercial terms in which 
the benefits of the partnerships between technology companies and health and care 
providers are shared fairly”.727 Furthermore, the guiding principles to realise the 
benefits of NHS data suggest that “the boards of NHS organisations should consider 
themselves ultimately responsible for ensuring that any arrangements entered into 
by their organisation are fair, including recognising and safeguarding the value of the 
data that is shared and the resources which are generated as a result of the 
arrangement”.728 
This broad guidance allows NHS trusts a number of possible alternative 
commercial models for data-driven research. Profit sharing offers one potential 
solution; the Code of Conduct implies the potential for use of this model, arguing that 
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“the participant (as data source) ... might expect to share in the increase in value”.729 
Profit sharing models may better effect the realisation of socioeconomic rights by 
generating financial resources for NHS trusts in exchange for sharing patient data.  
However, Reform’s Eleonora Harwich was doubtful about the profit-sharing 
approach, highlighting the ‘extremely technical’ nature of apportioning percentages in 
a fair manner. Furthermore, profit-sharing models not only fail to address the 
fundamental inequities between NHS trusts but may in fact fuel an internal market in 
the NHS, widening the gap between well-resourced, technologically-advanced trusts 
who are able to profit from such collaborations and those who are not. This issue has 
been acknowledged by the UK government; the Code of Conduct highlights the 
importance of determining whether a local or system-wide approach is most 
appropriate in developing data-driven technologies, while the guiding principles to 
realise the benefits of NHS data state that “NHS organisations should not enter into 
exclusive arrangements for raw data held by the NHS, nor include conditions limiting 
any benefits from being applied at a national level”.730 
Equity-sharing agreements offer an alternative model that addresses the 
inequities of trust-level partnership. This model is already being utilised by some 
NHS trusts in their research collaboration with technology company Sensyne 
Health.731 In Sensyne’s most recent partnership with Wye Valley NHS Trust, the 
Trust is set to receive a £2.5 million equity stake in the company and a share of the 
associated revenues, which will be fed back into the broader health system.732 By 
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delivering financial benefits at both the trust and health system levels, equity-sharing 
models such as this may help to incentivise NHS trusts to develop new technologies 
while also addressing distributive asymmetries within the health service. However, 
this approach doesn’t challenge commercial actors’ exclusive patent rights over 
algorithmic technologies, which would therefore pose a continued risk to the financial 
accessibility of data-driven technologies under the right to health. 
To this end, IP-sharing agreements are a further possible alternative 
commercial model to DeepMind-NHS. In our interview, Hal Hodson hypothesized 
about the possibility of IP-sharing agreements: 
 
“What might help is if you licensed the data to DeepMind with an agreement that 
gave kickback to the NHS. Say the DeepMind datasets that they’ve got, and one of 
them produces this incredible thing that no one has ever found before. Say you can 
stop people from dying and it becomes the basis of the medical economy around the 
planet and it generates trillions of dollars of revenue. Why can’t the Royal Free have 
0.1% of the revenue generated from that product?” 
 
The use of IP-sharing agreements would acknowledge the collective and 
cumulative nature of data-driven innovation and reward the public sector accordingly, 
helping to mitigate the data extractivist paradigm in which all scientific and 
commercial benefits are rewarded to technology companies.733 From a right to health 
perspective, they therefore offer the most preferable commercial model, as they both 
maximise the health systems’ resource returns and prevent commercial actors from 
blocking access to any scientific and health benefits.  
                                               




Despite these potential benefits, the Department of Health appears to dismiss 
this possibility in the Code of Conduct, arguing that “the participant (as data source) 
in a particular application cannot hope to own the underlying algorithm”.734 Though 
its justification is unclear, the UK government’s resistance to IP-sharing agreements 
suggests the likelihood of their widespread use in the NHS is limited.  
Further to this, multiple interviewees highlighted how the lack of commercial 
and data governance expertise across the NHS was a significant barrier to the 
establishment of data-driven research partnerships in the public interest. Professor 
Julian Huppert argued that the NHS was not “currently competent to make the best 
deals and secure the best arrangements to get things right”, while another 
interviewee argued that the NHS would benefit from “a more joined up approach, 
more technological know-how and more legal know-how”. Their concerns echo the 
comments of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age who- 
on completion of his mission to the UK- remarked how the decentralised nature of 
the NHS and the inexperience of some trusts prevented the establishment of an 
effective partnership with DeepMind Health.735  
In addition to these practical barriers, though alternative commercial models 
for data-driven research might ensure that individual partnerships contribute towards 
the progressive realisation of the right to health, they do not fundamentally challenge 
the underlying political economy of data-driven innovation, in which data is treated as 
a commodity that can be legitimately assetized and commercialised by state or 
corporate actors without the knowledge or consent of data subjects. This is 
problematic given mounting calls within the human rights community for scholars to 
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engage substantively with issues of political economy that constrain the realisation of 
socioeconomic rights.736 To do so requires a more radical reimagination of the health 
data economy and its governance, to which I will now turn my attention.   
 
7.1.2. Alternative data governance models 
 
Data trusts- a term referring to “a legal structure that provides independent 
stewardship of data”-737 offers one possible alternative to commercial partnership 
models in data-driven innovation. Data trusts may be a particularly promising data 
governance model for the NHS as they have gained significant traction in the UK in 
recent years, with initial pilot studies of the model receiving support from the UK 
Government Office for AI and Innovate UK.738 
One interviewee described the concept in more detail: 
 
“The Open Data Institute has been asked to come up with a practical way of going 
about the creation, maintenance and use of data trusts. We don’t know what these 
data trusts will look like yet but the idea is that you have some sort of overseer and 
responsibility for the use of data is taken away from the individual patient or the 
individual hospital to the data trust. Whether the data trust is a community of people, 
whether it’s the NHS itself... it’s completely unknown at the moment and there’s lots 
of different ideas about this.” 
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The data trust model offers a number of potential benefits; it gives individuals 
greater control over their data- enabling patients to steer data-driven health research 
towards their own needs- and ensure that the benefits of health data “are distributed 
more widely, ethically and equitably”.739 Data trusts may thus provide an alternative 
form of health data governance that more effectively advances the right to health 
than data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS.  
Other data governance models like data cooperatives may also prove a more 
effective mechanism to advance the right to health in data-driven research. Data 
cooperatives are “cooperative organisations (whatever their legal form) that have as 
their main purpose the stewardship of data for the benefit of their members, who are 
seen as individuals (or data subjects)”.740 In a data cooperative, the individuals 
responsible for stewarding data act in the collective interests of the cooperative’s 
members, either by advancing the interests of all members at once or achieving 
consensus over whether an action is permitted.741 
The data cooperative approach is intended to give its members greater 
control over their data. Furthermore, by creating new, cooperatively governed data 
assets, data cooperatives tend to place emphasis on the use of data as a resource, 
opening up new opportunities for data use.742 In light of my argument that states 
should pay greater attention to health data as a resource to advance the right to 
health, this model could therefore help to support the realisation of the right to health 
in data-driven health research.  
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Data commons is yet another alternative form of data governance that bears 
much likeness to the cooperative model. There is a lack of consensus around the 
exact definition of data commons; however, the idea is frequently associated with 
‘open data’ and the notion that data should serve the common good.743 Such models 
often involve the pooling of data sources to generate a ‘common-pool resource’; a 
collectively-governed, often publicly-available dataset to aid scientific research. 
Efforts to generate data commons resources abound; Google itself has also 
developed a data commons resource of open source datasets.744 Data commons 
such as this promise to advance collective control over data as a means of mitigating 
power asymmetries in data-driven research;745 they may thus offer a more effective 
means to realise the right to health and science by challenging the commercialisation 
of health data and its benefits. 
Despite this, some critical data scholars have warned of the limitations of data 
commons models. Prainsack argues that not all data commons models are 
appropriate to address power asymmetries, as many necessitate exclusion; as such, 
the conflation of data commons with open data risks conversely reinforcing power 
asymmetries in data-driven research in health rather than mitigating them.746 Taylor 
and Purtova highlight the need for greater attention to be paid to stakeholdership and 
governing institutions in health data commons for this model to succeed in 
addressing power asymmetries in health research.747 The ability of data commons 
models to facilitate the realisation of the right to health may thus depend on the 
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particularities of the different forms of data commons, and their stakeholders and 
governance.  
The development of alternative commercial and health data governance 
models highlights the potential for the UK government to mitigate the distributive 
asymmetries arising from data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS and 
ensure that future data-driven research initiatives promote the realisation of the right 
to health. While alternative commercial models are currently more accessible to NHS 
trusts than novel data governance models, the promise of these more radical, 
downstream interventions- which pose a more fundamental challenge to the political 
economic structures that perpetuate distributive asymmetries in the data economy- 
justifies further development and investment by the UK government. 
The distributive asymmetries and right to health implications of data-driven 
research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS and the potential of alternative models 
reveals the complex interaction between different modes of governance and the 
political economy of health data, highlighting how data governance has significant 
implications for the realisation of socioeconomic rights. This points to the critical 
need for the UK government to ensure that the regulatory and governance 
frameworks surrounding health data acknowledge and embed the full range of 
human rights, not just civil and political rights like the right to privacy. Despite this, 
innovative data governance models like data trusts, cooperatives and commons- 
which allow data holders greater autonomy over how their data is used- could also 
advance civil and political rights like the right to privacy, exemplifying the 
interdependencies of human rights in the digital age. Adopting a more holistic 




Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ calls for states to “regulate the 
ownership and control of data according to human rights principles”.748 
 
7.2. Mitigating knowledge asymmetries in data-
driven research partnerships 
 
7.2.1. Improving transparency 
 
To mitigate the transparency deficit surrounding data-driven research 
partnerships and ensure it fully discharges its obligations to respect and protect the 
right to health, the UK government should consider developing a comprehensive 
database of data-driven research partnership agreements, akin to the use of clinical 
trials databases in the pharmaceutical sector. This database could be compiled and 
updated by a centralised body like NHSX- the recently-established NHS unit tasked 
with driving digital transformation in the health service- which should be given 
powers to regularly review their progress towards advancing the right to health.  
However, my analysis of the political economy of DeepMind-NHS highlighted 
how commercial confidentiality laws prevented the disclosure of many of the financial 
details of the partnership. This is problematic as this kind of information is critical to 
assessing the true value and distributive effects of data-driven research 
collaborations and their implications for the right to health. Commercial secrecy may 
therefore pose a more persistent barrier to effective state oversight and thus to the 
                                               




fulfilment of the UK government’s right to health obligations under international 
human rights law. This supports the view that “states have a duty to develop reliable 
and publicly accountable information systems” and reinforces human rights scholars’ 
calls to reframe access to data about health research as an integral component of 
the right to health.749 
 
7.2.2. Strengthening administrative accountability mechanisms  
7.2.2.1. Right to health accountability mechanisms 
 
The UK government could further improve right to health accountability in 
data-driven research partnerships by strengthening accountability mechanisms in 
this context. An accountability mechanism is “the procedure through which 
government is answerable for its acts or omissions in relation to right to health 
obligations”.750 Accountability relies on the establishment of accessible, transparent 
and effective accountability mechanisms.751 There are broadly five types of 
accountability mechanism; judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, political and 
social.752  
Judicial accountability mechanisms for the right to health exist at national and 
regional levels. The right to health is justiciable in approximately 40% of States 
worldwide.753 Furthermore, all three regional human rights courts provide judicial 
accountability for the right to health; the European and Inter-American Courts of 
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Human Rights have been particularly active in this area.754 Some countries with a 
justiciable right to health- such as Colombia- risk undermining health system equity 
and diverting resources away from those in need due to a high volume of health 
rights litigation.755 As such, right to health scholars have highlighted the need for 
adjudication of the right to health to focus on systemic inequities as opposed to 
individual rights claims.756  
Accountability can also be enforced through both specific and non-specific 
quasi-judicial mechanisms. At the national level, National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) are independent bodies established with the specific mandate of advancing 
and defending human rights, ranging from human rights commissions to human 
rights ombudsmen and public defenders.757 However, only a small minority of the 
100 existing NHRIs in the world actively engage in work on economic, social and 
cultural rights- fewer still on the right to health- and most lack the necessary legal 
mandate to effectively enforce accountability.758 General national quasi-judicial 
mechanisms include patients’ rights commissions or tribunals, healthcare 
commissions, and health complaints tribunals, autonomous bodies with varying 
powers and mandates.759  
At the international level, both United Nations Committee Treaty Bodies and 
Special Procedures provide quasi-judicial right to health accountability. The CESCR 
is the main treaty body responsible for enforcing the right to health, which requires 
states to submit regular reports documenting their progress in implementing the right 
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to health to which the Committee responds by making recommendations. Quasi-
judicial accountability is further operationalised by the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Health, who is mandated to undertake missions, investigate human rights 
allegations and report periodically to the UN Human Rights Council and the General 
Assembly on right to health issues.760  
Administrative right to health accountability necessitates the monitoring and 
evaluation of health administrative management and the establishment of 
administrative procedures through which individuals can bring complaints.761 These 
might take the form of general administrative mechanisms, which operate at the 
hierarchical and horizontal levels, and supervisory bodies dealing with specific 
issues.762 The complexities of administrative systems can result in multiple 
governmental entities having overlapping responsibilities, meaning governmental 
bodies at the highest level must demand accountability from other organs and non-
governmental actors.763 Furthermore, administrative accountability mechanisms 
require transparency around budgets, regulations and targets to facilitate the 
assessment of progressive realisation of the right to health.764  
 Political right to health accountability mechanisms include parliamentary 
committee review, democratically elected health councils and commissions, and free 
and fair elections.765 As they depend on a democratic political framework, they vary 
from country to country.766 Parliamentary committees conduct enquiries into specific 
policy issues, proposed legislation or government activities.767 Health councils are 
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statutory bodies with variable powers, which may include the ability to enforce the 
accountability of health professionals.768 Finally, free and fair elections can be an 
important retrospective political accountability mechanism, enabling the public to 
remove policy-makers from office when they fail to implement electoral promises.769  
 Social accountability mechanisms for the right to health rely on citizen action; 
they include social mobilisation, civil society movements, and the use of media to 
hold governments to account.770 Although they are generally considered weaker than 
other mechanisms as they lack direct enforcement, social accountability 
mechanisms have a critical role to play where other forms of accountability are weak, 
where they can act as quasi-official agents or strengthen other forms of 
accountability.771  
 
7.2.2.2. The relative weakness of right to health accountability 
mechanisms 
 
DeepMind-NHS highlighted the importance placed on the right to privacy in 
data-driven research partnerships and the effectiveness of relevant accountability 
mechanisms in monitoring, reviewing and remedying violations of the right to privacy 
in the UK. The investigative work of Hal Hodson played a critical role in exposing the 
controversies associated with the Royal Free deal, generating a wealth of public and 
civil society interest in the collaboration and its privacy breach. This further catalysed 
the Information Commissioner’s Office’s investigation of the partnership, its ruling 
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that the Royal Free had breached the Data Protection Act 1998, and its request that 
the trust take remedial action. Other relevant bodies such as the National Data 
Guardian subsequently made significant efforts to strengthen privacy in health data 
governance.772 The DeepMind-NHS case even drew attention at the international 
level from the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age.773 
Together, these developments demonstrate the relative strength of the accountability 
architecture for the right to privacy in the UK, which includes well-developed and 
interdependent accountability mechanisms. 
By comparison to the right to privacy, accountability mechanisms for the right 
to health in this context are weak. The media can play an important role in holding 
governments accountable for the right to health, as demonstrated by the impact of 
the South African media’s reporting and mobilisation of the public in the Minister of 
Health vs. Treatment Action Campaign case.774 However, the media reports 
surrounding the DeepMind-NHS partnership focused predominantly on the privacy 
and data protection breaches associated with the Royal Free scandal and 
DeepMind’s close connections to Google.775 Furthermore, privacy-focused civil 
society organisations like MedConfidential and Open Rights Group were vocal in 
their scrutiny of the DeepMind-NHS collaboration; organisations explicitly concerned 
with the human right to health, by contrast, were absent from the debate. This lack of 
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social accountability reflects the lack of public awareness and political support for the 
right to health in the UK.776  
Political accountability mechanisms also fail to provide accountability for the 
right to health in data-driven research partnerships. The Joint Committee on Human 
Rights (JCHR) is yet to address the issues raised by data governance and new 
technologies for socio-economic rights and other relevant parliamentary committees- 
such as the Health and Social Care Committee and the AI Select Committee- have 
not explicitly recognised the right to health in their work. Quasi-judicial mechanisms 
also predominantly fail to address the implications of data-driven technologies for the 
right to health; though the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)- Great 
Britain’s statutory, independent national human rights institution- does report on the 
right to health, it has only addressed issues relating to data and data-driven 
technologies in the context of the right to privacy.777 Furthermore, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health is yet to give sustained attention to data-driven 
innovation or AI. Judicial accountability for the right to health is also weak in the UK, 
as the right to health is excluded from the Human Rights Act 1998 and is thus not 
justiciable in UK courts. 
The DeepMind-NHS collaboration also revealed the inadequacies of 
administrative right to health accountability mechanisms in the UK. Prior to the 
establishment of NHSX in April 2019, data-driven research partnerships were only 
subject to administrative scrutiny in relation to data protection, research ethics and 
health outcomes, to the exclusion of broader human rights concerns. This is 
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reflected in the due diligence procedures surrounding the partnership, which did not 
include a human rights impact assessment. This is problematic not only for the UK 
government’s accountability for the right to health but also its duty to protect the right 
to health under the Guiding Principles, which encourage states to ensure that 
commercial actors implement human rights due diligence procedures.778 
This relative weakness of right to health accountability mechanisms in data-
driven research partnerships reflects the concerns of right to health scholars that 
socioeconomic rights like the right to health have been relatively marginalised in the 
UK.779 It further provides evidence for the continued neglect of the broader socio-
economic impacts of emerging technologies and associated data practices by 
comparison to the direct risks they pose to values like privacy.780 In light of my 
findings that data-driven research partnerships may infringe upon the right to health, 
this points to the urgent need to strengthen relevant accountability mechanisms.  
 
7.2.2.3. Strengthening administrative mechanisms 
 
There are a number of opportunities to strengthen right to health 
accountability in data-driven research partnerships in the UK. Unlike other quasi-
judicial mechanisms, the CESCR has made significant progress in addressing the 
connections between emerging technologies and socio-economic rights like the right 
to health; General Comment 25 obligates states to “adopt policies and measures that 
expand the benefits of these new technologies while at the same time reducing their 
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risks” and highlights the importance of regulating the ownership and control of data 
in accordance with human rights principles.781 Further to this, the Committee will 
continually monitor the impact of emerging technologies on socio-economic rights 
like the right to health.782 This suggests that quasi-judicial mechanisms may have an 
increasingly important role to play in socioeconomic rights accountability in 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS.  
In the UK, a number of relevant administrative mechanisms have also recently 
been established, notably NHSX. The new joint NHS unit for data-driven innovation 
has an expansive mandate, including setting national policy for NHS data-sharing, 
developing best practice guidelines and reforming NHS technology procurement.783 
Furthermore, the unit has committed to establishing a Centre of Expertise to “provide 
specialist commercial and legal advice to NHS organisations entering data 
agreements, develop standard contracts and guidance, and ensure that the 
advantages of scale in the NHS can deliver benefits for patients and the NHS”.784 
NHSX is thus set to play an important future role in enforcing new NHS data 
governance policies like the Department of Health’s Code of Conduct and guiding 
principles, providing much needed state oversight of the commercial aspects of data-
driven research collaborations and potentially strengthening right to health 
accountability in this context. Despite this, the body has no statutory powers, which 
will likely restrict its authority. 
The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, an independent advisory board 
mandated to investigate and advise the government on how to maximise the benefits 
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of the data-driven technologies in the UK, is another key development in this space. 
The Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation has expansive powers of monitoring and 
review, providing overview of and insight into opportunities and risks, reviewing 
existing regulatory and governance frameworks, and articulating best practice for the 
responsible use of data-driven technology.785 It thus affords an important opportunity 
to strengthen administrative accountability for the right to health in data-driven 
research. 
Another relevant development is the part government-funded Understanding 
Patient Data initiative, which is mandated “to support conversations with the public, 
patients and healthcare professionals about how health and care data is used”.786 
Though the initiative has not explicitly discussed the right to health, it indirectly 
enforces a key component of the right to health under the CESCR General Comment 
14 by facilitating public participation;787 this is significant given the importance of 
participatory systems to the protection and fulfilment of human rights in commercial 
data-driven health research.788  The potential of new administrative mechanisms 
reaffirms Hunt’s suggestion that administrative accountability may offer the best 
hope for advancing socio-economic rights in the UK.789  
These findings suggest that quasi-judicial and administrative bodies have an 
important role to play in right to health accountability in this area. The CESCR might 
consider developing more detailed, specific guidance with respect to the relationship 
between health data governance and innovation and right to health. Furthermore, to 
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strengthen general administrative mechanisms for right to health accountability, the 
UK government should provide support to relevant administrative bodies and 
encourage them to operationalise the right to health in their policies and 
procedures.790 
 
7.2.3. Implementing human rights due diligence in data-
driven research partnerships 
 
The UK government could further mitigate knowledge asymmetries in data-
driven research partnerships by implementing appropriate human rights due 
diligence processes. Both the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
and the CESCR’s General Comment 24 have emphasised the importance of states 
promoting the corporate duty to respect human rights in commercial transactions like 
public sector procurement, which may provide “unique opportunities to promote 
awareness of and respect for human rights by those enterprises, including through 
the terms of contracts, with due regard to States’ relevant obligations under national 
and international law”.791 Furthermore, CESCR’s General Comment 25 requires 
states to “establish a legal framework that imposes on non-State actors a duty of 
human rights due diligence, especially in the case of big technology companies...”.792 
Furthermore, under the proposed UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights, the 
state’s human rights due diligence obligations are set to be made mandatory.793 
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Implementing human rights due diligence procedures is also the responsibility of 
companies like Google Health, who have a duty to respect human rights under the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.794  
To mitigate the absence of human rights due diligence in DeepMind-NHS, the 
UK government should ensure that future data-driven research partnerships are 
preceded by a human rights impact assessment (HRIA). As specified in the Guiding 
Principles, impact assessment should be undertaken periodically throughout the 
lifecycle of the partnership and draw upon the knowledge of both human rights 
experts and relevant stakeholders and affected groups, who should be placed “front 
and centre” in the due diligence process.795 Technology companies should comply 
with these obligations, ensuring that findings from human rights impact assessments 
are communicated externally and integrated into company procedures and the 
process is repeated if further mergers and acquisitions take place.796 
This process could be further strengthened by moving beyond the Guiding 
Principles’ voluntarism to introduce mandatory human rights due diligence 
obligations for commercial actors like Google. This notion has gained traction in 
recent years- particularly in Europe- and may soon become reality under the 
proposed UN Treaty on business and human rights. At the national level, the French 
Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law of 2017 imposes mandatory human rights due 
diligence obligations on certain large companies, establishing civil liability for failure 
to comply.797 Furthermore, in April 2020, the EU announced a region-wide legislative 
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initiative to require companies in the EU to conduct human rights due diligence.798 
The draft Treaty on business and human rights also contains a mandatory due 
diligence requirement.799 This growing momentum behind compulsory human rights 
impact assessment, if applied to data-driven research partnerships, may lead to 
greater consideration of human rights in future collaborations of this kind.  
Despite this, even mandatory human rights due diligence can inadvertently 
facilitate corporate impunity for human rights violations depending on its scope, 
nature relationship to legal liability.800 As such, it is critical that the application of 
human rights impact assessments to data-driven research partnerships prevents 
harm through accountability for non-compliance, is accompanied by civil liability 
provisions that enable rights-holders to access remedies, and ensure strong 
transparency and reporting duties.801  
Oversight from an effective enforcement body is also critical. 802 In data-driven 
research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS, a relevant administrative body such as 
NHSX could fulfil this role. This demonstrates how strengthening administrative 
accountability mechanisms for the right to health, as I proposed in the proceeding 
section, could also aid in the implementation of impact assessments in this context, 
supporting the UK government’s duty to protect and Google’s duty to respect the 
right to health.  
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By revealing the potential impacts of data-driven research partnerships on the 
right to health, my research also highlights the critical need for impact assessment 
processes to cover all relevant human rights, not solely the right to privacy. This 
supports the views of the CESCR who, in General Comment 25, argue for the need 
for a holistic approach to emerging technology governance that considers all human 
rights.803 
Furthermore, this finding highlights the importance of the work of right to 
health scholars like Williams, who has developed the first health rights impact 
assessment framework specifically for AI projects.804 This framework moves beyond 
questions of privacy, ownership and security to consider a much wider range of 
issues relating to right to health principles and the impact of AI projects on the health 
system, including legal context, health services, goods and facilities, health 
workforce, health information systems, medical products, vaccines, and 
technologies, national financing and governance and leadership;805 it thus gives 
consideration to broader questions of political economy, satisfying Birchall’s calls for 
human rights due diligence processes to address the systemic causes of human 
rights infringements.806  The UK government should therefore ensure that human 
rights impact assessment for data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS 
draw upon Williams’ framework, ensuring that due diligence processes for data-
driven research partnerships equally as comprehensive and prevent violations of the 
right to health and all other relevant rights, including the right to privacy  
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7.2.4. Strengthening corporate right to health 
responsibilities 
 
7.2.4.1. Creating binding human rights obligations for commercial actors 
 
My findings in the previous chapter suggest there is much the UK government 
could do to strengthen oversight of data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-
NHS and realise its right to health obligations in this context; these include compiling 
a centralised, publicly-available database of existing data-driven health research 
partnerships and their details, supporting new administrative bodies like NHSX to 
operationalise the right to health in their work, and requiring human rights due 
diligence of technology companies in data-driven research collaborations. Existing 
shortcomings in the UK government’s approach thus give weight to Van Ho’s 
argument that the enforcement of existing state human rights obligations is critical to 
mitigating the corporate human rights accountability deficit.807  
However, the previous chapter highlighted more fundamental barriers to the 
UK government holding companies like Google accountable for their human rights 
responsibilities, which point to the limitations of this state-centric model. Google’s 
significant influence over policymaking and regulation, supranational operations and 
complex organisational structure, and disregard for regulatory efforts- including the 
Guiding Principles- all pose substantial challenges to states’ ability to hold it 
accountable, highlighting how technology companies increasingly exercise power 
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over institutions and knowledge in ways that impact the realisation of human rights 
yet bypass existing regulatory frameworks. This suggests that efforts to persist with 
the Guiding Principles’ state-centrism- as the proposed UN Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights does- may be of limited impact in addressing technology companies’ 
human rights infringements.  
This reinforces calls for the UN to consider the possibility of direct, legally-
binding human rights obligations for commercial actors.808 Numerous human rights 
scholars have argued for the potential benefits of adopting this approach;809 Bilchitz, 
for example, proffers four justifications for legally-binding corporate obligations, 
including recognition of the normative position that rights impose legally-binding 
obligations on businesses, aligning existing law with this normative position, 
providing legal remedies where states cannot be held culpable and where states fail 
to comply with their ‘duty to protect’ obligations.810 In partnerships like DeepMind-
NHS, therefore, where the UK government failed to effectively discharge its duty to 
protect and Google shirked its non-binding responsibilities under the Guiding 
Principles, a legally-binding Treaty that places obligations on commercial actors 
could help to mitigate resulting knowledge asymmetries and lead to stronger 
protection of the right to health. 
However, the Treaty in its current draft form does not recognise direct, legally-
binding corporate human rights obligations, thus reinforcing the human rights state-
centrism that characterises the Guiding Principles. Furthermore, given previous 
failed attempts to implement legally-binding obligations on corporate actors under 
                                               
808 Wettstein (n676); Deva (n46).  
809 Wettstein (n676); Deva (n46); Andrés Felipe López Latorre ‘In Defence of Direct Obligations for 
Businesses Under International Human Rights Law (2020) Business and Human Rights Journal 
5(51); Bilchitz (n681).  





the Norms on Business and Human Rights and resistance to the idea both within the 
BHR community and from companies themselves, the feasibility of introducing 
legally-binding obligations for commercial actors is limited. Furthermore, in light of 
Google’s systematic violations of other regulatory regimes, there is reason to doubt 
whether direct, legally-binding obligations would even prove effective in ensuring 
technology companies’ compliance with human rights. This draws attention to the 
need for further investigation into the relationship between the BHR movement- 
including existing and future corporate human rights instruments- and today’s most 
powerful and profitable corporate actors, Big Tech; with few exceptions, this 
relationship has been thus far neglected in the BHR field.811 
 
7.2.4.2. Beyond human rights minimalism 
 
The previous chapter argued that, even if Google did adhere to its human 
rights responsibilities under the Guiding Principles, the kinds of resource 
asymmetries arising from DeepMind-NHS- which act as a barrier to realisation of the 
right to health but do not amount to direct or egregious human rights violations- 
would fall outside of the Guiding Principles’ focus on the duty to respect human 
rights and therefore would not be prevented. If the right to health is to be advanced 
by technology companies through data-driven innovation- or by corporate actors in 
any context- there is an urgent need for the human rights movement to consider the 
enforcement of corporate human rights obligations that extend beyond this narrow 
legal and ethical focus on the obligation to ‘do no harm’. 
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At the theoretical level, efforts to do so must grapple with the challenging task 
of determining the scope and interaction of positive state and corporate obligations; 
Wettstein’s argument for a collaborative approach, which seeks to determine how 
business obligations can strengthen regulatory and public policies and contribute to 
the provision of goods and services, is thus a critical point of consideration.812 
Furthermore, human rights scholars have highlighted the importance of the 
capabilities of corporate actors in determining the extent of their positive 
obligations.813 With regards to Big Tech, this approach might help ensure that the 
bounteous financial rewards of digital market dominance are accompanied by 
corresponding duties to give back to the citizens and state institutions from which 
these companies profit and help to mitigate emerging power asymmetries between 
states, citizens, and the technology giants.  
These positive obligations may be operationalised through the current Treaty 
efforts; those stakeholders involved in the Treaty development process might thus 
consider the potential scope for the inclusion of positive corporate obligations. 
However, given the uniquely powerful position of Big Tech in the global economy, 
the UN might consider the potential for sector-specific obligations for technology 
companies. In this respect, human rights practitioners might consider ways of 
aligning efforts to promote positive corporate human rights obligations with current 
trends towards responsible research and innovation (RRI) and mission-oriented 
innovation in the global economy.814 Ramasastry has highlighted the potential utility 
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of providing incentives to stimulate corporate human rights fulfilment;815 framing 
good corporate governance and practices through the lens of human rights 
advancement may thus incentivise further corporate engagement in socially-
beneficial activities by strengthening their social license to operate. Developing a 
legal framework for positive human rights obligations could thus play a role in efforts 
to align public and private incentives in the global technology innovation economy.  
 
7.2.4.3. Public function obligations 
Even if the notion of expanding corporate human rights responsibilities 
beyond the duty to respect were not accepted, Google Health may be deemed to 
have positive human rights obligations under DeepMind-NHS if it qualifies as a 
public authority and is therefore subject to concomitant public function obligations. In 
his 2009 report to the Human Rights Council, Ruggie suggested that corporate 
obligations beyond the responsibility to respect “may be required when companies 
perform certain public functions”,816 though he provided no further clarity on what 
such responsibilities might entail. The notion of ‘public function’ has thus been 
subject to differing interpretations; Nolan and Taylor, for example, suggest that the 
term may apply “in a situation where... a company is exercising elements of 
governmental authority, or where it is acting under the instructions, direction or 
control of the State”,817 whereas the Institute for Human Rights and Business has 
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argued for greater consideration of “the scope and activities of a company and their 
effects”.818 
Taking forward this latter definition, the former Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Health- Professor Paul Hunt- sought to determine how such public function 
obligations might apply to pharmaceutical companies. Hunt and Lee argued that- 
given the indispensable role the pharmaceutical companies play in providing access 
to medicines and thus fulfilling the right to health- they should be subject to additional 
responsibilities beyond the duty to respect human rights.819 In 2008, in his report to 
the UN General Assembly, Hunt presented the Human Rights Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Companies in relation to Access to Medicines (hereafter the Human 
Rights Guidelines),820 which aimed to provide detailed guidance about the human 
rights obligations of pharmaceutical companies.  
The Human Rights Guidelines acknowledge that pharmaceutical companies 
can contribute to the realisation of the right to health in many ways, like ensuring 
access to medicines,821 and that pharmaceutical companies have a set of general 
human rights obligations, as well as more specific duties relating to issues like 
transparency, accountability, patents and pricing. While some of these obligations 
relate to the corporate responsibility to respect, others represent additional 
responsibilities to protect and fulfil the right to health; for example, responsibilities to 
ensure the affordability of medicines and promote neglected disease research may 
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fall under the duty to fulfil the right to health.822 The Human Rights Guidelines are a 
novel and bold effort to explicate public function obligations and to help shape 
corporate policies, and they have been praised by some for their specificity and 
innovation.823 However, they have also faced criticism for generating a number of 
‘grey areas’- in which the delineation between state and corporate obligations is 
unclear-824 for failing to establish direct legal obligations for pharmaceutical 
companies,825 and for inadequately addressing the fundamental tension between the 
social obligations of pharmaceutical companies in carrying out a ‘public function’ and 
their commercial obligations to maximise shareholder value.826  
Public function obligations have also been addressed indirectly in the CESCR 
General Comment 24, in which the Committee raise concerns that the affordability 
and quality of privatised services might be compromised in the pursuit of corporate 
profit-making, creating “new forms of socioeconomic segregation”.827 The Committee 
suggest that the state’s regulatory efforts could subject commercial actors to ‘public 
service obligations’, such as “universality of coverage and continuity of service, 
pricing policies, quality requirements, and user participation”,828 as well as 
prohibitions on the denial of access to affordable and adequate services, information 
and treatment.829 Furthermore, they acknowledge that particular forms of relationship 
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between states and corporations- including public contracts and the corporate 
exercise of governmental authority- should be distinguished from other forms of 
corporate activity. Van Ho suggests that General Comment 24 thus employs 
stronger language around privatisation than previous general comments.830  
There are two sets of criteria under which Google might be deemed a public 
authority under DeepMind-NHS: if the company is contracted or sanctioned by the 
UK state or if the effects of Google’s activities play a critical and determinative role in 
the realisation of the right to health. The DeepMind-NHS partnership is founded on a 
number of contractual agreements between DeepMind/Google Health and different 
NHS trusts, including a Memorandum of Understanding, a research collaboration 
agreement, and information sharing agreements. However, these forms of 
contractual agreement are not legally binding and differ substantially from the kinds 
of public contracts used in procurement; as such, whether they qualify under the 
authority rationale is questionable. However, the ISA between DeepMind and the 
Royal Free clearly defines the roles of DeepMind as ‘data processor’ and the Royal 
Free as ‘data controller’, implying an authoritative relationship between state and 
corporation.831 This is supported by the company’s assertion that “our partners are in 
full control of all patient data and we will only use patient data to help improve care, 
under their oversight and instructions”.832 This suggests some form of authoritative 
public-private relationship may be established through forms of contractual 
agreement that differ from traditional public procurement contracts, highlighting the 
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need for human rights practitioners to consider how novel forms of PPP may 
necessitate the imposition of public function obligations. 
However, the activity rationale provides a more conclusive justification for 
Google’s positive human rights obligations under DeepMind-NHS. This rationale has 
been theorized and operationalised in the context of the right to health by former 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Paul Hunt, who argued that 
pharmaceutical companies play an indispensable role in providing access to 
medicines and realising the right to health and thus qualify under the activity 
rationale for public function obligations.833 
My findings suggest that technology companies like Google are set to play an 
ever-more critical role in providing access to data-driven health technologies, which 
are increasingly indispensable to the provision of quality health care services. 
Furthermore, my findings illustrate how the effects of Google’s activities- such as 
their patent claims and pricing policies- have repercussions for resource availability 
and economic accessibility under the right to health. This suggests that technology 
companies like Google could qualify as public authorities under the activity rationale 
and may therefore be subject to additional right to health obligations under 
international human rights law.  
The exact nature and scope of Google Health’s public function obligations in 
the DeepMind-NHS partnership are unclear. However, given the close synergies 
between the pharmaceutical and data-driven technology sectors, the Human Rights 
Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies provide a useful blueprint.834 Three 
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components of these guidelines are particularly pertinent here: patents and pricing, 
transparency and accountability.  
The Guidelines state that “pharmaceutical companies should not seek to limit, 
diminish or compromise the ‘flexibilities’ and other features of the intellectual 
property regime that are designed to protect and promote access to existing 
medicines”,835 and that a pharmaceutical company “should consider all the 
arrangements at its disposal with a view to ensuring that its medicines are affordable 
to as many people as possible”.836 In the context of Google’s partnership with the 
NHS, these principles would require the company to refrain from establishing 
exclusive patent rights over algorithmic technologies developed in collaboration with 
the public sector, to agree a cap on prices across the NHS, or to actively consider 
ways to facilitate financial accessibility through technology donation or financing 
programmes.  
Furthermore, the importance of transparency in facilitating access to 
medicines is continually emphasised throughout the Guidelines; Hunt recommends 
that companies agree to “standard formats for systematic disclosure of information 
and data bearing upon access to medicines”,837 including financial information- such 
as information relating to drug pricing, drug donation, patients treated, and tax 
benefits- and information about political activities like advocacy and lobbying. 
Applying these conditions to data-driven research partnerships implies that 
companies like Google should make commercial information relating to their patent 
applications, technology pricing, and political activities publicly available, further 
reinforcing to right to health case against commercial secrecy.838 
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 The Guidelines also obligate companies to establish an independent body to 
monitor disputes regarding information on access to medicines, develop a publicly 
available policy on access to medicines, and establish direct, board-level 
responsibility for access to medicines, as well as publishing an annual report to 
facilitate monitoring and accountability.839 Each company should also “encourage 
and facilitate multi-stakeholder engagement in the formulation of its policies, 
programmes, projects and other activities that bear upon access to medicines”.840 In 
the context of DeepMind-NHS, Google could integrate considerations around access 
to technologies into monitoring and review and policy and decision-making 
processes, as well as engaging more stakeholders in these processes.  
Though I have argued the case for technology companies having public 
service obligations in data-driven health research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS, 
the voluntary nature of the Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies calls into 
question the effectiveness of existing efforts to enforce public service obligations. My 
findings have pointed to the limitations of voluntary regulatory efforts in the face of 
shareholder interests; in this context, Hunt’s contention that companies should take 
reasonable steps to improve access to medicines “within a viable business model” 
casts doubt on the willingness and ability of commercial actors to enact public 
service obligations.841 This is supported by evidence that pharmaceutical companies 
have continued to engage in practices that infringe upon the right to health after the 
publication on the Human Rights Guidelines, including insufficiently differentiated 
prices within and between countries, lack of attention to neglected diseases, lack of 
disclosure of financial support from political candidates, inappropriate drug promotion 
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and problematic clinical trials.842 Thus, despite their voluntary nature, the Human 
Rights Guidelines failed to obtain support from industry; at a UN sponsored expert 
consultation on access to medicines and the right to health in 2010, none of the 
invited pharmaceutical companies participated.843 
This reinforces calls for stronger accountability for corporate actors carrying 
out public functions.844 Furthermore, the proliferation of novel forms of PPP in the 
field of health calls for human rights advocates to pay greater attention to public 




This chapter summarised my recommendations to advance the right to health 
through data-driven research partnerships. The first section of the chapter discussed 
ways to mitigate resource asymmetries in future data-driven research partnerships. 
Firstly, it explored the potential of alternative commercial data-driven innovation 
models, including profit, equity and IP sharing models. In light of their limitations in 
addressing questions of underlying political economy, it turned to the possible 
benefits of more radical data governance approaches such as data trusts, 
cooperatives and commons, which more fundamentally challenge the resource 
asymmetries associated with the political economy of data-driven innovation.  
 The second section of the chapter explored solutions to improve the 
distribution of knowledge in data-driven research partnerships. Firstly, it argued for 
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the need for a centralised, publicly-accessible database of data-driven research 
partnerships to improve transparency and facilitate monitoring and review. It then 
drew attention to the weakness of right to health accountability mechanisms in 
DeepMind-NHS, making the case for strengthening quasi-judicial and administrative 
mechanisms in this context. The following section argued for the need to strengthen 
human rights due diligence in data-driven research partnerships, ensuring that 
impact assessments are inclusive of the right to health. The final section reflected on 
the limitations of existing corporate right to health responsibilities, arguing that 
protecting the right to health in data-driven research partnerships requires binding 
corporate right to health obligations that extend beyond the duty to ‘do no harm’ and 
considering how the precedent of public function obligations may provide an 
opportunity to strengthen corporate right to health accountability in this context.  
 These recommendations attempt to address the underlying political economy 
of data-driven research partnerships and its detrimental impacts on the right to 
health, thus reflecting a vision of international human rights law that challenges the 
logics and institutions neoliberalism in the digital age. They therefore respond to 
human rights scholars’ calls to consider the broader political economic conditions 
under which the possibilities for the realisation of socioeconomic rights like the right 
to health are determined, reinforcing the centrality of questions of political economy 
in human rights.845 
 These recommendations also move beyond the protection of privacy in the 
governance of data and technology to consider ways to mitigate the broader, 
systemic impacts of data-driven innovation on health systems. In this respect, they 
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build upon the work of the small body of socioeconomic rights scholars who have 
sought to expand the conversation around the relationship between data, technology 
and human rights beyond the narrow range of civil and political rights that remain the 
predominant concern of policymakers in this area. In doing so, this chapter  
supports the view that “not only should digital health technologies ensure privacy, but 
they should be leveraged to advance the right to health in an equitable, non-




                                               




Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1. Research Aims 
 
This section summarises my findings in relation to my three research aims: a. 
To analyse the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS partnership, with a particular 
focus on the distribution of resources and knowledge; b. To explore the implications 
of the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS partnership for the right to health; c. 
To consider how future data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS can 
advance the right to health. 
 
8.1.1. The DeepMind-NHS case: implications for political 
economy 
 My in-depth analysis of the DeepMind-NHS case and its political-economic 
implications first assessed the promise of the partnership. I argued that the 
Memorandum of Understanding between DeepMind and the NHS, as well as public 
statements about the collaboration, suggested it would be mutually beneficial for 
both parties; proposed benefits to the NHS and its patients included improved 
efficiency of the healthcare system, better quality of care, and the development of 
new innovations in healthcare. This exemplifies how- much like other PPP models- 
data-driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS are justified on the basis that 
they deliver mutual benefits.847 I further argued that DeepMind’s blue-sky mission 
                                               




statement, leadership, public engagement work, development of an Independent 
Review Panel and engagement with CSR have created a public image of the 
company as a socially-conscious, publicly accountable research organisation 
motivated by societal benefit as opposed to commercial objectives. This image 
supports the view that PPPs can afford an opportunity for improved transparency 
and accountability in the delivery of public goods and services, highlighting how 
engagement with CSR and contributing towards the greater good has become a 
critical characteristic of technology corporations.848 
 Despite the promise of DeepMind-NHS, my analysis further revealed 
asymmetries in the distribution of resources between public and private sectors. The 
contractual agreements underlying DeepMind-NHS stated that the company would 
keep all IP developed through the collaboration. Thus, research partnerships like 
DeepMind-NHS risk facilitating the accumulation of IP- and with it entitlements to the 
scientific and commercial benefits of NHS patient data- in the hands of a few 
powerful technology companies like Google. 
The contractual agreements also shared a common feature; that clauses 
relating to payments and the costs of Google’s services were redacted, preventing 
the public from accessing information about the price of technologies developed 
under the partnership and the long-term costs of their use to the NHS. The lack of 
clarity surrounding pricing is problematic in light of Google’s exclusive rights to 
developed IP, as it risks corporate price-gouging- akin to that practiced in the 
pharmaceutical sector- which could restrict NHS trusts’ access to the innovations 
resulting from the collaboration. This highlights the existence of an ‘innovation lottery’ 
                                               





in the NHS, such that patients in the least financially viable NHS trusts are least 
likely to benefit from new data-driven technologies.849 This is further exacerbated by 
concomitant inequities in digital maturity between NHS trusts; as digital maturity is an 
important precondition to the development and implementation of data-driven 
technologies, this inequity risks generating new divides between data rich and data 
poor NHS trusts. These findings reveal how- where due consideration is not given to 
the broader health systems in which they are embedded- data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS may exacerbate health inequities, revealing how 
neoliberal reforms in the NHS- including fragmentation of the health system and the 
introduction of PPPs- have contributed to health inequities. 
Together, these resource asymmetries highlight how the short-term incentives 
of access to technology for free can overshadow consideration of the long-term costs 
and broader impacts of data-driven research partnerships for the NHS. They 
demonstrate how companies like Google adopt a ‘data extractivist’ business model 
to capture scientific and commercial value through PPP.850 My findings thus reveal 
the real resource trade-off necessitated by DeepMind-NHS; that underlying the 
rhetoric of mutual benefit is a partnership model that allocates the long-term scientific 
and commercial benefits- as well as the power to control access to their health 
applications- solely to Google. This trade-off demonstrates the vulnerabilities of the 
concept of value in data-driven research partnerships- which is both ambiguous in 
the context of health data and can be manipulated in PPPs to serve private interests- 
revealing political economic risks that extend far beyond privacy.851  
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Further to this, the DeepMind-NHS collaboration was only publicly announced 
after the original data transfer had taken place and was significantly more wide-
ranging and ambitious than any public announcements had disclosed. Public 
knowledge of the partnership therefore heavily relied on the investigative work of 
journalist Hal Hodson, who himself faced challenges in interpreting the information 
he gathered through FOI requests. Commercial confidentiality laws were a further 
barrier to transparency around the partnership, enabling the redaction of prices that 
prevented assessment of the value of DeepMind-NHS. Furthermore, some 
interviewees suggested this opacity is indicative of a broader lack of transparency 
surrounding commercial deals in the NHS, which are not routinely subject to public 
disclosure. Together, these findings highlight how DeepMind-NHS has suffered from 
a lack of transparency that not only covered up the original data transfer- enabling a 
serious breach of patient privacy- but also obscured important commercial details of 
the collaboration, preventing public appraisal of its long-term risks and benefits. 
My analysis further uncovered details of DeepMind’s relationship to Google, 
which troubled critics from the start. DeepMind remained secretive about the 
business model it intended to pursue through collaboration with the NHS and publicly 
distanced itself from Google, resulting in a lack of clarity around their relationship. 
Despite this, in November 2018, DeepMind Health was subsumed under Google 
Health, a move that led to the abandonment of the Independent Review Panel and 
was justified on the basis of commercial interests. The merger demonstrated how 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS can enable Big Tech’s stealthy expansion into 
health markets, affording them ever-greater power and influence over the future of 
healthcare.852 These concerns about Google’s encroachment on healthcare markets 
                                               




are further fueled by the company’s disregard for privacy norms; its business model 
of ‘surveillance capitalism’ and involvement in numerous privacy scandals- many of 
which fall within the bounds of legality despite their intrusiveness- demonstrate the 
limited means available to the public to hold Google to account. This lack of 
accountability is further evidenced by Google’s breaches of anti-trust and taxation 
laws. The company also occupies an increasingly prominent position in AI 
policymaking and research, which risks corporate bias in efforts to regulate the 
industry. These findings point to the expanding monopoly powers and lack of 
accountability of technology companies like Google and growing power asymmetries 
between commercial actors, the NHS and its patients.853  
Together, my findings reveal the knowledge trade-off underlying DeepMind-
NHS; that collaboration with a seemingly publicly-accountable and socially-
responsible technology company obscures the covert expansion of the monopoly 
powers of Big Tech. This trade-off implies that the potential benefits of technology 
companies’ engagement in socially-beneficial technological innovation in health may 
come at the cost of public accountability. It further points to the ‘toothlessness’ of 
voluntary corporate responsibility- which relies entirely on corporate good will- in the 
face of shareholder interests, highlighting the importance of remaining critical of the 
effectiveness of such initiatives and underscoring the need for robust accountability 
mechanisms.854  
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8.1.2. Resource asymmetries: implications for the right to 
health 
 
This chapter analyzed asymmetries in the distribution of resources in 
DeepMind-NHS through the lens of the right to health. Firstly, it argued that Google’s 
exclusive rights to any developed IP under DeepMind-NHS and the lack of clarity 
around future pricing may enable corporate price-gouging that restricts the 
accessibility and equitable provision of technologies developed under the 
collaboration, thus posing risks to the rights to health and science. This raises 
questions about the human rights responsibilities of and relationship between public 
health systems and commercial actors in facilitating access to technologies in data-
driven research partnerships. It further highlights how intellectual property systems 
pose a persistent challenge to the realization of the rights to health and science. 
The following section argued that the ‘data extractivist’ business model 
Google pursued through DeepMind-NHS draws attention to the increasing 
importance and value of health data as a public asset in the digital economy. As a 
result, I called for health data to be recognised as a resource to progressively realise 
the right to health under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR and considered some of the 
challenges this may present, including risks of data misuse that threaten the right to 
privacy. Framing health data as a resource to progressively realise the right to health 
under international human rights law reveals the ineffectiveness of DeepMind-NHS 
in leveraging the value of patient data to this effect, as all scientific, health and 
commercial benefits are allocated to Google. This suggests that this type of 




casting doubt on the effectiveness of PPPs as a means to maximise the state’s 
available resources.   
The final section suggested that the promise of DeepMind-NHS to deliver 
public benefits highlights the potential of data-driven research partnerships to 
advance the right to health. Despite this, the resource trade-off underlying 
DeepMind-NHS instead points to a right to health paradox; that the promise of 
collaborating with commercial actors to advance the right to health through data-
driven innovation may conversely present barriers to its effective realisation, This 
conclusion draws attention to the way that neoliberal policies- including the 
expansion of IP systems, the fragmentation of health systems, and the introduction 
of PPP governance models- generate a political economic reality that constrains the 
realization of the right to health, supporting Birchall’s view that economic violations 
by commercial actors pose substantial risks to the right to health.855 It further 
demonstrates how the distributive requirements of the right to health have evolved in 
the data economy, highlighting the need to reinterpret the international human rights 
framework in the context of the digital economy and for the UK government to 
consider alternative data governance models that mitigate digital divides and 
leverage the value of health data as a public asset. 
 
8.1.3. Knowledge asymmetries: implications for the right to 
health 
 
                                               




This chapter explored the implications of knowledge asymmetries in 
DeepMind-NHS for the right to health under international human rights law. The first 
section argued that the lack of transparency surrounding DeepMind-NHS acts as a 
barrier to the UK government’s ability to monitor and review the partnership and thus 
the restricts the state’s accountability for the right to health in this context.  
The second section highlighted how, despite DeepMind Health’s socially-
responsible and ethical behaviour- including establishing its own mechanisms for 
accountability and participation- these efforts fall short of the company’s right to 
health responsibilities under the Guiding Principles; neither DeepMind nor Google 
conducted a human rights impact assessment prior to establishing the partnership 
and any policy commitments to human rights are not adequately operationalised 
throughout the company. This highlights the distinction between CSR and corporate 
human rights responsibilities and supports the idea that technology companies 
should prioritise their legal responsibilities under international human rights law 
rather than viewing them as an adjunct to or component of their broader CSR 
agendas.856   
The final section argued that Google’s growing material and institutional 
power- as evidenced in the DeepMind-NHS partnership- poses a challenge to the 
Guiding Principles’ restrictive focus on ‘doing no harm’ and their non-binding nature, 
laying bare their limitations in realising the right to health in data-driven research 
partnerships. These limitations, I argue, give reason to question the underlying 
justifications of the Guiding Principles in the digital age, highlighting how companies 
exercise power in ways that fall beyond the scope of the existing framework of 
                                               




international human rights law.857 This calls for reconsideration of the scope and 
legal authority of corporate human rights obligations as they apply to Big Tech. 
 
8.1.4. Recommendations to help data-driven research 
partnerships advance the right to health 
 
In light of my analysis of the right to health implications of DeepMind-NHS, 
this chapter summarised my recommendations to advance the right to health through 
data-driven research partnerships. Firstly, I explored the potential of alternative 
commercial data-driven innovation models as a means of mitigating resource 
asymmetries in data-driven research partnerships. I considered the potential benefits 
of profit, equity and IP-sharing models, concluding that- while all three may 
potentially benefit the right to health- they also are limited in their capacity to address 
the underlying political economy of data-driven innovation. I thus considered the 
potential benefits of more radical data governance approaches including data trusts, 
cooperatives, and commons, arguing that these models may be more effective in 
challenging the resource asymmetries associated with the political economy of data-
driven research partnerships like DeepMind-NHS. 
The second section explored solutions to improve the distribution of 
knowledge in data-driven research partnerships. Firstly, it argued for the need for a 
centralised, publicly-accessible database of data-driven research partnerships to 
improve transparency and facilitate the state’s efforts to monitor and review the 
realisation of the right to health in data-driven innovation. Next, it drew attention to 
                                               




the weakness of right to health accountability mechanisms in DeepMind-NHS, 
arguing for the need to strengthen quasi-judicial and administrative mechanisms to 
realise the right to health in data-driven research partnerships. Subsequently, I made 
the case for strengthening human rights due diligence in data-driven research 
partnerships, ensuring that impact assessments are inclusive of right to health 
concerns. Finally, I reflected upon the limitations of existing corporate right to health 
responsibilities, arguing that protecting the right to health in data-driven research 
partnerships requires binding corporate right to health obligations that extend beyond 
the duty to ‘do no harm’ and exploring how the precedent of public function 
obligations may provide an opportunity to strengthen corporate right to health 
accountability in PPPs.  
By seeking to address the political economy of data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS, these recommendations reflect a vision of 
international human rights law that challenges the logics and institutions of 
neoliberalism, thus reinforcing the view that questions of political economy are 
intrinsic to the study and operationalisation of human rights.858 They also move 
beyond privacy concerns to consider ways to mitigate the broader, systemic impacts 
of data-driven research partnerships in health, thus building upon the work of 
socioeconomic rights scholars who have sought to open up the conversation around 
data, technology and human rights beyond the narrow range of civil and political 
rights that have predominated discussions in this area.859 
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8.2. Limitations  
 
My research findings are subject to limitations that must be acknowledged. 
The first relates to the generalisability of my findings, both to other data-driven 
research collaborations like DeepMind-NHS and to PPPs more generally. In recent 
years, the NHS has entered into a number of partnerships with Big Tech, most 
recently with Apple and Google to develop the government’s coronavirus contact-
tracing app.860 At the global level, these companies are also engaged in a multitude 
of data-driven research initiatives in health.861 
There are undoubtedly comparisons to be drawn between such partnerships 
and the DeepMind-NHS case. However, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff have highlighted 
the diversity of PPP purposes, structures and processes, which restrict the 
generalisability of any conclusions about PPPs in a particular setting.862 In drawing 
upon scholarship across studies of PPPs in multiple contexts, I have attempted to 
draw out the commonalities between PPP models and thus to improve the 
generalisability of my findings. However, I acknowledge the likelihood of significant 
differences between the DeepMind-NHS partnership and other data-driven research 
collaborations. Therefore, my findings should be interpreted as exemplifying some of 
risks that data-driven research poses to the right to health as opposed to providing a 
comprehensive overview or generalisable template of these implications.  
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Further to this, my research has been subject to a number of practical 
limitations. In particular, the collection of my interview data has been necessarily 
restricted by the time constraints of a doctoral thesis and by the willingness and 
ability of private sector actors to participate in research interviews. Though my 
nineteen semi-structured interviews have provided a rich source of information, they 
cannot solely paint a representative picture of the DeepMind-NHS case. For this 
reason, my interview findings are best considered as a supplementary and enriching 
adjunct to data gleaned from analysis of grey literature. 
My research has also been complicated by the unfolding of events in real-
time, meaning that major developments in the case- such as DeepMind Health’s 
merger under Google- played out during the course of my interviews and document 
analysis. As a result, there are inevitable inconsistencies across my documentary 
and interview sources, which complicated the analytical process. As best as 
possible, I have attempted to clearly contextualise my document analysis and 
interview data, such that particular references and quotes do not misrepresent the 
details of the case study or the views of particular authors and research participants.  
 
8.3. Recommendations for future research 
 
This thesis highlights a number of areas that warrant further enquiry by 
human rights scholars. IP regimes have serious implications for access to medicines 
under the right to health; however, the impact of these systems for the right to health 
in the area of algorithmic health technologies are yet to be fully explored. Given Big 




issues raised by PPPs in the pharmaceutical sector and the DeepMind-NHS case, 
this would be a fruitful area for future research. Furthermore, though I have argued 
for greater state recognition of the potential utility of their data resources as a means 
to advance socio-economic rights like the right to health, the ethical and practical 
issues I raised- including the ‘availability’ of data, the risks of data misuse, and the 
difficulties of measuring state compliance- all warrant further investigation. Here, I 
have also begun to explore the right to health implications of different commercial 
and data governance models, highlighting the potential utility of human rights 
discourse as a means of challenging distributive data injustices; as such, future 
research might explore these issues in greater depth or in different sectors, ensuring 
that socio-economic rights are on the political agenda in the area of data 
governance. 
My conclusions also highlighted how commercial confidentiality is an ongoing 
hindrance in efforts to realise the right to health, a topic that warrants further 
attention. Further to this, this thesis called into question the efficacy of both corporate 
human rights responsibilities and CSR efforts and the complex relationship between 
them; scholars might consider investigating the benefits and limitations of the 
Guiding Principles as they apply to increasingly powerful and influential corporate 
actors or their potential to compliment, strengthen or undermine existing governance 
and regulatory efforts in the technology and health sectors. 
I have also called into question the legitimacy of non-binding, minimal 
corporate human rights responsibilities in the digital age. Building on this, future 
research may thus further explore the limitations and benefits of the existing state-
centric, ‘do no harm’ model in the context of Big Tech and the potential impacts of 




my work highlighted the lack of clarity surrounding the concept of public function 
obligations in international human rights law. In light of the prevalence of PPP 
models around the globe in a diversity of forms, including data-driven research 
partnerships, there is an urgent need for the human rights community to give greater 
attention to this issue; future research might seek to clarify the situations in which 
such obligations apply- for example, what kind of contractual obligations qualify as 
establishing an ‘authoritative’ relationship- or to determine what such obligations 
might entail.  
 
8.4. Key Contributions  
 
8.4.1. Key contributions to international human rights law 
 
By utilising the legal framework of the right to health, my analysis expands the 
scope of human rights scholarship on commercial data-driven health research. To 
date, much of the scholarship surrounding commercial data-driven health research- 
both within and beyond the field of human rights- has focused predominantly on 
privacy. Though the CESCR and some right to science scholars had highlighted the 
relevance of the right to health in this context,863 socio-economic rights like the right 
to health remained underexplored in scholarly debate. Approaching the topic of data-
driven research from the standpoint of the right to health thus responds to calls for 
scholarship beyond the narrow set of issues that has thus far dominated the human 
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rights literature in this area,864 furthering efforts “to regulate the ownership and 
control of data according to human rights principles” in accordance with CESCR’s 
General Comment 25.865 
My findings also highlight how the distributive effects of data-driven research 
partnerships like DeepMind-NHS implicate the state obligation to provide equitable 
access to technologies under the right to health, vindicating the CESCR’s concerns 
that the involvement of commercial technology companies in the provision of 
algorithmic health technologies may compromise their financial accessibility and thus 
infringe upon the state’s duty to protect. This reinforces the critical importance of IP 
systems for the realisation of socio-economic rights and the interdependence of the 
rights to science and health in the context of scientific research.866 Furthermore, my 
work builds on the existing body of literature surrounding the MAR requirement 
under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,867 contextualising it in the data economy; it thus 
reinforces the need for an evolving conception of available resources and a renewed 
emphasis on their quality.  
My thesis further demonstrates the limitations of the state’s accountability and 
duty to protect the right to health in data-driven research, giving weight to scholars’ 
calls for access to information around health research and providing evidence of the 
relatively weak position of the right to health in the UK.868 It also draws comparisons 
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between CSR and the Guiding Principles, contributing to a greater understanding of 
their differences and highlighting the limitations of their voluntarism.869 Furthermore, 
by highlighting the limitations of the state-centric model of human rights law in the 
context of Big Tech and considering the case for positive human rights obligations 
for technology companies like Google, my thesis provides empirical evidence in 
support of normative and practical critiques of the Guiding Principles, thus 
contributing to the ongoing debate surrounding the nature and scope of corporate 
human rights obligations under the future Treaty on Business and Human Rights.870 
By elaborating on existing notions of public function obligations in international 
human rights law, it also builds upon Hunt’s rationale for and explication of public 
function obligations for commercial actors in the health sector, highlighting the need 
for further consideration of the application of human rights law to PPPs.871  
Historically, human rights approaches have avoided engaging with economic 
questions, leading some critics to claim that the human rights movement has either 
failed to challenge or even been complicit in the emergence and proliferation of the 
neoliberal economic order. 872 By directly addressing questions of political economy, 
the state-business nexus, and corporate power over human rights, my research 
builds upon the work of those human rights scholars who advance an alternative, 
constructive vision of human rights as a counterforce to neoliberal inequalities.873 In 
doing so, it makes an early contribution to the nascent field of human rights and 
political economy as a distinct field of enquiry within BHR.874 Furthermore, by 
reflecting upon the limitations of existing human rights instruments in countering 
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neoliberalism and considering opportunities to strengthen the legal system, my work 
reveals human rights themselves as a site of political struggle, reinforcing the critical 
need for a political economy approach as “a necessary revolution within 
contemporary practice”.875 
 
8.4.2. Key contributions to the political economy of PPPs 
 
My analysis of the political economy of the DeepMind-NHS collaboration 
indicated that DeepMind are set to disproportionately reap its benefits, casting doubt 
on the rationale underlying PPPs; that they are mutually beneficial to public and 
private sectors876. These findings contribute to the body of evidence that PPPs do 
not deliver tangible public benefits and calls for deeper interrogation of the claims 
surrounding PPP models.877 Furthermore, this thesis argued that the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership suffered from an accountability deficit, giving weight to political 
economists’ views that PPPs provide only limited opportunities for transparency and 
accountability.878  
My findings also highlight how data-driven research partnerships are a yet 
another iteration of the PPP paradigm, which- despite its diverse forms and contexts- 
are united by their underlying rationales and associated risks. The commonalities 
between the DeepMind-NHS partnership and previous PPP models highlight the 
politicisation of the partnership paradigm- which evolves to suit “the political need of 
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the moment”-879 and reveal the novel forms that PPPs inhabit in the data economy. 
This has ramifications for policymakers in the area of health data governance, who 
might acknowledge and learn from previous efforts to regulate PPP models.   
 
8.4.3. Key contributions to critical data studies 
 
By revealing the potential for data-driven research partnerships to generate 
distributive injustices, my thesis contributes to a growing body of scholarship around 
the political economy of health data in critical data studies, providing evidence of 
commercial practices of data rentiership and their inequitable consequences.880 
Furthermore, by exploring the nuances of conceptions of value and benefit in data-
driven health innovation,881 this thesis reveals the trade-offs underlying the 
DeepMind-NHS collaboration, reinforcing the need for these to be made 
transparent.882  
This thesis also gives weight to concerns about the growing power and 
political influence of Big Tech, exemplifying the process of the ‘Googlization’ of 
health in action.883 It thus brings further evidence to the body of critical literature 
documenting Google’s rise to power, expanding global monopoly, and expansion 
into healthcare markets.884 By critically evaluating DeepMind’s CSR efforts through 
the lens of human rights, my work further sheds light on the movement towards 
‘health data entrepreneurism’ in the health technology sector,885 highlighting the 
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need to remain sceptical of voluntary governance initiatives and to push for robust 
governance frameworks.886  
 
8.4.4. Interdisciplinary insights 
 
The interdisciplinarity of my research has also generated novel insights into 
the topic of data-driven research partnerships and the three disciplinary strands this 
thesis synergises. By drawing on the substantial body of political economic 
scholarship on PPPs to explore the implications of the DeepMind-NHS partnership 
for the right to health, my thesis highlights how the human rights community have not 
adequately addressed the PPP phenomenon, as evidenced by the obscurity and 
lack of enforcement surrounding the concept of public function obligations in 
international human right law. My work thus makes an early contribution to a human 
rights scholarship on PPPs, highlighting the need to give greater consideration to 
public function obligations and building on the work of right to health scholars who 
have sought to justify their application and define their scope in the health sector.887 
Furthermore, by revealing how the DeepMind-NHS collaboration allocates 
resources disproportionately to the private sector, my political economic analysis of 
the partnership called into question PPPs as an efficient and effective means of 
channelling available data resources towards the realisation of the right to health. 
This casts doubt upon the assumption that the state can make resources available 
for the advancement of socio-economic rights through private sector contributions 
like PPP.888 To date, the majority of scholarship surrounding MAR has focused on 
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financial resources and macroeconomic analysis of resource availability. By 
providing empirical analysis of the implications of PPP for MAR, my findings thus 
highlight the need for a parallel, more in-depth focus on the distributive effects of 
specific funding models for MAR and a potential role for political economic analysis 
in this context. This would provide greater nuance to discussions surrounding the 
role of the private sector in making resources available for the realisation of socio-
economic rights, helping to guide states’ policymaking efforts to this end.  
Furthermore, by contextualising my right to health analysis in the political 
economy of health data, my research contributes to a more dynamic understanding 
of the right to health in the digital age and the nature of so-called ‘postindustrial 
rights violations’.889 In particular, it draws attention to the potential benefits of data 
resources as a means of progressively realising socio-economic rights under Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR and the limitations of existing legal instruments enshrining state 
and corporate right to health obligations in the data economy. This demonstrates the 
utility of an interdisciplinary socio-legal approach in facilitating the continued 
evolution of the international human rights framework, highlight the need for the law 
to remain responsive to the technological, political and economic systems in which it 
operates.  
The framework of international human rights law also has much to offer the 
fields of political economy and critical data studies. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff have 
argued that PPPs can promote good governance values like human rights;890 in such 
cases, they suggest, “inclusion, equity, transparency, accountability and ethical 
behaviours become integral to the partnership functions”.891 My right to health 
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analysis suggest these values are not being realised in the DeepMind-NHS 
partnership; thus, by framing data-driven research through the lens of the right to 
health, my research advances understanding of the so-called ‘normative elements’ of 
PPPs, which have thus far been overshadowed by financial considerations.892 
Furthermore, by framing the inequitable economic and political consequences 
of data-driven research through the lens of the right to health, my research 
demonstrates how international human rights law- as a robust legal framework 
enshrining universally-applicable moral standards-893 can lend normative weight and 
legal authority to debates surrounding distributive data injustices and systemic power 
asymmetries. This implies the human rights framework may have an important role 
to play in policymaking efforts surrounding the governance and regulation of health 
data and data-driven research partnerships in and beyond the UK. My thesis thus 
contributes to efforts to centre civic values in data-driven research.894  
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